Biss 15

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Editorial comment

The annual meeting of the International Summer School on the Production of the Built Environment was held in 1993 in Roubaix.

The intention of the meeting was primarily to re-think the role and function of the international summer schools on the production of the built environment in the light of the rapidly changing social, political and intellectual situation in Europe and beyond.

In fact the meeting revealed significant divergences and rifts among participants and very little clear consensus upon how to go forward - in terms of research or effective ways to influence policy, events and social movements or indeed the practical organisation of the Biss itself.

Two further annual meetings were held, in London in 1994 and in Glasgow in 1995. Both were productive of good debates and valuable research contacts but it has become clear that the Biss as an organisation no longer has a core of active organisers with enough time and resources to operate the association on the old basis. A proposed 1996 meeting at METU in Ankara was cancelled because inadequate numbers booked to attend and no meeting was planned in 1997. It thus remains to be seen what Biss activities, if any, there may be in the future.

There continue, however, to be researchers, teachers and active citizens across the world who remain committed to the power of a materialist analysis in understanding the world - though this work become ever more challenging as social relations under a near-ubiquitous capitalism are complicated by the interplay of resurgent national, ethnic and religious identities - identities which have a material force in shaping societies and the built environment, and in shaping social movements.

Another layer of difficulty is that many of those involved find themselves in worsening material conditions to pursue this work and to find the time and money to organise and attend international meetings.

In the circumstances the Biss has effectively become a "virtual" organisation, with individuals communicating electronically in the development of their work. Those wishing to find out what is going on, or to join in, should email to one of the following:
m.edwards@ucl.ac.uk
j.charley@strath.ac.uk
deak@usp.br
and a web address - see title page.

A number of the strands of work which the Biss has developed over the years continue to be discussed in international gatherings and interested people may wish to contact one or both of the following:
INURA International Network for Urban Research and Action, c/o Richard Wolff, Nordstrasse 151, CH8037 Zürich, Switzerland, http://www.inura.org
CLR European Institute for Construction Labour Research, c/o Jan Cremers, EFBWW, rue Royale 95, 1000 Brussels, Belgium.

This volume contains the papers presented at the Roubaix meeting. The papers are printed now because it may be better for readers to have them late than never and because many of them actually read well today.

In some respects the papers constitute an archive document, a snapshot of thinking at a very particular moment. The boom associated with neo-liberalism was showing its fragility in western Europe while the same ideas were making their triumphalist advance through central and eastern Europe and elsewhere. The injuries and inefficiencies of uneven development were spreading across the face of cities, regions and continents with a new force and speed – with profound consequences for the quality and quantity of production of the built environment, for those working in this production field.

As the historian Eric Hobsbawm wrote in the following year, "We do not know where we are going. We only know that history has brought us to this point…and why. However, one thing is plain. If humanity is to have a recognisable future, it cannot be by prolonging the past or the present. If we try to build the third millennium on that basis we shall fail. And the price of failure, that is to say, the alternative to a changed society, is darkness." *The Age of Extremes: the short twentieth century 1914-91*, London 1994, p 585.

Michael Edwards, Simona Florio,
London, 1997

Shift from labour to financial capital and its impacts on the production of the built environment: some philosophical considerations

Martin Schwartz

Introduction

The traditional Marxian conflict counterposes labour, or the working class, to capital (and not to the class of the capitalists).

The concept of labour has recently been merged with that of variable capital. Thus, the dialectical and antagonistic conflict comes to be seen as one between capital and variable capital.

This paper deals with following questions:

* does the use of the words "financial capital" help elucidate the problems surrounding today's ideological struggle between labour and capital ?

* has there really been a shift of emphasis and / or importance from labour to financial capital ?

* what is the significance of this shift for the production of the built environment?

In this respect, the traditional antagonism between the working class and capital, has not changed significantly since the industrial revolution. So, is there any meaning in introducing a new conflict (between the working class and financial capital) into the discourse?

I think there is. In fact, the traditional conflict, between labour and capital implied a conflict between employers and employees. Nowadays, however, financial capital has acquired an overwhelming importance and pushed both employees and employers into a subordinate position.

This specific aspect leads us to consider some questions raised by the Hegelian analysis as Hegel dealt with exactly this type of problem in his philosophical research.

The shift of emphasis from labour to variable capital is important because, today, financial capital increasingly rules work and the relationship between employers and employees whereas, under the post-war social democratic system, the employer/employee relationship was ruled primarily by state regulations. This traditional pattern of social redistribution of national incomes resulted in a convergence between the labour force and state structures. Thus, the conflict between the working class and capital has, today, also been transformed into a fundamental antagonism between state regulations, which can be seen as (and are) institutions protective of labour , and capital.

Thus, the shift of emphasis from labour/capital to labour/finance capital implies a shift of importance from the state towards private power structures or, in other words, a shift from democracy towards plutocracy.

Theoretical background of the analysis

This paper does not intend to be an economic and/or scientific analysis of the above relationships. This contribution, it should be said from the start, is a political expression of an ideological and ethical response to the monetarist attack against labour.

I intend to analyse recent political trends focusing on Thatcherism and its ideological, economic and social implications. The rather “hot” discussion which follows is centred on the role of the state. The analysis refers mainly to the philosophy of Hegel because it seems to me that only the Hegelian dialectic and its philosophical tradition can provide the necessary explanations.

Of course, Marx and Engels are important and, although their misconception of the state weakens their (dialectical) approach, they remain in the centre of the discussion.

However, the Hegelian Lenin, and his philosophical notebooks in particular, are much more “workable”. Unfortunately, a serious examination of his theory is beyond the scope of the present contribution.

Max Weber is constantly quoted and referred to. His work brings some insights but few explanations. It can also be extremely tedious

The Hegelian rational State

Hundreds of books and thousands of pages have been devoted to this theme. Many inanities have been written. In particular, Francis Fukuyama, the American record holder in this respect, in his *End of history and the last man* shows poor understanding of the subject.

Hegel introduced his *rational state* in the *Philosophy of Law* in 1817

A philosophical movement with many followers criticised this work on the grounds that Hegel's *rational state* was intended as a strong apology for the Prussian state. However, that view has now been discredited. Shlomo Avineri, one the new members of the editing committee of the *"MEGA"* and a profound Hegelian philosopher, has shown how this movement's interpretation was mistaken.

At the other extreme, Marxists view Hegel's work as a proto-theory for class struggles, revolution and communism. In fact, Hegel was not opposed to such extreme answers. Not even Marx spoke of bourgeois society, and its prospects, using such harsh words as Hegel's. Moreover, Hegel's pessimism about the future – or rather the lack of future – of bourgeois society surpassed Marx's. However, some authors, such as McGregor (a Trotskyist philosopher), place excessive emphasis on Hegel's class theory (which existed only to a very limited extent).

Avineri, Dieter Henrich (who can be considered as the main specialist on Hegel) and, to a certain extent, McGregor himself, eventually reached non-Marxian conclusions. They did not share the Marxian belief that the development of the capitalist economy could, roughly speaking, automatically cause labour to integrate into capitalism through (labour's) collective ownership of the means of production.

According to the Marxist school of thought, the transition from private to collective ownership was to result from the rise of the working class. It was expected, first, to raise its self-consciousness and then organise a revolutionary take-over of the means of production. The Hegelian approach is similar to the Marxian one but does not pose as many conditions

Hegel, does not draw a sharp distinction between the working and the capitalist class. Like all Hegelian classes, these two share the same level of consciousness. Hegel acknowledges the marked antagonism between the working class and capital (rather than the capitalists, as argued by Marx) but maintains that labour shares the same fate as the members of the capitalist class. Although Marx never opposed this view, he disagreed with Hegel's implicit belief that labour could not develop into a distinct and autonomous class.

The ability of the working class to play a historical role is not the central issue. Probably, nobody emphasised the historical and universal role of labour as much as Hegel. Whilst he recognised the conflict between capital and labour, Hegel did not introduce a dialectical division between these two antagonists. The Hegelian solution to the problems posed by the conflict, was not the simple abolition of one of the two classes, but the subordination (*Aufhebung)* of the functions of one of the classes to those of the other.

Perhaps Marx did not give enough consideration to the consequences that the revolutionary process would have on the working class itself. Although a revolution would inevitably induce profound transformations, Marx seemed to overlook the inevitable transitional stage between a phase of conflict between capital and labour and a period in which classes would no longer exist. If Marx did think of this intermediary stage, he did not attach great importance to it.

Apparently, Hegel did not believe in the *exclusive* historical role of the working class and today, this position seems rather convincing. The sharp antagonism within bourgeois society cannot be explained by the different roles played by the two classes, but by the dialectical link between these two groups.

Marx, Hegel (and many others) agree that capitalism is a parasitic structure which destroys people and labour. In addition, they both agree that what has later become known as the "primitive accumulation of capital" also includes important elements of liberation. However, although Marx did not seem to be aware of this, Hegel proposed a solution based on the antagonisms *between capitalism and the "concrete universal", that is between capitalism and the whole of bourgeois society including the state.* Unlike Marx, Hegel did not simply base his solution on the internal antagonism between capitalism and labour.

"Wie die bürgerliche Gesellschaft der Kampfplatz des individuellen Privatinteresses

Aller gegen Alle ist, so hat hier der Konflikt desselben gegen die gemeinschaftlichen besonderen Angelegenheiten, und dieser zusammen mit jenem gegen die höheren Gesichtspunkte und Anordnungen des Staats, seinen Sitz."

Generally, this extremely important passage is not translated accurately because the translators themselves conflate the *conflicts between private interests and private interests themselves*. Here, there is not only an opposition between different interests, but also oppositions within struggle itself – within the state. Perhaps this text can only be translated adequately by splitting it up into different sentences:

"As civil society is the battlefield of private and individual interests of all against all, there is (in the organisation of the state) a conflict between this struggle and the particular matters of common interest. Further, here is the place of the conflict between these two conflicts and the higher considerations and the organisation of the state."

Thus, it is the state's role to mediate all interests. However, the state only perceives these interests as conflicts. Bourgeois society is reduced to a place of sheer conflict.

An initial study of Hegel's economics could fail to identify yet another (perhaps the most dangerous) conflict which exists within the Hegelian system: that between the bourgeoisie and the concrete universal: society as a whole and the state. A deeper study of the Hegelian system almost automatically leads to Hegel's solution: rather than focusing on a narrow sphere (the internal conflict between capitalism and labour) Hegel investigated all the possible conflicts within society as a whole.

A further reflection can better explain the contrast between Hegel's position and Marx's. In Marx, the state scarcely exists because, in his theory, the state and bourgeois society are virtual identities which cannot be in antagonism. To a large extent this is true, but Hegel, in this respect, is more precise. The Hegelian system sees the state and the classes ('estates') as distinct entities, civil servants as playing distinct roles and the state having its own existence. In addition, in Hegel's system, individuals exist only through a collective consciousness which is embodied in the state (since the state is the "most" universal social body).

Hegel's conception is a logical conclusion of his reasoning. In Marx, bourgeois society represents the destruction of mankind and has to be abolished. In Hegel, the same society has to be tamed. But – and it should be emphasised as great merit in Marx – both are reluctant to make a complete, utopian, picture of the future society. Marx is the advocate of the complete change, revolution, Hegel of the enforcement of ethics through the rational state. Here the work of both stopped.

It thus seems useless to try to imagine the detailed functioning of the future society and its economic framework. There are a lot of possible solutions. The important point is the principle: Marx advocated the disappearance of the state. Hegel its development. Both are completely opposed to actually existing capitalism, and that is the main issue.

Lenin was puzzled by Hegel. His conclusions about colonisation, development of ideological needs, the state and so on are very close to those of Hegel. Nevertheless, as leader of the Soviet Union, Lenin came close to a situation like that of Robespierre. But, like Robespierre, had he any choice ?

Is the social democratic post-war State identical to the Hegelian rational state?

At the end of World War II, the USA and Europe witnessed the emergence of a new type of state, along the lines adumbrated by people like Hilferding at the beginning of the century and, later on, by the Regulation School. This school, especially developed in France, considers (in some ways in accordance with the late Engels) that capitalism has almost unlimited means of adapting itself to all the challenges of a developing society and / or of developing new technologies.

This school is especially represented by Aglietta, whose books are deeply influenced by Hegel. The pattern identified by this school is characterised by powerful fordistic structures. The state plays a prevailing role as ruling machine – ruling mainly in favour of the working class, despite the periodic claims by anarchists and leftists to the contrary.

This is not the place to give an analyse of this type of state, which has been described by many other authors. My purpose here is simply to establish that, roughly speaking, this type of state is identical with or at least similar to

the Hegelian rational state: the corporations play a fundamental role, civil society is a basic part of the social basis-superstructure relation; in a way, this welfare state is quite cynical since it accepts the conflicts between all the egoism, and self interests.

This type of social democratic Hegelian rational state seemed to have only one limit, i.e. the limits imposed by the impossibility of endless development. The limitation seemed to be an ecological one but, this natural limitation apart, nothing seemed to allow us to imagine a dramatic end befalling this state.

The collapse of the social democratic state involved the breakdown of the actually-existing socialist states. It was just an incredible collapse of both systems, the social democratic one and the communist one.

It is very difficult to know the reasons for this break-down. Possibly, the political rulers who initiated the collapse of the social democratic and the socialist states considered that these structures were not an adequate response to the "objective" necessities of technological development. They were afraid of the risk of a certain backwardness or, at least, considered that a technological revolution was impossible in a social and political framework which recalled the Hegelian rational state.

Whatever the reasons, it was quite clear, by the beginning of the Seventies, that the capitalist state was ready to realise the technological revolution, *whatever the human and social price would be*.

Walter Ulbricht, in a speech delivered in 1971, already realised the danger: if the socialist and the communist states were not able to start and achieve a technological revolution, the capitalist states would overwhelm them.

It is therefore necessary to examine the phenomenon of the Thatcherist revolution.

Monetarism and the production of the built environment

The first question is not easy to answer : there is a quite obvious link between the destruction of the state structure, monetarism and the production of the built environment but which what element is the cause and which is the effect or consequence of one of both ?

As a matter of fact, a major part of the production of the built environment has, in post-war times, been devoted to social housing, mainly to municipal housing.

These mass dwellings of the post-war era were an important part of the Fordist political and social project. So also was the program of public education.

If capitalist society could dispense with a strong public educational system, one could seriously ask whether the same phenomenon could be related to mass social dwellings. While, on the one hand, the production of mass housing was under attack from Thatcherism, it seemed, on the other hand, not so easy to destroy the means for the production of mass social dwellings. The needs of the building industry (for a stabilised output) and the needs of industrial capital (for good workers' dwellings) prevented the total privatisation of the production of the built environment.

World-wide, all the countries which shifted towards monetarism saw drastic and dramatic cuts in the budgets for the production of mass dwellings. In the former Soviet Union and in the Eastern European countries this phenomenon developed like a caricature: privatised building factories were just dismantled and sold to Pakistan, India or Bangladesh. That the monetarist approach leads to a quasi automatic breakdown of the public production of the built environment no longer needs to be demonstrated. The reverse chain of causation seems less obvious.

Let's leave the question open and turn to the core of our problem. The main obsession of the Thatcherists can be summed up in one and only one slogan – "prime-location" – and the typical heroes of this new crusade were the brothers Reichmann, of Olympia and York.

The policy of this corporation was characteristic of the new conservative thinking crystallising around Margaret Thatcher. Only office buildings of top status, for leading international banking trusts, insurance companies, etc. were on the menu of products. No mass dwellings, no mass housing, only roofs and walls for the rich. The disintegration of the Olympia and York group did not curtail this trend at all. As always, the developers consider that only prestige buildings are of interest, even if their personal misfortune recalls the thirties with the Rockefeller Centre.

The powerful attraction exerted by Thatcherism on all sectors of business activity generalised what can be called the "Reichmann ideology", specific to the production for the built environment. This ideology mirrors the process of polarisation of society into two extremes, the very few "happy" ones and the growing "lumpenproletariat".

Where, in apparent contrast, there are some projects of rather major rehabilitation, as in Roubaix, there is the suspicion that the developers of these projects, and especially the municipalities, are acting on behalf of those who are more interested in maintaining or creating areas of good facades, in order to secure a nice built environment for offices and other prestigious buildings.

Hospitals and schools are considered as reminders of a lost paradise and the public facilities come to a state of total disintegration (most obviously in the former Soviet Union).

Aesthetics and ideology: the problems of the BISS

The BISS is a child of the sixties. Of course, there were many arguments. Of course the BISS was also a place of alternative and revolutionary contestation. But, some of its theoretical achievements – as was the case with Marx – became a part of the bourgeois scientific approach. For example, the statement that the production of the built environment is not only a technical, but primarily a social process, belongs now to the common scientific discourse. Volens nolens, the BISS became a part of a commonly shared scientific perspective.

The triumph of monetarism destroyed these scientific links. And the Thatcherists' ideology also disintegrated the educational system as a whole, weakening the university milieu, in which the BISS was grounded.

In itself, this phenomenon is a very trivial one. But, to a certain extent, the BISS integrated itself in the contemporary aesthetic discussions and evaluations. The Fordist industrialisation of architecture was of great interest for the BISS, even if this architecture was the expression of capitalist means of production. But, what can we do with flourishing individual "homes sweet homes" and what can we do with high-tech, or apparently high-tech, office building ?

Even if the failures and collapse of socialism only conceals the increasing difficulties and failures of capitalism, the rehabilitation of the social democratic/Fordist model doesn't seem of any relevance any more.

People are of course impressed by the fact that Latin-America, Africa and Central Asia are just dying and that the North is splitting up into a small plutocracy and a proletarian class with diminishing power and income, but this political phenomenon allows no coherent answer to the basic question.

In a way, the BISS was organically linked with the contemporary university and educational activity. Perhaps – and this will be the conclusion – the BISS was an excellent tool of analysis but not really a place where a social project was elaborated.

The monetarist disaster and the Thatcherist gangsterism appeared successful, if not triumphant. Have they a future ? Fortunately, the answer is rather negative. The social class supporting this destructive and hazardous enterprise is so small that, in Hegelian terms, it could hardly be expected to play a historical role.

For many reasons, traditional socialism failed. Wouldn't it be a fantastic goal for the BISS, to elaborate a new political, technical and scientific analysis of the recent events and foster an enthusiastic effort to propose a new architectural manifesto ?

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An attempt to explain the disintegration or decline of the State by means of two concrete examples, Great Britain and the USSR

Deregulation - privatisation - destatalization - monetarism and other such words/in vogue at the moment depict what has come to be known as Thatcherism , and is already a part of legend

Within the space of a few years Verso has published two works dealing with the phenomenon of Thatcherism. The first is by Stuart Hall *The Hard Road to Renewal*, London 1988, second edition 1990, the second deals with the same subject in the former USSR and is by Boris Kagarlitsky *Disintegration of the Monolith*, London 1992.

The former refers to Great Britain, where the adventure started in 1979. It is apparently

not yet over. The latter refers to the soviet experiment, begun in 1989.

The similarities are striking, above all at the ideological and philosophical level. The official language is the same, the socio-cultural background / foundation is similar and yet everything seems to separate these two nations.

In both cases and in Hegelian terms, the object of the enterprise of destruction is the *State*. We will come back this later.

Two hypotheses have been advanced in order to explain this phenomenon. In the first, the State had finished playing its part, its goal having been reached. In the second, the collapse of the military-industrial set-up would have brought about the State's disintegration / downfall / decline. What is most interesting to note is, that however objective these two theories may be, they are nevertheless directly linked to the philosophical aspects of the problem.

The critics of Thatcherism invariably join up together. Kagarlitsky merely recapitulated all that other critics have said and repeated.

> **"We need to build roads, to encourage the modernisation of production and, not least, its ecologization. We need an economy which allows us to produce more while polluting less and consuming fewer resources. We need to form local production organisations which use resources available locally and which provide work for people near their homes. All this is simply inconceivable without national, regional and local development programmes, relying on the socialised sector."**

But , however "simple minded" they seem – Margaret Thatcher, Egor Gaigar and the other economists surrounding Yeltsin – they have never submitted a programme / policy assigning to the State or to the economy one of the goals evoked by K Bien. On the contrary the constitutional discussions in Russia always stumbled because of the refusal of the monetarists to acknowledge that the State could have a social and programmatic aim. As for Margaret Thatcher, she has always especially criticised politicians who proposed the setting-up of an industrial policy. In her opinion, industry was part of the economy – i.e. of the civil community, a space removed from the State's hold. Neither Margaret Thatcher nor Yeltsin are bothered about people's welfare. Their incredible success, particularly the support of those political and social classes which had by no means benefited from their policies, is a pure product of their populism, but that is another question.

The composition of the ruling political class has apparently not changed. The "happy few" in 1993 are those who came to power after the Second World War. Indeed, Margaret Thatcher has discarded / set aside the statist-conservatives – who could to some degree be considered as British Gaullists. Reagan sabotaged the "social conservatives" movement in favour of the neo-conservatives. Even the former USSR has known an incredible stability. The neo-conservatives surrounding Yeltsin are not the former dissidents – who are now formed into a fierce opposition. It is banal to see the children in charge of a system line up on the side of the revolutionaries. In the case of Russia, it is a sad irony to see how the new regime has absorbed all the incompetence, parasitism and corruption of the old regime

Thus the attack against the State is by no means a move which the ruling party would have suddenly adopted ex nihilo But let's look back at a few historical elements / facts.

A:

The post-war period was marked by the need to rebuild and modernise the countries which had already entered an industrialisation period due to their armament requirements.

The "Twenty Glorious Years" (1950-1970) had above all assigned to the State a Hegelian function which moreover resembles what Hegel had himself experienced following the Napoleonic War. The Gaullist ideology was omnipresent, even in the United States of America. The State had to ensure the scientific and technical training of the indispensable staff capable of modernising production as well as financing industrial research and development. This phenomenon has been the preferred object of studies of the regulation school. It was a period during which British political theorists were seriously questioning themselves on the difference between a "left wing" and a "right wing" as Tory and Labour goals increasingly coincided.

If we exclude Japan and the four Far-Eastern dragons as well as communist China and North Korea, this model has been contested and disputed, even pulled to pieces (from 1979 at the latest).

B:

If one takes the paradigmatic case of Great Britain (and today Russia) the first target of the Thatcherist attack (monetarist in Russia) has been the *education system*. The famous "cuts" in university budgets have been the joy of English novelists, the victims of these cuts were generally not the 1968 "lefties" but instead the Tory-voting establishment. What an irony of history to see that the first victim of Russian monetarism is public education and moreover it is the most conservative and pro-Yeltsin strata who have had to bear the brunt of this whole adventure.

The privatisation of education is not inscribed in a development strategy of education, but in a demolition / destructive strategy for education. Great Britain, the United States and Russia are noticing a recrudescence of illiteracy as well as an enormous fall in the general level of education. It did not seem to matter much to the English monetarists because public education had supplied the job market with myriads of highly qualified people. And it is precisely this group which is suffering from the counterblow of unemployment.

The famous "head hunters" have been replaced by early retirement specialists, psychological consultants for higher / management staff on the dole and the exodus of brains is encouraged, as there is such a surplus of engineers, doctors and other highly trained people.

The State has stopped playing its role. An Indian engineer costs less than a Swiss one and because specialised man-power is not always mobile, one moves the administrative or scientific research headquarters to Bombay. Education is no longer a viable investment.

But , education occupies an essential place in the State's organisation and set-up, because it is this and only this, which can transmit culture. sustaining the Hegelian "Weltgeist".

The rest followed almost automatically: public health , social justice and job security have all been sacrificed as they were considered as "not very viable / profit earning", which is in effect what they are for the dominant ruling class.

C:

There is another factor which has paradoxically accelerated the disintegration and decline of the State: the advance of peace or more exactly demilitarisation.

It is necessary to look back into the past.

During the last years of the communist and capitalist blocks – ever since Andropov came to power – there was a marked change in Soviet politics, whose (growing) priority was disarmament.

The West following slowly behind, especially after Gorbatchev's assaults / attacks. But the demilitarisation which was to follow led to a demilitarisation of the whole national economy.[1]

Demilitarisation of the national economy creates ideal conditions for shrinking of the state. It is nevertheless true that the monetarist ideology occupied an important place in the political context well before the demilitarisation processes entered its decisive phase. It is clear that there is a link between these two phenomena, but there is no clear line of cause and effect.

[1] In thisconnection, please refer to Jacques Sapir *L'Economie mobilisé*, Editions la Découverte, Paris 1990

Biss: retrospect and prospect

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The purpose of this short paper is two-fold:

(i) for new participants, to provide some clues to what we have been doing in the international summer schools on the production of the built environment since 1979 when they began. Not everyone would agree with my emphasis or selection, and if alternative accounts are produced as a result, that will be very welcome.

(ii) for people who have been before, to offer some provocation both for debate and for renewal of our collective effort.

The paper is not referenced. It draws, effectively, on most of the papers ever presented and debated in the Biss meetings and the reader who wants to explore further should brows the past volumes of Proceedings or the cumulative index.[2]
The paper proceeds by…

- • flagging what seem to me to have been key issues, debates and approaches since 1979;
- • suggesting some successes and failures;
- • looking to the future in an attempt to foresee what we shall have to do next.

Issues, debates and approaches

When we first met in 1979 it was clear that a world was ending but I think we have all been taken by surprise at the speed of its ending.

Most of those active in the Biss have insisted on the centrality of **production** in the understanding of the built environment. Why exactly is this so important?

The material root of social life is human ability to produce to meet needs and the root of progress in better meeting needs is the capacity of human labour as social labour to produce more than is needed for simple reproduction of life. This surplus is what enables human societies to strengthen the forces of production - whether the ends are for material, psychological or cultural enjoyment.

One of the pernicious features of capitalism is that things are not as they seem: appearances distort the underlying reality. This is the case for commodity relations in general and work relations in particular. In the case of the built environment we have these vast **things** – streets, parks, subways, factories, shops, offices: systems of cities, towns and villages and networks of links. We grow up with them, we take them for granted. They seem almost "natural". But of course they are social products. They have been different, they could be different, certainly they should be different. What happens will be the product of human social action and is thus potentially subject to human will. The analysis of the production of the built environment in this spirit is a crucial part of de-mystifying it and thus a pre-condition for empowering ourselves to change the means by which it is produced, managed and used and the forms the built environment itself takes on.

Production analysis is also important as an antidote to so much emphasis on consumption, circulation, and market exchange generally. Of course circulation is important. Labour begets value, value then circulates in an appallingly obscure struggle. I think we sometimes forget just how much more indirect and obscure this struggle for value is now, compared with when Marx was writing. And I think the main thing that I have learned from our discussions of rent, credit and exchange, of class and gender, over 15 years has been the degree to which the valorisation of labour power in production is obscured and displaced by the related struggles over realisation and appropriation of that value. We also find that these struggles interlock with others which are not simply displacements of class struggle.

Value is created in the production of goods and services. The workers who produce it are paid a wage and this (seemingly free, but fundamentally un-free) exchange of labour power for wages leads to an initial distribution of value. But the worker lives many years as a child and a student first; and many years in

[2] The annual volumes of *Proceedings* are available in many libraries. Copies of some are still available for sale A cumulative index to contributions is at the end of this volume, or can be had on disc from London and soon, we hope, by down-loading via our World Wide Web page. (see back cover).

retirement, plus periods perhaps of ill-health, unemployment, full-time parenting. In all this period (s)he may or may not be able to enjoy some of the social product. The working period may only be half of life – with luck[3]. Many parts of lives, and some whole lives, are lived as members of the reserve army of labour which, under Capitalism, means people are playing a crucial function in maintaining the feasibility of accumulation and thus of continued capitalist society. The lifetime distribution of income, incomes of the unemployed, children, the sick and carers are thus key parts of the whole struggle over the social product. This is the more so since part of the population now seems to be surplus to the requirements of capitalism even as 'reserve army'.

The struggle for shares in the social product, is obscured because of the many ways value is appropriated and distributed. If a worker gains a wage increase it may be cancelled through general inflation, through increases in housing costs, through the interest paid on credit, and so on. Class relations remain, but become more and more obscured. Two examples:

(i) A recent study of why consumer goods cost more in the UK than in the USA has estimated that a substantial part of the difference comes from the substantially higher rents paid in the UK for shops offices and factories and these rents enter in to the final retail prices of production.

(ii) Many workers are also rentiers, with their savings and their pension funds invested (often largely out of their control) in capitalist enterprises of all kinds and in all locations, thus giving them a real material interest in the prosperity of capitalism – of capital, actually – in a diffused but a powerful way. As a prospective pensioner I have an interest in the rent paid by my supermarket to my pension fund, in the profit earned by my pension fund in factories in Malaysia and in mines in South Africa.

These two examples also illustrate something which the Biss has often stressed: that production processes have to be seen as a whole. We can only make sense of the supermarket (its design, its location, its environmental impact) by looking at the place it occupies in the whole production, circulation and realisation of value. This will involve looking at real estate, at relations among companies, between companies and investors and at relations with the state – as indispensable regulator and as the conduit which channels taxation into highway construction. One of the great strengths of discussions in Biss, at least for me, has been the interplay between production in a narrow sense (the building process) and in a totalising sense (the whole process of circulation and).[4]

No wonder that class consciousness becomes increasingly obscure and dilute. Where is clear and critical thinking to come from in the modern world with all these local and global interactions and all these confusions and mystifications at work?

It should be no surprise that class-consciousness – and especially the media reporting of it – should have been so smashed in recent years in Europe. It should also be no surprise that some of the other contradictions and miseries of modern societies should be much more prominent now than in the past – partly because they are so much more obvious and visible than class contradictions: resistance to pollution and environmental degradation, resistance to patriarchy, demands for freedom to travel and debate, demands to be free of a nuclear war threat. These are real and valid forms of social struggle against oppression. It should also be no surprise that many of the sufferings endemic in modern societies generate displaced rage and frustration – displacements into racism, addictions and madness. So, while it may be true that capitalism today (growing to fill the huge new clothes provided by the collapse of centrally planned societies) is driven and guided primarily by considerations of labour costs, production costs and markets, the prospects for resistance and change must depend on opposition to a much wider range of social phenomena than was the case under the relatively simple (though still mystified) conditions of mass proletarianisation.

[3] We all tend to say 'with luck' because, despite the miseries of many people's jobs, being without a job is usually more miserable psychologically and materially, at least for people of working age and being without income is unsustainable at any age.

[4] This paragraph added 1996 for completeness.

Success and failure

On these issues I think the BISS has successes and failures to report. It is a success that we have constantly emphasised…

• the centrality of labour confronting capital accumulation in society.

• the importance of wage forms and the labour process in illuminating labour relations, working conditions, the sustainability of forms of production and the quality of the product;

• the significance of value flows and struggles in shaping the built environment and shaping the division of labour between individuals, professions, firms and places in the process of planning, conception, design, production, circulation and use…

• …and in explaining how it is possible that many different forms of production organisation can coexist within an essentially capitalist mode of production: design techniques, building, materials and labour relations which appear to be entirely archaic – throwbacks to pre-factory conditions – can actually be explicable and even essential to the accumulation strategies of capital (and thus in a way thoroughly 'advanced) in conditions as diverse as Italy, England, Turkey and Brazil. Note also that we have shown how these mixtures can themselves be the source of fresh contradictions and forces for change. There is a logic of capital and of accumulation but it is always up against the people on whose labour it depends.

• There has been some success too in thinking more effectively about the state and its role in the regulation of labour, of land, of tenure and property ownership, indeed of the built environment as a whole. We have moved a long way from the rather arid discussions about the 'relative autonomy of the capitalist state' and towards a more diverse and accurate understanding of the levels and means by which there can be scope for individual and collective human action mediating and challenging pressures from capital.

• Finally, the Biss at its best has developed a way of working in which we have been very open to a vast range of kinds of people and types of analysis and experience and we have printed their work without too much scholarly oppressiveness.

On the other hand we must acknowledge some failures…

• sometimes a hostility, an unwillingness to listen long enough, to draw in to our debates people for whom the approach is a new one or whose work has an unrealised potential to contribute richly but who come to us trapped in confusions or approaches which are tangential or parallel to our own or different in scope. I would be pleased for example if we could be debating here with scholars like David Harvey and Doreen Massey – whose work is rich and powerful but would take time to absorb and for mutual influence to develop – and to be arguing with some of the greens whom I regard as a rich source of ideas for change.

• Praxis has always been a problem for the BISS. What do we do – beyond talking supportively and critically to each other? Many of us work in universities and probably spend too much time teaching in an archaic, intimate and considerate way, running the pedagogic equivalent of a family cafe, not Macdonalds or Ikea. Probably we should work harder at engaging in social struggles directly as intellectuals – as many of our Brazilian members do – and being more active in journalism, on television and in the 'high productivity' forms of teaching.[5]

So these are my criticisms of the BISS: sometimes a lack of welcome to outsiders, some failure to develop praxis.

The Future

What do we expect in the near future and the next future? What will be the task of Biss?

Clearly some more stages of global integration of capitalism are to come. But in what forms?

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[5] The foundation of INURA, the International Network for Urban Research and Action, partly as an out-growth from Biss, is a step in this direction. See Wolff, R, Hitz, H and Schmid, C, 1991, Proposal for the foundation of an international network for urban and regional research and action (INURA), *Proceedings*, **12**, 85-89

[5] I say 'amateur' because the contrast is so remarkable with post-1945. The ineptitude and incoherence of US and supra-national agencies towards the incorporation of the former communist countries is quite remarkable, especially compared with the earlier systematic and intelligent re-constitution of Western Europe and Japan.

My sense as a European is that we should expect a dramatic shrinking in Europe's' relative global importance as a base for production of many goods and services (though it will remain important as a base of ownership of capital).

I am much less optimistic than last year's Biss held in Brussels (hosted partly by the Commission) about whether the Social Chapter will be dominant within the EC for much longer. It seems to me that western Europe could fall between two stools as a production site – neither a really cheap location à la Thatcher nor a high-productivity, high wage location on the former German model. There are strong grounds for thinking that the USA will be resurgent with Reaganomics being proved more effective than Thatcherism. Although the USA will not for some time have wage levels which are low by world standards, its combination of vast domestic market and corporate monopoly power should counterbalance that problem and permit a lot more intensification of labour and impoverishment of Americans.

The neo-liberal orthodoxy will continue to lead within Europe, as within the USA, to increased unevenness of development, more social polarisation and divergence.

South East and East Asia seems to be in a long authoritarian boom. It is not clear to me whether Latin America or Africa could do the same: I don't know enough about them and undoubtedly others here others can comment. For the former Soviet Union we surely must expect absolute catastrophe: a combination of amateur[6] western imperialism picking the carcass alongside an absolute breakdown of the social organisation of production and of social life.

Returning to Western Europe, and returning to the built environment, what should we expect?

A fall in investment, as accumulation runs off to the east and elsewhere. Steady degradation of the stock of buildings and infrastructures in some regions and in parts of cities, and on the other hand some growth of luxury consumption areas and their infrastructures – the TGV, the airports, the suburbs, defended landscapes and so on.

Dissolution of wage forms of both blocks (East and West) and emergence of diverse kinds of relations of labour. Some of the old ones may survive but only in certain enclaves of society or sectors of production. Prospects for work life, for reproduction, for quality of product are very poor and falling for the majority, good and rising for a minority. The coexistence of forms of production which we see in São Paulo and Ankara may come to Roubaix, Paris and London too.

It has been very valuable finding out how important ideology can be as a material force in social change. For the future can it carry the load? For example, so many people in East Europe who thought they had bought some democracy (or at least been sold some democracy) actually are getting a crude form of bandit capitalism while the pre-cast concrete flats rot around them. How long will the rhetoric of democracy and 'freedom' permit this regime to survive? At the global scale it is not clear that the ideology of the Word Bank, the GATT and the IMF can hold the show together in the face of so many evident losers. At a local scale it is not clear that enough social order can be preserved to enable capital accumulation to proceed harmoniously outside of the most authoritarian regimes.

On the other hand a great diversity of cultures, regulatory regimes, landscapes and built environments presents a constant series of opportunities for production. The sheer mass of inherited labour embodied in actual places and their built environment, infrastructures, universities, hospitals, resorts – and the very diversity of these societies – will always be the basis for survival and development everywhere, however uneven that development is. And since the production of the built environment must always be substantially a local production, this will always be a branch of the economy everywhere. Even if the building arrives in containers from the far East, there is work to do in siting it, connecting it and maintaining the landscape.

I may be wrong, but I doubt it

But what are the theoretical issues? Alongside established priorities, are there any new ones?

Issues of consciousness. If we cannot be part of spreading a wider understanding of what is really happening, then all the remaining

enclaves of social innovation, socialism and social democracy will be gone and it may be decades or centuries before the essential madness and destructiveness of capitalism is rediscovered. Scientific analysis is only one part of the growth of consciousness – shared experience and solidarity the other – but it is very important.

I think there is also theoretical work to be done in further understanding the state and its potentialities. The state proliferates, from the World Bank, the GATT, the EU and UN at one extreme to the other extreme which in Britain takes the form of the Neighbourhood Watch: people in each locality keeping an eye on each other, at the behest of the police and at the insistence of their own anxiety, to prevent burglary and violence. Between these levels, with all the debates about protectionism and subsidiarity, lie a whole set of social institutions which are no rigid structure and do present opportunities for continuing regulation and collective action. With luck the rapid lurch to market relations in the former communist countries, will generate an intense demand to understand the relative merits of the regimes of regulation (meshing state and market) which we have experienced and studied in various parts of the world. The Biss offers a unique potential arena for collective learning in this sphere.

Clearly human society has the capacity to generate and maintain built environments of fabulous diversity and richness, to house populations well in sustainable settlements and to do the construction and maintenance in ways which yield rewarding and safe careers to the builders and others involved. This is not a theoretical statement: the theory is required to help explain why we are not in this promised land, and thus how we can move in that direction.

UK city centres in crisis: a review of some policy responses.

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Introduction: Roubaix - historic labour and historic locations

Roubaix finds itself – like many other sites of historic capital accumulation – uncertain of the next round. With strong connections in labour history but with only decades of decline to serve as recent experience, it confronts new rounds of capital accumulation with equanimity. Small towns at the heart of the new Europe face great threats. A greater European integration could see their cultural history as it is embodied in vestiges of previous built environments buried under tons of new fixed capital.

Alternatively opportunities are being found to maintain the visibility of the physical representation of previous social relations of production – new uses for old factories and warehouses, old transport systems, tools equipment and so on. This is old fixed capital capable of being found new purposes – for offices, shops, restaurants, museums, performing arts venues, cycle trails, recreational waterways, urban sculpture. But separating the socially salient from the merely technically curious demands skilful industrial archaeology.

Patrick Geddes remarked that cities not only establish relations between people, they also provide the setting for the dramatisation of those relationships. Towns and cities can also be made to render the dramatic relationships of previous social formations visible to current inhabitants and visitors. This can be done as embalmed history where current observers see the history as alienated from their own contemporary relations: the historic city as theme park (Lomholt, 1992). Alternatively the social relations of the past can be observed through vestiges of the spatial relations of that time and can be linked to current relations as living history.

The crisis of modernism in all its expressions provides opportunities to safeguard precious places for new uses in current conditions. It does so by amplifying opportunities for historical reference. This so often takes the form of pastiche and is presented by capital in the market in a commodity form. Alternatively in many places class, gender and ethnic relations of previous eras hold special lessons for contemporary social relations. The appropriation of meaning of such locations can therefore take place at the behest of public interests as well as a general process of recommodification.

The current paper is specifically concerned with a review of several approaches made largely by civic authorities in the U.K. to safeguard the vitality and viability of town and city centres. Such centres will contain elements important for the rearticulation of cultural relations between different parts of the social formation. They provide a context for modern social dramas – both on an heroic scale (eg.. pageantry, ritual, celebration or mass demonstrations) or everyday scale (eg.. shopping, visiting, recreating or boulevarding). By contrast out-of-town shopping and leisure, package holidays, home entertainment etc. provide few cultural and historic references for social life (Gardiner, 1988).

The potential for conflict over policy prioritisation abounds. Such town centre revitalisation policy has significant budgetary impacts and while it may have appeals for urban intellectual groups who inevitably are predisposed to such items of social consumption, it may be questioned in periods when living standards are stagnating or falling in real terms. Demoralised working class leadership may wish items of social consumption to be targeted at individuals and families through education, housing, health and social services policies. They may feel that targeted benefits are less likely to leak across to more advantaged groups. The fact that many inner city initiatives have benefited the development industry and the much-vaunted 'trickle-down' effects have failed to materialise is grist to this mill.

A town centre revitalisation policy must therefore run alongside and not in counter-position to corporate anti-poverty and empowering strategies. At the same time failure to stimulate public interests in town-centre enhancement would leave the way clear for private interests to appropriate the historical validity of existing centres and leave the public realm of such locations as merely

isolated vestigial elements of an otherwise privatised and commodified townscape. By contrast the goals of social justice can be pursued through equitable forms of town centre revitalisation.

European urban trends and some recent examples of State regulation in the UK

The biggest single threat to both the vitality and viability of existing town centres comes from roving retail capital. This was recognised in the UK with the publication of Planning Policy Guidance Note 6 concerned with retail and town centres. The UK Department of the Environment (DoE) has commissioned a further study by consultants Hillier Parker and Urbed of the concepts of 'vitality' and 'viability' in a variety of town centre locations. A preliminary discussion of vitality and viability can be found in the report 'The Effects of Major Out Of Town Retail Development' (BDP Planning / Oxford Institute of Retail Management, 1992, 35-6)

Interestingly the continuity of regulation of retail development has been unique in the British experience of the 1980 and perhaps more in line with European experience. For example the 1987 changes to the Use Classes Order strengthened local authorities" control over retail developments (Thornley, 1991, 158). Furthermore the 1980-1 debate over simplified planning zones (supposedly a planning deregulation measure) had seen the Thatcher government acknowledge that in the specific case of large retail developments, planning could still have a role in mediating the effects of 'free competition' (Thornley, 1991,.194).

Stability of policy in respect of out of town retail developments has yet to be achieved. Trends are currently masked by recession which has yet to lift from the retail sector in any consistent way. But consents for large-scale developments have been characterised more by the personality of the Secretary of State when considering an appeal than by any policy instruments including Use Classes Order, General Development Order and Planning Policy Guidance Notes. The current research commissioned by the Department of the Environment is obviously aimed at resolving a number of outstanding issues.

In the absence of a settled national policy framework, local government planning authorities have fought to defend the positions of their own legal entities by attempting to safeguard their economic bases within the national, regional and local retail hierarchies. Some examples will be considered later in the paper.

Long waves of capital accumulation have washed out manual jobs from cities and washed in office work and service employment. The residue of working class communities have been beached in inner city areas and peripheral estates while the city commuters increasingly have become a service and professional class. At the same time the traditional social structure of the urban environment becomes shot through with new processes of fragmentation demanding new approaches to issues of social justice (Harvey, 1992).

From 1985 until 1992 the conservative government sought inexpensive ways to address the challenge of urban regeneration (Robson, 1988; Healey, Davoudi, O'Tolle, Tavsanouglu & Usher, 1993). But from 1991 the government realised that the kind of resources that could be levered from the private sector for such purposes were so pathetically small that only token measures would in future be taken. The effective winding down of urban programme funding announced in the 1992 Autumn statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer signals the state's effective withdrawal from any meaningful urban policy commitment. The process spatial segregation of social classes can therefore be expected to accelerate unimpeded by social policy.

Town and city centres began to decline as centres of production even in the early 20th century. Castells' expectation that urban centres would serve as foci mobilising for the defence of social consumption was only partially vindicated in the UK. The defeats inflicted on left wing local authorities in the mid-1980s have undermined even the extent to which traditional city centres can effectively operate as administrative centres for locally based collective social consumption – as organising centres for Housing, Education, Health etc.

In 1990 the Commission of the European Communities published a Green Paper on the Urban Environment. It identified several 'root causes of urban degradation' (CEC, 1990, 40-45). These were grouped under the following headings: spatial segregation of different functional activities by means of urban planning; the spatial separation of the place

where investment decisions are made from the place where they will deployed; the crowding out of local people from the use of hotels, restaurants and housing in city centres; the transformation of a few elite historic centres into monofunctional areas experiencing excessive concentrations of visitors; increasing communications and mobility leading to further dispersal with wasteful use of land and waste of existing urban infrastructures.

The section of the Reports concerned with distribution and consumption is worth quoting at length.

> The age of mass consumption has had a profound impact on the spatial organisation of the city. One such phenomenon is the large shopping mall at the far periphery, accessible only by car; similarly the access routes to the city are lined with speciality shops, garishly advertised ....
>
> Meanwhile, high class shops take over the most picturesque parts of the old centre, depriving its inhabitants of shops for their daily needs. Other central areas are taken over by pedestrian zones, crammed with a narrow range of clothing and similar shops, which reduce variety and convenience for inhabitants and attract large amounts of traffic to surrounding parking garages.
>
> There is thus a link between single-purpose public spaces and urban monoculture generally: the pedestrian area creates shopping precincts; the urban motorway, office ghettos. What is lost is the equilibrium resulting from many uses and many modes of transport coexisting: the pedestrian, cyclist and public transport creating a multifunctional environment which neither depends on nor totally excludes the private driver." (CEC, 1990,42)

It seems almost impossible to disentangle those elements of the city produced by the processes of large-scale capital accumulation from those elements which are produced by modernist planning. The literature of Jane Jacobs (especially 1962) and Richard Sennet (1970) raised the possibility of small-scale capital rehumanising and reanimating the city. Clearly this did not take place in the intervening period. Planning has been blamed for the creation of concrete jungles, urban wasteland, single land-use monotony, office canyons and, most of all, dehumanising urban landscapes. Christopher Booker produced an epic Channel 4 television programme blaming it all on the overweening ambitions of the modern movement architects and planners. Similar themes were taken up by HRH, the Prince of Wales in a book (1989) and television programme.

Only recently have there been calls upon the municipal planners to distance themselves from the spatial accumulation strategies of large scale capital (Wilson, 1991) in order to produce a rehumanising townscape. So much of even left critical thinking has tended to assume the impossibility of achieving urban regeneration independent of the needs of large-scale or global capital (Fainstein, 1994; Smyth, 1994). Such writers have made their peace with strategies which fundamentally reject public values and local democracy. So desperate are the defenders of the city form of settlement that it has led even erstwhile champions of the poor and industrial labour to embrace paternalistic prestige urban regeneration strategies. The great merit of Wilson's (1991) work was that it boldly asserted that the city could become once more a fundamentally attractive settlement form for women and oppressed groups.

Indeed it is quite noticeable that as more women and people from ethnic minorities have come forward in municipal politics, architecture, planning and estate management then the issue of addressing the question of a democratic form for revitalising to city centre has been placed upon the agenda. Those wishing to pursue the goal of revitalising the down-town area and improving its economic viability are faced with a stark choice. To lure in large-scale capital may almost certainly require the subordination of the needs and wants of local people. On the other hand to consult with local people and involve them in participation may be too fussy for the balance sheet mentality.

Several local authorities of medium and larger settlements have attempted in recent years to pursue policies for reinvigorating town centres. Some have done so having been overtaken by large-scale retail developments on the periphery. Some have responded too late to avert the massive process of disinvestment from the High Street. Dudley in the West Midlands suffered this fate consequent upon the Merry Hill retail development. Others have boldly fought back against retail peripheralisation. Sheffield did this in the face of the Meadowhall retail development. Still others have tried to anticipate continued decline and

have unrolled counter-disinvestment strategies based on the creation of opportunities in several new sectors. Such a pro-active approach was adopted in Birmingham where particular emphasis was placed upon business tourism, performance arts and cultural production together with the knowledge-based industries. Some have ceded the retail function within conurbations and here Stoke-on-Trent which ceded the role to neighbouring Hanley is an example. Some have even managed to rebuild an urban nucleus around a retail superstore and relocated local authority offices (eg.. Oldbury in the West Midlands Black Country).

Many local centres have blended different new elements in order to offset the effects of disinvestment. Sheffield combines retail at the core with a creative media quarter on the fringe while Wolverhampton combines retail, leisure and entertainment initiatives at the city core. Many others confront the prospect of shooting the rapids of decline. Coventry in the West Midlands finds that the belated but sudden exodus of manufacturing jobs from the city core takes with it many shoppers and recreational visitors although Coventry has been particularly successful at attracting new service sector jobs to its metropolitan fringe where new motorways have vastly increased access. Even UK seaside resorts are repackaging architectural features and attempting to emphasise the quality aspects of their historical fabric (eg.. Brighton, Georgian; Margate, Victorian and Edwardian; Morecambe, Art Deco, 1930's). The English Tourist Board has recently made an impassioned plea to "turn the tide" in respect of the enhancement of English Seaside Townscapes (English Tourist Board, 1993)

Rates of decline matter and the significance of the decline can vary. Obviously very large cities can lose their core functions or at least see them radically reduced but still remain great cities albeit often described as 'donut cities'. (Liverpool is probably the clearest example.) Smaller settlements, either those which are free standing or particularly those which are subordinate within a larger conurbation (eg.. several Black Country town centres – Great Bridge, Willenhall, Smethwick, Tipton) can lose their identity altogether.

Counter trends in the social formation

A variety of groups are stakeholders in existing centres. They will have varying degrees of commitment to these locations but local authorities are often in a position to hold the ring if an alliance can be wielded in support of policies to safeguard the environmental quality of such locations. The variety can include such people as city centre proprietors (longer lease holders, freeholders as well as traders who could not easily find another niche in the market at another location), local employers who have assembled an important blend of skills not easily reproduced at other locations, urban intellectuals who have developed attachments to the location for a variety of sentimental or scientific reasons. In addition trends in personal consumption and leisure activity may lend themselves to the promotion of specific locations if the historic and cultural connections are appropriate.

For activities sustained by the local tax base, the issue of jobs at the centre can be important. As much as 20-25% of a metropolitan borough's jobs can be within the city core; for a smaller town the proportion could be even higher. This is a powerful incentive for those whose livelihood depends on the public purse to pursue counter-disinvestment strategies for the town centre.

Successes in preserving and enhancing town centres often reveal strong and engaging historical narratives. I would like to give a little example. In the early 1970's the Australian construction union developed the strategy of green-ban action. This was a very successful popular front alliance with civic, conservation and amenity groups to frustrate the efforts of insensitive redevelopment and to safeguard historical references of the townscape. The idea was taken up by UCATT (the builders' union) in Birmingham when the Victorian Society was fighting to save from demolition the central post office in Victoria Square. Almost exactly 20 years after the post office won a reprieve, Birmingham City Council has opened a completely re-created and enlarged square in front of the Council House. The Post Office building whose preserved facade overlooks the square has been taken over by the Trustee Savings Bank as their new national headquarters. The square and the new jobs contained within the reused (and massively expanded) original building is the latest and proudest achievement of the City Council within the core area. The task of re-creating the square had been awarded to an Italian firm of urban designers who provided the citizenry of

Birmingham with a fine public square, fountains, sculpture, seating and steps.

Town and City public authorities are capable of generating the vision for the necessary transformations. They can no longer generate the resources. City centre proprietors in decaying centres are rarely able to raise their eyes above the bottom line of the profit and loss account. Therefore the public authority has often to make the initial resource commitment in order that the leap of imagination can be made. The vogue for 'off-the-peg' solutions in the public sector is rarely the best way to initiate this process. Standard pedestrianisation and street furniture measures simply replace dowdy, dirty traffic congested streets with, paving, planters and cluttered areas of uninspired quality. The same elements could be found in any 'tarted-up' high street anywhere in Europe. Such elements of a townscape do not 'speak' to the people about their social relations in any articulate fashion. Historical, topographical and architectural specificity is needed in order to engage people with their past, present and future social relations. The public authority has a major task and responsibility for cultural interpretation. The forms of discourse with which the authority develops its approach and engages local people is beyond the scope of this paper (see Rydin and Myerscough, 1991).

The question of property-led urban regeneration has successfully been removed from the political agenda in the UK. It has so often been felt that the issues are too technically complex and the necessary alliances between public and private sector too sensitive to be entrusted to the realm of public debate. Encouraged by central government policy and spurred by the social class origins of local authority senior staff, local government has found it far easier to construct urban regeneration agenda with the business community than it has with the electorate who live closest to the city core. Thus in Manchester, Birmingham and London the strategic decisions concerning the regeneration of the city core have been reached through 'growth coalitions' rather than through any democratic political process (Loftman, Middleton and Nevin, 1993).

Thus having initiated the transition the public authority will find ready partners for suitable projects. Proprietors with an existing stake in centres experiencing decline face stark choices. They can do nothing and witness their assets wither on the vine, they can seek to trade in their diminishing equity. An explanation of the diseconomy of this may be necessary. If trading associations exist then the authority can speak through these or it may have to facilitate the formation of some collective organisation of proprietors. The existence of such organisations makes the next step easier for the authority – namely the patient explanation of the need for proprietors to contribute to the regeneration process, appropriate ways in which that contribution can be made and ultimately the need for contributions to even public local infrastructure investment where benefits to private stakeholders are easily demonstrated. Several public authorities in the UK are currently working on these lines (eg.. Manchester at Castlefield, Nottingham in the Lace Markets, Birmingham city centre, Wolverhampton city centre). These initiatives may come about as a result of a variety of different policy measures (Birmingham – City Action Team; Wolverhampton – city centre manager; Nottingham – Lace Markets Development Company which has recently failed, Manchester – Urban Development Corporation).

Clearly there can be clashes resulting from obtaining private sector resources on the one hand and attempting to work to a democratically derived agenda. Loftman, Middleton and Nevin (1993) believe that in the case of Birmingham's City 2000, Manchester's Financial and Professional Forum and London Forum and London First, democracy has been sacrificed in order to secure the effective participation of the private sector, Clearly there is an evident fear within Britain today that ‘democracy is too much of a good thing’ in the largest urban centres. In smaller settlements there may be more scope for democratically derived agendas.

Where the agenda are not derived democratically, local leaderships encouraged by central government have been encouraged to justify investment in prestige and elite projects on the grounds that it will give their particular settlement the 'edge' over others in marketing of space.

Harvey has drawn attention to the imperative and ultimately destructive compulsion to inter-city competitions as a part of the post-modern condition. Civic boosterism is a strategy imported from the USA to the UK in the 1980s. Loftman and Nevin (1992) have demonstrated the adverse effects on local

people of this approach in the case of Birmingham City Council's prestige projects. Education and social services budgets suffered while much vaunted "trickle-down" benefits failed to materialise. Worpole and Mercer (1992) have advocated blending four elements in producing a more social approach. Urban cultures need nurturing; economic development for local people needs focusing; self development proceeds through participation, celebration and ritual; the uses of urban spaces should recognise the importance of cultural diversity. This approach can boost districts in a way in which civic boosterism simply tramples on the existence of local populations.

Clearly a variety of models exist for public authorities. They can not avoid the task of upgrading their local built environment. To do so merely at the behest of capital as in London Docklands or some other Urban Development Corporations contributes nothing more than to the palimpsest of capitalist landscapes. (Harvey). To do so merely at the behest of labour is unlikely to be sustainable in electoral terms. A strategy which maintains the cultural expressions of local communities and enlists the support of other local stakeholders is proving workable. Perhaps this is the single most valuable discovery of the City Challenge initiatives begun in 1991, continued in 1992, but discontinued in 1993.

Urry (1990) has identified larger changes in the class structure that have created opportunities for reconstituting the culture of townscapes. The growth of service sector employment, the increasing number of retired people, the expansion of higher education widens the demand for cultural production. At the same time there are strong tendencies toward the fragmentation of national culture and towards the growth of the specific local and group subcultures. These are often referred to as the phenomenon of post modern cultural consumption. The eruption in the 1980s of local movements for the protection of local and specific environments finds expression in inner urban areas, towns and other urban districts. Demands for community technical aid, planning aid, science shops, know-how networks grow as local communities are confronted with large scale and long-term planning procedures.

These are the contexts in which people can be helped to reconnect themselves to local histories and traditions. Making sense of the history of a location is an important element in community development measures.

Conservation theory and practice in the UK has traditionally had three foci. First it attempts to safeguard buildings of 'significant architectural merit'. Grade 1 listing has often been reserved for building which are the work of 'famous architects'. This usually means that the buildings are prestigious. Grade 2 listing is less elitist and in the recent past has been an element in allowing old buildings including factories and warehouses to be renovated and turned to new and imaginative uses. However the listing process is rather incidental and the fact that it confers remission from VAT obligations on the costs of the building work is rather more significant.

Secondly conservation policy is concerned with protecting buildings that have associations with elite historic figures although this is increasingly questioned as the resources of English Heritage, the body charged with stewardship of such buildings, are stretched beyond sustainability..

Thirdly conservation policy has been concerned with groups of buildings – the quality of which is enhanced by their ensemble character. Such designation confers additional premium value on already considerable real estate assets. Larkham and Jones have called for a fundamental review of Conservation Areas as a policy instrument (1993). The publication of the consultation draft Planning Policy Guidance Note 15 dealing with Historic Buildings and Conservation Areas (DoE, 1993) goes some way to broaden the scope of regulation. It claims to be "a completely revised and updated version of DOE circular 8/87" (covering letter signed by A.H.Corner, 08/07/93). It gives recognition to the practice of seeking to protect and enhance not only those individual buildings "central to the heritage of European civilisation" (p.6) but goes on to say the following.

> But conservation policy is not only about protecting these great set pieces. The many lesser historic buildings to be found in our towns and villages and countryside are also of great importance for the contribution which they make to our knowledge of the past, and to the character of our environment. The cumulative character and interest of relatively minor historic buildings, in a street or a village square or a residential neighbourhood, are particularly

> important in times when much new development no longer reflects local building traditions. Government policies for conservation areas aim to take full account of group value, context and setting, as well as of the intrinsic quality of individual historic buildings. (DoE, 1993, 6)

Thus official guidance unambiguously endorses widening the scope of Conservation Area designation both qualitatively and quantitatively. Currently whilst there are 441,000 separate list entries protecting about 500,000 individual buildings (DOE, 1993, Annex 2, P.1), there are at least 7,500 designated conservation areas in England (DOE, 1993, P.24) . This suggests that PPG15 is reflecting practice rather than guiding it. Indeed the number of listed buildings has increased 400% since 1970 (DOE, 1993, Annex 2, P.2).

Since 1984, English Heritage is the organisation charged with regulating preservation and enhancement of historic buildings, ancient monuments and conservation areas. One of the three general duties defined for it by the National Heritage Act 1983 is

> …to promote the public's enjoyment of, and advance their knowledge of, ancient and historic buildings situated in England and their preservation."

Yet resources and priorities clearly will not allow a bonanza of environment preservation and enhancement that celebrates historic labour processes. Likewise PPG15 recognises but does not resolve the contradiction between conservation and redevelopment in actual conservation areas. Referring to

> "....increasing realisation in recent years that our experience of a historic area depends on much more than the quality of individual buildings...."

the PPG lists urban morphological and architectural features and continues.

> Conservation area designation should be seen as the means of recognising the importance of all these factors and of ensuring that conservation policy addresses the quality of townscape in its broadest sense as well as the protection of individual buildings. At the same time, policies for conservation areas need to take account of the Government's deregulatory objective of minimising and, where possible, reducing detailed controls over businesses and householders. (DOE, 1993, P.24)

Those concerned with critical theory have tended to view such aspects of state policy as a means whereby the state underscores and validates the value of privileged location. It is not only buildings and environments that are protected and enhanced but also the wealth of those who own them. It is therefore not hard to see why conservation designations in the UK hold little interests for those whose social vision extends beyond safeguarding and enhancing the domestic wealth of the bourgeois.

However Raymond Williams (1973) showed the importance of linkages between town and city, between bourgeois, landowner, farm worker and urban proletarian all within the context of place. Such an approach places tremendous responsibility upon the interpretation of elements of the built environment.

In the 1970s an enthusiasm developed for 'saving' threatened historic buildings which could not be listed by removing them to a place of safety – a park. The Wooden Building Museum at Gamila, Umeå, Sweden; the Weald and Downland Museum near Chichester in Sussex, England and the Black Country Industrial Museum near Dudley, England are outstanding examples. Where capital forsakes a location not only the original buildings may be spared but also the whole setting – Coalbrookdale / Iron Bridge in Shropshire and Grand Hornu near Brussels may be familiar. The popularity of such places grows and grows. Even relatively isolated and fragmentary townscapes from the historic record attract thronging crowds when special events are organised. This has become known as 'animation' following the work of Worpole, Montgomery, Bianchini. The Albert Dock in Liverpool, Birmingham Jewellery Quarter, Castlefield in Manchester and Little Germany in Bradford (Falk, 1993) are examples of locations animated episodically and as part of area-based regeneration strategy.

It is interesting that a number of books published at the end of the 1950s and early 1960s in reaction to modernism are enjoying a new lease of life. Jane Jacobs's *Death and Life of Great American Cities'* contained a condemnation of the zoned and formulaic approach to city planning being pursued in the North End of Boston (Jacobs, 1962). It celebrated urban vitality through the extended metaphor

of the ballet in her observations of Hudson Street. Kevin Lynch produced 'The Image of the City': its language has become the stock in trade of current urban design consultants in the UK. Gordon Cullen produced a very English response to similar challenges in the book 'Townscape'.

Themes developed in that period find resonance in current thinking. Much of the current thinking can be dismissed as nostalgic, a yearning for a past golden age; indeed the Prince of Wales' 'Vision of Britain' (1989) has been so labelled. However the issues of vitality and viability are at the heart of the Department of the Environment's current concerns. From the private sector 'a concept for creating mixed-use urban developments on a sustainable scale' is offered in the form of the 'Urban Villages' Report (1992). Public authorities committed to functional segregation since the lessons of both the Modern Movement and the Garden City Movement were absorbed into the mainstream are now embracing mixed-use area strategies. The tenacious struggle for Coin Street, Southwark in London (Ward, 1989) and the experience of involving local people in the reuse of redundant buildings in the Kreuzberg district of Berlin (Hanley, 1993) demonstrate the importance of achieving public authority support for local mixed use redevelopment which at the same time pays respects to the historic fine-grain city scale.

Urban regeneration can be achieved partly through design. Not everywhere can have the quaintness of York or Chester or the grandeur of Georgian Bath or Brighton but suitable elements can be emulated rather than imitated in the amplification of existing districts in less exalted locations. Lockwood points out that the very successful Calderdale Inheritance Project in Halifax started with the stylish restoration of a prominent Halifax shop (Lockwood, 1993, P.290).

Hinsley (1992) and Pratt (1992) have independently chosen the term 'recommodification' to describe the process whereby old fixed capital, especially in the form of buildings which have experienced massive devalorisation through redundancy are re-equipped and are taken to the market for new uses. Public authorities, both local and central facilitate this process via new planning consents and grant assistance and tax breaks to facilitate the conversion. McNamara (1993) has recently identified some of the parameters for institutional investment in inner city commercial property markets. Lack of certainty about the levels of risks has meant high yields being demanded. Better information and greater familiarity with the performance of investments in such areas should reduce this by giving institutional investors the means for accurate pricing of such assets and a clearer idea of adequate returns for known risks.

In the absence of these the recommodification of buildings continues but outside the institutional sector, at least for the moment. It is carried out by a variety of local capitalists, often with either enthusiasm for conversion work, and the technical capacity to achieve it or with local knowledge and an insiders feel for the potential of an area. Such developers were found in Castlefield, Little Germany and the Birmingham Jewellery Quarter and Gun Quarter (Pratt, 1992).

Hence it can be said that the development industry takes a very pragmatic view of such investment. There is no track record to cause investment scouts to look for hide-bound formulae. Investment decisions can be shaped by the availability of planning consents, tax breaks, modernisation and improvements grants.

But where will benefit? Who will benefit?

Mainstream development capital is indifferent to town and city centres of all sizes. So too is the institutional property investment capital. Significant improvements in national and regional economic growth rates can only modify this picture marginally.

However large constituencies of people have significant stakes in the revitalisation and improved viability of town centres. Some centres have a paucity of interesting buildings let alone an ensemble of ailing fixed capital capable of transformation. Other areas may have physical attributes but few human agencies are available capable of dynamising the necessary coalitions of interest. Still other areas can be revitalised but the social dimensions of the revitalisation will be meagre.

Public agencies with a flair for explaining the past to the present can grasp opportunities to render the purpose of areas and the historical identity of its people. The opportunity to create appropriate jobs for localities should not be considered separately from the meanings that those jobs and the jobs which they seek to replace can give to the lives of local people. Places are not precious because they have

'quaint' urban design characteristics. They are precious merely because they hold significant meanings for the people whose lives dramatise their physical relationships.

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Industrialisation: labour, time, and space; work, speed up and urbanisation

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..the open gates of the New Tower of Babel, the machine centre of Metropolis, threw up the masses as it gulped them down..' taken from the script of *Metropolis* by Fritz Lang 1926

Single metaphors can never describe the mesmerising visions of heaven and the abyss that the industrial revolution brought to the mind of the human subject still tuned to the space and time of agricultural life. Of all the great art projects of the nineteenth and early twentieth century that attempted to grasp the mad frenzy of urbanisation and industrialisation, perhaps the film Metropolis by Fritz Lang captures best the contradictory social character of the modern revolution which had pitted wage workers against capitalists, vernacular houses against the apocalyptic city, and had raised the spectre of the tyrannical machine that would one day subordinate us all. Yet more than a machine, more than an object, industrialisation is the violent force that propels us from the mystic uncertainties of the feudal world into the rationalist bliss of the modern. It drags us from the field to the factory, from the cottage to the housing estate and from the rural market to the shopping mall. It starts with the transformation of the labour process, and brings in its wake the wholesale revolution of everyday social life and the spaces in which it takes place.

Industrialisation – The transformation of the labour process

At the heart of all human history lies the labour process, 'the everlasting nature imposed condition of human existence.' (Marx Capital) It is within the labour process that men and women produce use values, transform nature, and reproduce the material pre-conditions of human life. Not surprisingly, the labour process has been the terrain on which the great classes of modern times in alliance with interest groups, have battled and struggled to fashion the world according to their own aspirations. This is quite simply because successful control over the labour process, and therefore economic development, becomes the key test on which all social systems ultimately flourish or flounder. Consequently, industrialisation has as much to do with the maintenance of patterns of political and economic power as it has with the satisfaction of human need and desires. Within the capitalist world this has revealed itself in the contradiction that exists between the satisfaction of biological and socially produced needs, and the imperative to reproduce the pre-conditions for continued capital accumulation .

One of the ways in which historians have sought to periodise human history is by distinguishing different epochs by the changes that occur within the labour process. Probably the most profound transformation in the history of the labour process has been the development of industrialisation, not only because of scientific and technological breakthroughs, but precisely because it is in the process of industrial development that the social contradictions of modern times have been most acutely expressed and intensely felt. It is where the dialectic of need is transformed into the ultimate clash, that positions the promise of liberation from want and physical toil, against the unfreedom of repressive needs and the alienation from the process of work and the products of labour.

The epic and turbulent history of the industrialisation of building production begins with the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and from the journeymen and apprentices of handicraft building production, to the first wage workers involved in non mechanised manufacture. Its historical development mirrors and forms part of the general history of capitalist industrialisation and thereby of the struggles that have occurred throughout its two hundred and fifty year history to transcend and direct productive activity along different lines.

Somewhat predictably our images of this history are clouded by the overwhelming human desire to believe in the possibility of truth, to be found in this case at the end of the inexorable march of scientific and technological progress. But such images of the victorious

machine have always been tempered by the knowledge that for all of its promises, modern industrial society has been characterised by antagonistic forces that have upset what was such a clearly mapped path to freedom.

Nowhere is the dialectic of hope and despair more clearly articulated than in the shift from manufacture to machinofacture, whereby buildings and their components could be mass-produced by machine processes. This opened up the possibilities of the liberation from environmental poverty, but also the threat of subordination to a new set of dictated needs. If we have any one person to thank for this, then it was Ford, who applied Taylor's and Gilbreth's ideas on time, motion, and work organisation, to the automated vehicle production line. Whilst within early manufacture the revolution in productivity had commenced with human labour power; within modern industry it had begun with the instruments of labour. With the combined application of new technologies and Fordist principles concerning the social organisation of the labour process, new methods of labour control were thus incorporated into large scale machinery. This resulted in enormous increases in the productivity of labour, such that workers were able to produce not only greater quantities of product, but at ever increasing speed.

Within the context of building production, work that had previously been conducted by skilled craftsmen with hand tools, by the advent of the late twentieth century had increasingly become mechanised and in some cases automated. If in the late feudal era a single carpenter could make all the doors, windows, and trusses a building might require, the modern world saw each aspect of this labour process fragmented into many parts, each presided over by a different worker, in a process that had largely shifted from the site and small workshop with hand saws and chisels, to the factory, and to the machinery of lathes, routers, and bench drills. Within the space of three hundred years, tasks that had previously needed a thousand labourers could now be accomplished by two machines and two operators. At last the unshackling of the human subject from heavy manual labour seemed a real possibility. Yet within capitalist conditions the private ownership of what is social property was to temper and contradict this dream of deliverance. Within manufacture the production of surplus and profit was absolute in that there were limits to how much the working day could be lengthened. But in modern industry it is the speed of the machine that dictates the amount of surplus that any one worker can produce. The implicit growth in the scale and speed of production was mirrored in the expansion of a managerial elite and bureaucracy who's task it was to supervise the increasingly complex vertical and horizontal division of labour, ensure labour discipline, and maintain efficiency and the rate of profit. The outcome was a situation where the direct producers were divorced from the products of their own labour, created in a process over which they had very little control.

Thus, despite the fact, that the automated and machine technologies which dominate modern building production represent the historic accumulation of labour power, of human skill and knowledge, the machines stand to the worker not as the products and objectification of human labour and thought, but as objects that are remote and alien, and which appear as an attribute of capital. From the producers of such innovations, workers now appeared as organs scattered within their mechanical systems. Instead of the means of emancipation, the machine ‘confronts labour as a ruling power and as an active subsumption of the latter under itself..’ (Marx *Grundrisse*, 693 -695) Here lie the origins of the technological tyranny of the twentieth century and one of the cornerstones of modern alienation.

Furthermore, such contradictions manifested themselves on building sites and factories throughout the industrial world. Indeed, life for a worker on the automated line producing concrete panels, often differed little whether it was inside one of the great Soviet house-building combines, or in a concrete plant outside London, or San Francisco.

Industrialisation – The labour process in space

Matter, and material processes like that of industrialisation can not exist independently of space or time. As matter is transformed, so is space. This would suggest that the transformation of the labour process which distinguishes industrialisation, is mutually interdependent with the process of urbanisation which has transformed the spaces of our social life with such mesmerising and bewildering speed. The space of work, that is the factory, and the space of home life, such as the mass housing schemes of the twentieth century,

represent revolutions in the spatial organisation of social life that are inseparable from the revolution within the labour process itself.

Similarly at a more general level, if the industrialisation of building is correctly understood as involving the rationalisation of the labour process, then it comes as no surprise to find this accompanied by the rationalisation of space through urban design – the similar desire to order and control with all the discipline a ruling class can muster. This truly gets underway with the 19th century re-planning of Paris, Budapest, Glasgow, and virtually every other major European city. Even at this early stage there is an inescapable correspondence between the rationalisation of space through the boulevard, public square, and urban grid, and the increasing division of labour. Both space and labour become fragmented into easily controlled, packaged, and potentially commodifiable parts, a process which gathers pace in the transition to the post war zoned city of mass produced middle class suburbs and working class estates. It reaches its apogee in the globalisation of capitalism. As the world shrinks and there occurs an increasing convergence not only in the application of scientific knowledge but in economic and political practice, we witness the simultaneous construction of almost identical built environments, be they in New York, London, or Tokyo.

If this is one of the most important features of the modern industrialised landscape, the spatial segregation of society along class and ethnic lines is another, and is similarly replicated wherever commodity culture takes root and capitalist urbanisation gathers pace. Historically this has been reinforced by the class disparities in the quality of building. This is as evident in the late twentieth century metropolis as it was in the construction of Georgian London. But without doubt the most celebrated examples of the industrialisation of building are the seas of tower blocks that punctuate the peripheries of virtually every metropolitan centre whether it be Glasgow, London, or Paris, and which continue to be built in Latin America, the former USSR and Africa. This aspect of urbanisation sharply reveals the contradictory character of any process of commodity production. On the one hand, we can see the process of industrialisation as a quantitative expansion in building production brought about by technological innovation. Faced with periodic destruction through war, and the associated pressures of migration and population growth, this appears as a result of the moral imperative on governments everywhere to build as much., and as fast as possible. But there were clearly other forces at work. The post second world war 'Fordist' industrialisation of building production offered hitherto unimagined opportunities, not just for solving the housing crisis, but for the rapid accumulation of capital and surpluses. Within the west, our needs were to be met with a state-regulated building industry where the land and technologies of construction lay in private hands; in the east needs were to be met through a centrally-planned and completely State-owned industry.

However, in both cases the speedy realisation and release of surpluses and profits, was a process that was vital for the ruling classes and state bureaucracies in the countries of the former Soviet bloc and NATO, to maintain their hegemony. In such chaos the housing and welfare needs of subject peoples were ultimately subordinate to financing the arms race, propping up the military industrial complex, and lining the vaults of capitalists, bureaucrats, and Party hacks.

It is precisely during this classic period of industrialisation that the Soviet industry was almost completely converted to one wholly dependent on the pre-fabrication of concrete components, employing thirteen million workers and operating over two thousand concrete factories. In Britain, construction output tripled between 1948 and 1964 and doubled between 1955 and 1970, and it is from this period that the giants Wimpeys, Laings and Taylor Woodrow consolidated their position at the forefront of the British building industry, a position that they still enjoy, not least because of their involvement in the speculative mass production of new suburbs in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This would indicate that the process of industrialisation is accelerating rather than slowing down. Indeed, almost all contemporary buildings use factory pre-fabricated building components. It is simply that the process has changed gear in the application of more sophisticated machines and computer based technologies, and changed appearance in the production of building types that differ from those we normally associate with industrialised building. The timber framed

house, the populist Wimpey and Barratt home, the speculative office block, the MacDonalds, the Safeways stores, and the light industrial factory unit are all building types that are heavily dependent on the factory pre-fabrication of components and are reliant on a site labour force that is mobile, and has been largely retrained with 'fitter' type skills. This lethal combination means buildings and space can be produced and transformed with ever increasing speed in a situation where capital turns over with equal rapidity.

The industrialisation of every day life

The industrial revolution not only helped redefine the human subject as a direct producer or as an assistant to the process of mass production, it also remade us as mass consumers, firstly for money itself and then for all of the commodities like cars, fridges, and cookers that help define modern life. This is a process that is achieving new heights with the profusion of DIY stores where we buy the products of industrialised production, and thereby mass produce the spaces of our home lives. Such familiar changes have been accompanied by perhaps the most important contemporary innovations of all, which are those connected with mass communication and information systems. Here we have the television, the radio, the video, the Personal Computer, the Satellite, along with the whole arsenal at the disposal of modern publishing and advertising corporations. The massive increase in the production of information as a commodity, and of pleasure devices in the form of new technologies are all part of the armoury and fabric of industrial society. Indeed, their proliferation is wholly dependent on the industrialisation of production. It would be easy to see such improvements in the quality of life brought by the consumer and communication revolutions as wholly positive and by their very nature, democratic. However this would presume that such new technologies are able to develop in an autonomous way beyond the limitations set by political and economic interest groups.

Ultimately, it is impossible to discuss industrialisation in the abstract. Within the history of Western Europe, industrialisation not only marks the inauguration of the modern, but of the two great classes of the modern world, the bourgeoisie and the industrial proletariat and it has been primarily the unfolding relationship between these two classes that has structured and conditioned the development of industrialisation. It comes as no surprise to find that industrialisation bears the hallmarks and distinguishing features of a particularly capitalist social process, more the focus of profound contradictions than the Enlightenment promise of the glorious and uninterrupted march of science and reason. It is a process that has continued to display all the strengths and weaknesses, creative might and ruthless destruction, that one would expect from a process predicated on the antagonistic relationship between capital and labour. It is as if, with the resolution of every contradiction, a new one emerges that counteracts the will to progress. In place of prosperity and freedom, it has been argued by authors like Marcuse, that the process of capitalist industrialisation has given birth to a tyranny that extends beyond the workplace, and carries an imperative in the name of reason to rationalise and regulate all aspects of social life, that subjects us to what Foucault might have called the technologies of discipline and normalisation. What we think of as our freedom to consume the free products of industrialisation, is no more than the unfreedom of suffocating under a limited range of false and repressive needs. In such circumstances the possibilities of self determination, of enjoying non-administered free time, and of the occupation of non-regulated space, becomes ever more elusive. In opposition to the mythologisation of progress, the advent of industrial society has promoted the subordination of the human subject to a labour process and mode of life that represents technical progress but is simultaneously a new form of domination. The antithesis of freedom, industrialisation is but one aspect of a near-terrorist rationality where we enter into the 'technological community of the administered population'. Under the rule of non elected private interest groups and monolithic state dictatorships, the liberation from need, want and poverty that industrialisation had promised, becomes eternally shattered by the monstrous waste and destruction of not only nature but of human life itself.

Such a view of the world is for many either unpalatable or simply wrong headed. One way out of this dilemma has been to proclaim that the age of Modernism, of industrial society, is at an end. That the era of homogeneity, mass production, large unwieldy enterprises and unresponsive bureaucracies, has been replaced

by one characterised by heterogeneity, choice, and flexibility, and that we have therefore moved according to authors like Daniel Bell and Lyotard into a post-industrial era. No doubt the debate will continue as to whether this proposed shift corresponds to the realities of global change. Maybe it is simply a desire to try and escape, at least within text, the inevitability of the total commodification of social life. We arrive at the conclusion that the processes associated with industrialisation and urbanisation have compounded the contradictions of society based on the culture of the commodity, to such an extent, that we are now confronted with a social world, dominated by passive shoppers and spectators, increasingly unable and unwilling to become conscious of our own oppression.

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Urban theory and the theme of nature

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The naturalist image

Throughout history the theme of Nature has been a constant paradigm in the construction of urban theories. The re-instatement of the urban individual in its natural environment – even if this only occurs in the imaginary domain – has been a constant theoretical preoccupation.

But, in order to understand how the theme and the idea of Nature are conceived in the contemporary world – and to understand their philosophical and historical construction – should be better understood as part of the history of urbanism.

The origins of a more fully developed concept of Nature, may be found in Antiquity and the idea of Nature as the opposite of chance and artifice.(1)

Even before Plato and Aristotle, Greek philosophers had regarded Nature – *physis* – as a subject of rational discussion. Then, from the Ionian period onwards, philosophers drew a distinction between natural and abstract elements. Cosmology modified both its language and content. Instead of describing successive births of the cosmos, it now defined the first constitutive principles of existence.(2)

Vernant (1990) points out that, starting from the notion of *physis* and its development, Ionian Philosophy progressively distinguished between several levels of reality, stressing the separation between Nature, the Gods and human beings. Recognising this separation became the principal condition of rational thought. He adds:

> In myth, the diversity of plans hid an ambiguity that permitted the mixing (of natural and abstract elements). Philosophy multiplies planes in order to avoid confusion. Through philosophy, the notions of the human, of the natural, of the divine, become better differentiated, defining and elaborating themselves reciprocally (3)

Thus the notion of *physis* was separated from that of the divine and other mythical domains. The very identity of the philosopher became distinct from that of the magician and the *xamâ*. This new way of thinking coincided with a departure from the despotism of eastern civilisations and fitted into the new reality of the Polis. Vernant , among other authors who share the same view, commented:

> In fact, the town realises, at the level of social form ,this separation between Nature and society, which presupposes, at the level of mental form, the practice of rational thought. In the town, the political order detaches itself from cosmic organisation; it appears as a human institution that is the subject of restless inquiry, of passionate discussion... The social order, now human, is suitable for rational elaboration, in the same way that the natural order has become physis.(4)

It is from this heritage of separations that Plato and Aristotle distinguish between the effects of nature and those of chance, of the non-natural – the artifice. This construction that accepts the existence of the manifestation of an autonomous power, is hardly comprehensible by philosophical analysis, since it is invisible, and because it cannot be represented as a principle:

> Whatever it is, the idea of Nature always appears under the auspices of a mirage: it escapes from us the moment we think we have reached it, and it arises at an unforeseen point on the horizon, which it abandons the moment that vision has had time to fix itself there. The comparison of the idea of Nature to a mirage can be determined by the sense of duplicity, which contaminates the appearance of Nature, by the character of the duplication of images and their ideological counterparts (5).

It follows that this idea of nature produces a duplication of images. This is because the way in which it is determined is always confused with the way it is represented. What can be

(1) Rosset, 1989

(2) Vernant, 1990, P356.

(5) Rosset, *op cit*, pp.19.

distinguished from nature has, at the same time, its identity determined by this duplication. It is an ideological counterpart, because the idea of Nature cannot exist in isolation, although it is a reference from which different approximations should be recognised, including those of a metaphysical character.

According to Rosset (1989), Plato's thought is not confined to explicit concepts on the theme of Nature. Instead, Plato places the emphasis on the question of *degradation* – an idea with naturalistic roots. Accepting that degradation takes place implies the existence of a prior, non-degraded origin, embodied by Nature and contained in all things.

Besides the theme of *degradation*, Plato introduces that of *purpose* which is one of the most important in naturalistic thought. Although Plato's idea of *purpose* is not as fully developed and systematic as that of Aristotle's, it is always present in his writings on Nature (on humans and cosmos). Degradation does not tarnish the pure Idea as this is compromised from the very start by the way it is perceived by world of the senses. Degradation, instead, represents the greatest possible loss of Nature as it was conceived and created by God when it combined the domains of the sensible and the intelligible. Thus, the process of degradation cannot merely be considered a waste but, primarily as one which is an infraction against God's plan. The process of degradation starts when a heterogeneous element disturbs the purpose inscribed in the initial combination. Plato states that this disturbing element is the human being (6).

According to Rosset, *The Republic* and *The Laws* express Plato's preoccupation with the evolution of the degradation process induced by human freedom, its tendency for perversion and its anarchic autonomy which creates disorder leading 'from purpose to chance, from Nature to corruption'. This, once again, stresses the separation between the human and natural realms, between the *polys* and the *physis*, between freedom and determination.

Aristotle put forward an idea that was to become essential to naturalistic thought. He tried to demonstrate that, to the human eye, Nature appears as the very movement of its own elements: earth, fire, air and water. Their form, their movement and purpose is spontaneous. Here the theme of artifice is, also, constant.

> In Aristotle's works, the notions of Nature and art are interchangeable to such an extent that one could be forgiven for wondering whether an artificial model could inspire a naturalistic vision, although Aristotle constantly stated the contrary. An artificial production must always be considered a natural production, whether it is a natural or aesthetic one (the mimesis theory in Poetry), or a production of the State (Book I, in *Politics*, emphasises that fundamental social relations should be seen as a natural phenomenon and not as a contract) (7).

The notion of a Nature which rules the production of existence dominated post-Aristotelian Antiquity. Pliny's and Lucrecius' work also featured this theme which remained a constant up to and throughout the Middle Ages.

According to Lenoble and other analysts (1969) Pliny's *Natural History* set up a classification of 'natural things' which attempted to place the idea of Nature within a holistic framework.

> Pliny painted a very successful picture of Nature, which was of great influence over fifteen centuries – and that virtually means all centuries. The comprehensive nature of Pliny's works reflects more of an encyclopaedic than a philosophical ambition. He does not merely try and provide a definition of Nature, he attempts to list, count and describe all known natural species. However, Pliny's work does not lack philosophical authority because it expresses new and important thoughts centred around his fear that, through degradation, Nature will reach extinction(8).

Lucrecius's *On Nature* introduced the idea of Nature as a model which preceded human existence and this is especially highlighted by Agostinho da Silva's commentary([9]).

> According to this author, it is the very existence of this model which enables the production and, hence, the existence of all things. Without this model, how could the Gods conceive human beings and understand the human spirit? If Nature had not provided a model, how could the Gods recognise the importance of human

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[9] Lucrecio, 1973.

> principles and the various possibilities of combining them to create mankind, ([10]).

A world order determined by the supremacy of Nature (seen as the origin of all things) is consistent with the Naturalism of Antiquity but it contradicts another strand of philosophy which is not inclined to contrast Nature to artifice and chance. Even if only briefly, the historical development of this idea must be explored. The idea of artifice has a central position in Western philosophy and it is possible to distinguish between two great moments of its expression. The first dates to pre-Socratic times and it stretches from the end of the period of magical representation of Nature to Plato's and Aristotle's antique naturalism. Then, after the collapse of Aristotelianism and before the restoration of modern naturalism (of which, among others, Descartes and Rousseau, were major exponents), there is a second period ([11]).

However, during the Renaissance (which had its consequences on the history of philosophy), and just before Descartes, the links between magic and Nature were strongly revived. This coincided with a period characterised by the struggle between different concepts and during which pre-Socratic and neo-Platonic ideas were reconsidered and combined. This synthesis strongly influenced utopian thinkers like Campanella and philosophers like Spinoza, Leibniz and Diderot.. Giordano Bruno constructed an important synthesis about which Helda Barraco and Nestor Deola write:

> Animate matter would have the very divinity inside itself, and the doctrine produced by this idea constitutes Giordano Bruno's pantheism, which conceives God as related to the Universe and identical with it. Nature, investigated and exalted by the men of the Renaissance reaches, in this way, its most complete evaluation: it becomes divine. Another of Giordano Bruno's theses articulated pantheism and animism together. He stated that the Universe is infinite and unlimited, as Lucrecius had affirmed, repeating the thesis of the antique Greek atomist. The earth would not be the privileged centre of the Universe, as shown in Copernicus's astronomy, and there would exist countless inhabited worlds, as can also be read in Lucrecius's works ([12]).

This natural magic combines animism, pantheism and poetry and confers a divine identity on human beings whose minds are thought to be able to explore the hidden truths of the Universe thanks to imagination and memory. Over the same period, the influential religious reforms caused a shift towards artificialism, and increased the possibility that the essence of Nature can be corrupted. Nature no longer had to be the mediator between God and humans ([13]) neither in theology's rational demonstrations, nor in sacramental life.

During this period, artificialism questioned the principles of naturalistic philosophy, assimilated within social organisation.

> The history of philosophy never enjoyed the intellectual freedom which prevailed under the artificialist wave during the first fifty years of the XVII century. Pre-Cartesian artificialism developed simultaneously in Italy (the home of Machiavelli), in England (where the main exponents were Bacon and Hobbes) and in Spain (the home of Baltasar Gracian). In XVII century France, although it had already inspired Montaigne's essays, pre-Cartesianism was mainly associated with anarchist currents: with the precocious libertarian movement. The only French philosopher whose production was influenced by this current was Pascal, much later. In the second half of the XVIII century the idea of Nature in French literature, whilst nominally classical, remained faithful to the artificialist pre-

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([10]) Lucrecio, *op cit*, p107.

([11]) In order to evaluate the pre-socratic artificialism, identified between the VI and V centuries BC, see Rosset(1989). He considers that artificialism is founded in Ionian philosophy, under Heraclitus' expression, while reaching its culmination with the sophists, to whom Rosset attributes the abolition of the idea of Nature as the beginning of the construction of human learning. This author suggests the study of Empedocles' works, 'On Nature' and the reading on Democritus and Epicurus. These last are discussed in the early works of Marx, 1970, emphasizing the idea of the sensible and phenomenal world. Concerning the pre-socratic philosophers, see Bornheim, nd.

([12]) See 'Bruno , Galileu e Campanella', *Coleçâo Os Pensadores, Abril Cultural*, trans. by Helda Barraco, Nestor Deola e Aristides Lobo, SP, 1983, pXI a XII.

([13]) Lenoble, 1990, p.241.

Cartesian vision, mainly in the works of Molière and La Fontaine([14]).

In this period of effervescent literary production, human relationships are viewed as a social product. This is particularly evident in Macchiavelli and Montaigne's works ([15]) and even in Shakespeare's treatment of the tragic. In Shakespeare, Nature is considered mean and insignificant ([16]) and the idea of human history replaces the idea of Nature as the main determinant of the world order.

However, the medieval paradigm gradually transformed, moving away from artificialism and towards a revival of antique naturalism. This led to a new hegemonic notion of nature which became the basis of modern naturalism. Rosset comments:

> Essentially, modern naturalism was established by Cartesianism. Then its validity was confirmed by Enlightenment (Locke and Rousseau) and, later, by German idealism and every modern philosophical current. Whilst being based on principles of preservation and restoration as its 'antique' counterpart, modern naturalism, is also a reaction against the previous artificialist current. For instance, Descartes is much less concerned with criticising Aristotelian naturalism than Hobbes' artificialism restoring the old idea of nature while freeing it from antiquated concepts. Exactly like the naturalism of Antiquity, modern naturalism successfully established a relatively solid and lasting ideology, perfectly capable of resisting the influence of thinkers like Nietzsche and Marx. In this way, it marked the starting point of a new intellectual Middle Age ([17]).

One paradox is that, whilst rationalist thought imposes regulatory laws on the sciences, Nature is seen as an unpredictable power in collusion with mysticism, but differently related to the divine domain:

> However, when reconciled to antique thought, Renaissance conferred Nature divine characteristics. From the point of view of science, Nature is magic and autonomous. As well as being totally independent from God, it holds the secrets of its own order, and enjoys that admiration and adoration which had eluded it in the past. This new naturalism painted a polarised picture of men's spiritual life which, while it was believed to have miraculous powers, was also seen as a gift of providence to humankind ([18]).

Given the complicated relationship between the ideas of magic and science, understanding modern thought through the analysis of XVII century philosophy is not easy. Cassirer (1984) provides a useful insight into Descartes', Newton's, Diderot's and Rousseau's works. From his study of Descartes he re-considers some fundamentals of naturalism:

> We cannot understand Nature if we merely identify it with visible phenomena and limit ourselves to observe how it manifests itself through space and time. Our analysis should focus on the origins (of these natural phenomena) which are to be found in the universal laws of movement. Descartes' works on the world system should reach this fundamental theoretical level. Philosophical thought should go beyond empirical analysis and focus its efforts on developing a better understanding of the construction of the world and, hopefully, contribute to the completion of this understanding([19]).

The central contrast is between inductive and deductive thought: whether principles are derived from empirical observation – ultimately phenomenology – or facts deduced from fundamental principles, with the ultimate risk of circular argument.

> What always prevented men from either feeling in control of, or protected by, Nature was a fatal impetus to explore questions which transcended human spirit. If there were no questions of transcendence Nature would automatically cease to be a mystery. This because Nature is not essentially an

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([14]) Rosset, *op cit*, p129.

([15]) Rosset (1989), considers the utopias of the XVIII century among which he mentions Montesquieu's *The Persian Letters* and Voltaire's *Tales*.

([16]) Rosset, *op cit*, quotes Shakespeare's *Hamlet*: 'there are more things in Heaven and Earth, Horatio, than are dreamed of in your philosophy'.

([17]) Rosset, *op cit*, p129.

([18]) Lenoble, *op cit*, p251.

([19]) Cassirer, 1984, p68.

> incognito, it is the human spirit that has imposed an artificial obscurity on it ([20]).

XVIII century philosophy tried to restore an understanding of Nature which involved increasingly complex constructions of the physical world, and a series of consequent hypotheses based on this.

As far as natural philosophy is concerned, the world cannot be fully understood by deductive thought alone. The influence exerted by Newton's gravitational theory caused the analysis of natural phenomena to base itself on the fundamental properties of matter.

Rationalist thought triumphed when mathematical tools were applied to the study of Nature's behaviour, as with the experiments concerned with the ideal pendulum or those about perpetual motion. The dynamic of machines and the mathematical rigour of the world system became comparable, in many respects, to the gods of Aristotle.

> Indeed, the mechanical interpretation of the world was not a total novelty. The celestial world of Aristotle was an immutable and divine world of astronomical trajectories, the only phenomena susceptible to an exact mathematical description. We can lament that science, and particularly physics, disenchants the world, but science disenchants it precisely because it renders it divine. Science does not recognise the natural diversity and future, which Aristotle had attributed to a sublunar world in the name of an incorruptible eternity - the only entity that could be subjected to thought to the same extent as truth. The world of dynamics is timeless and divine and, within its boundaries, nothing is originated ([21]).

Aristotle concluded that Nature, if seen in a dynamic model, is alien to humans. In the XVIII century, the same model of Nature can be subordinated and manipulated without it losing its magical character.

In this context, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's thoughts ([22]) can appear controversial. He tries to reclaim the idea of Nature as superseded by human society. Starobinski (1991), commenting on his work, writes:

> This society which rejects Nature (the natural order), did not suppress Nature. It maintains a permanent conflict with it, from which harm and vices are born – and these make humans suffer. Rousseau's criticism outlines the denial of the denial: he accuses civilisation, whose fundamental characteristic is its negativity in relation to Nature([23]).

Rousseau's work resurrects the theme of 'appearance' and artifice. He argues that Nature and the superficial world become invisible and that, by hiding itself, Nature also hides order and God ([24]).

Another notion introduced by modern thought is that of a phenomenal, positive, world within which beauty, ethics or freedom have no meaning. Thus, modern thought distinguishes between a physical and a philosophical world. Prigogine and Stengers (1984) further elaborate on this, referring to Kant who states that, in principle, scientific interpretations of Nature are not mutually exclusive and thus, as a consequence, irreducible and positive choices are not necessary.

In this way, Kant seeks a unified scientific language applicable to Nature and able to re-unite the physical and the philosophical worlds.

> Since Kant, science has gradually fallen outside the mythical discourse and scientific investigation has increasingly become systematic and self-contained. Philosophy consecrates and stabilises the rupture. It has delegated its concern with positive knowledge to science and it monopolises speculative analysis of human existence focusing on all aspects that transcend positivistic and deterministic interpretations.
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> In conclusion, during Antiquity Nature was associated with learning and during medieval times it became associated with God. Then, during modernity it became mute because of the separation between science and learning and between science and truth. We have been living this separation for two

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([20]) *Ibid*, p.83.

([21]) Prigogine and Stengers, 1984, P204.

([22]) Rousseau, 1992.

([23]) Starobinski, 1991, P35.

([24]) Prado, 1990, P19.

> centuries and we firmly want it to end soon([25]).

The contemporary expression of naturalism

In order to discuss the idea of Nature in a contemporary framework it is first necessary to identify the philosophical currents involved.

Rosset (1989) tried to identify and classify three recent philosophical strands with diverging ideas about Nature. However, his book, which was first published in 1973, identified currents based on expressions and conceptions hardly defensible in the mid-nineties. Despite this shortcoming, the work synthetically and critically re-launches the theme of Nature into contemporary discussion.

Rosset focuses on Nietzsche's critique of reason and on his denunciation of the links between thought and power([26]). Rosset believes in 'the presence of an illusion' within both theoretical and philosophical naturalism . One of his objectives is to criticise the notion of a nature which incorporates a conflict with a transcendental order – a naturalist illusion which tends to reject the artificialism of human construction([27]).

Rosset identifies and qualifies three contemporary naturalistic views: the first is a conservative naturalistic view; the second one is referred to as 'revolutionary'; and a third one as 'transgressor'. They respectively correspond to a mysticism of falsification, repression and transgression and seem to reflect the everlasting philosophical debate which opposes Nature to culture and Physis to Polis. A debate that contrasted the possibility of apprehending Nature not as forces that transcend the ability of the human action, but as a result of men's constructions – as the production of contemporary rationalism.

However, this demystification is not based on the rejection of the classical idea of Nature, but on the rejection of the world that describes it, retaining, in this way, all the affective and cognitive meaning that is implicit in its use. Rosset (1989), whose diagnosis seems to be within the Nietzschean criticism of philosophy, attributes the character of the Freudian notion of de-negation to this process.

> ...the modern de-negation of the idea of Nature reveals the wear and tear on this word, and not the disappearance of a certain complex of wishes that are inherent in naturalism. It reveals the wear and tear on a word, but not on a concept or on a wish (concept that is absent and, therefore, is abundant).([28])

Thus, it is necessary to define what, in this context, is understood by naturalism, and that is attributed to the search for an order that can transcend chance. Naturalism corresponds to an illusion, that constitutes a unity of ghostly views that do not admit the artificial character of existence. It is an order that refuses artifice, identified as chance; according to this conception, naturalism had its most important period in the XX century.

The permanence of the Rousseauian registry is seen as one of the hints of this period, once contemporary criticism, while pointing out its mistakes, respects and accepts its general plane, even and especially thanks to the migration of meanings. The word Nature does not matter any more; other words take its place either through discourse or through ontological view of the world, with the same transcendent and theological efficacy: history, as in Hegel, and the absurdity of existence, referring to the presence of a contingent Nature, for example among the existentialists.

Thus, historicism revives a Nature that cannot be apprehended in the present, and counterbalances the current absence of Nature by the promise of a Nature spread over time, endowed with a messianic task.

On the other hand, in existentialism, which derives from Schopenhauer, we find the same question treated differently:

> The reality of existence (its absurdity) does not mean that existence has no natural aspect, but that the 'natural' that forms its structure is an adulterated one, even a 'natural' that is outside Nature, because it denies the elements of necessity and purpose which conceived Nature as a repository([29]).

([25]) Prigogine, I, Stengers, i, *op cit*, p70, commenting on Kant, 1985.

([26]) See especially Nietzsche's *A Genealogia da Moral'*1988.

([27]) Rosset *op cit*, p272.

([28]) Rosset *ibid*, p273.

([29]) Rosset *ibid*, 276.

In this way, a nostalgia of Nature is produced as necessity and, therefore, as determinate, in the face of the evidence of contingency: it becomes guilty and gratuitous because it exists contingently. Here we can discern Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer behind existentialist philosophy, sustaining a notion of Nature through the idea of its absence. The existence of Nature does not correspond either to the domain of necessity nor, consequently, to that of meaning.

In addition we should consider the position that emphasises the falsification of existence in a world supposedly rational and administered. This view can be seen in the writings of the Frankfurt School. Rosset(1989) attacks Marcuse identifying the positions and readings which guided his philosophical choices and support his rejection of naturalism:

> The anger against contingency and the search for purpose…were expressed, on many occasions, in the contemporary forms of cultural debate by philosophers, directly or indirectly linked to the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer, Adorno, Reich, Marcuse). They elaborated an eloquent ideological model, a model that is eminently naturalist, whose nominal fragments of Marxism and Freudianism functioned only to give a new and modern appearance to what was an expression of a very old wish and claim, whose historical origin cannot be found in Marx and Freud, but in Plato, Aristotle and Rousseau...([30].

All the authors mentioned are identified with revolutionary naturalism. The Frankfurt school, and especially Marcuse, are accused of operating from two fundamental imperatives – the need for purpose and the need for Nature – on which they would elaborate the criticism of capitalist society, which constitutes a process in which 'culture suffocates Nature' and vice-versa.

Once again, the migration of meaning becomes evident. The word Nature was substituted by the word revolution. However, a more considered reflection on these statements is necessary.

First of all, remember that the origins and sources that inspired the Frankfurt school are multiple. In their work, they assimilate and criticise Marxism, the Hegelian and Kantian contributions, and make progressive breaks which move them away from the themes of revolution, class struggle and exploitation – lead them to criticise the notions of progress, science and reason, through the tense dialogue with every philosophical tradition in which these same suspicions had sprouted:

> As readers of Nietzsche's works, the Frankfurt writers suspect the 'illumination' of reason; they recognise that the origin of the moral is extra-moral, the origin of the extra-epistemological is reason. As readers of Freud, they have learned to differentiate psychic liberation from political liberation. As readers of Heidegger, with whom they disagree so much, they differentiate the ontical from the ontological([31].

Another fundamental link – much closer than Rosset(1989) supposes – is between Marx and Hegel and classical philosophy, especially Aristotelian and platonic thought: the necessity of thinking of the future through determinations, and through demands for purpose (*telos*) without which the present itself is not understood in terms of history.

Thus, like Marx, they undoubtedly regard themselves as inheritors of classical philosophical traditions. Remember, though, that the meaning and even the tone of the criticism of Marx at the beginning of the seventies was rather different from the criticism that later became explicit in authors like Castoriadis([32] and even Lefort([33].

Anyway, it should be noted that, certainly since the events of the eighties, especially with the end of 'actually existing socialism', an evident crisis of the socialist utopia can be identified, together with the emergence of new utopian projects, fundamentally linked to the ecological movement, as Habermas([34] himself stresses.

Finally, the idea of human Nature, subject to permanent repression, similar to the subordination of Nature, leads us to a more general idea of Nature as receptacle and the inner content of man. Thus, the domination of

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([30] Rosset *ibid*, 278 / 279.

([31] Matos, 1990, P15.

([32]) Castoriadis, 1982.

([33] Lefort,1979.

([34]) Habermas, 1987.

Nature always corresponds to a domination over man's interior Nature (and not only from outside him). Despite what Rosset (1989) says, it is impossible here to avoid the Freudian inheritance, especially the anthropological view in some of his texts([35]). Marcuse's criticism of this moment of civilisation is linked to this inheritance: here the one-dimensional man is being produced. Liberation would, then, entail not only a critique of the internal and external domination of man, but a rediscovery and a liberation of Nature. This would imply therefore, rediscovery of the idea of necessity and happiness, without the falsification of its instrumental conceptions.

The same link between the idea of Nature being inside and outside man could be present in what Rosset(1989) calls perverse naturalism. It is interesting to notice here that the only reference is Sade, which – we believe – demonstrates one of the most significant weaknesses of the text, especially in face of the new technologies that permit us to think, contemporaneously, from virtual reality to what some authors call 'death of the social'. ([36])

Thus, the question is the same as that which permeates this whole text: of an assimilation between the notion of Nature and human Nature – man / Nature assimilated or opposed, but thought about using the same matrix. In his conclusion, Rosset attempts to recover or to think the tragic in a different manner, closer, once again, to Nietzsche:

> ...To approve existence means to approve the tragic: it consent of an intangible existence in general, described by the notions of chance, artifice, fact, non-duration, each at its own conceptual level. It also means a refusal of any demand that puts being above total existence. Being and the tragic are opposed, just as are no and yes, negation and affirmation, necessity and chance, right and fact, Nature and artifice; the tragic aspect of existence is that there is no ontological reference....([37])

Or still when he continues:

> ...the recognition of artifice implies an assumption of the tragic, but this assumption, in its turn, implies serenity and happiness. Paradoxes: the recognition of artifice as the only means of real existence has, as a second intention, a certain feeling for the natural order; an affirmation of a possible – and natural – adequacy between man and artifice is, at the same time, the affirmation of a greater inadequacy, and it is an adequacy for nothing - an intellectually empty affirmation. Because the man of artifice says yes to a purely negative domain (chance), to anything of which he knows that he is incapable of thinking about, whatever it is. This is the constant paradox of tragic philosophy, whose purpose is to be happy without reason and to describe all the horror of the world because it yields the pleasure of showing an unchangeable feature of its happiness – of which it will never be able to speak, except as an unintelligible babble...([38]).

Although we should not ascribe different authors to these same positions, the question of the paradox of a non-natural Nature is present in contemporary thought, either as the naturalisation of construction of the human , or because what we have thought of Nature since at least the XVIII century may be a fiction([39]).

([35]) See especially his works: Freud, 1972.

([36]) See especially Baudrillard, 1985. Therefore, centering on Sade his criticism of the mystical aspect of transgression, produced by a perverse naturalism, the author differentiates two habitual forms of naturalism (conservative and revolutionary), when he refuses to believe in a naturalism of a fascination for Nature, that will be confused with an attachment to the notion of Nature... In this sense, the perverse naturalism is still struggling within a naturalistic problem, whose illusory character, it seems, it wants to denounce indefinitely. This is the reason for the existence of a desire for transgression and its paradox, the eternal struggle against a domain in which the pretension of clumsily unravelling a natural weft, whose existence is negated would not exist. It is a paradox that sums up the wish to destroy something that is already considered not to exist. Once again, the author talks about negation and, in this way, he does not discuss what perhaps would be one of his main contributions for a criticism of the idea of Nature: the image of a Nature that is not just an exterior object, but that is present in the being of men. There is not in Sade's work, we believe, any discussion of Nature outside man: it is a question of begetting the crime from, and in a form that is circumscribed in the world of, human actions and words. See also Barthes, n .d..

([37]) Rosset, *op cit*, p300.

([38]) Rosset, *op cit*, p301.

([39]) It should be observed here that this naturalization of the human constructions can be related to the process of fetishization described by Marx, in the first chapter of *Capital*.

This abstract Nature is, in fact, rationalised and disenchanted Nature, or else it contains the human and artificial institution of a fabricated Nature, created and re-created by the media – fantastic and ghostly ([40]).

In the same way, it is clear that the paradoxes present in the very notion of Nature, as well as in their relations to the world of the artifice and of human production, make us suppose that…

> The environmental crisis is, therefore, a political crisis of reason, finding no meaning within the scheme of existing scientific representation which seeks to recognise the social meaning of the world, historically and technically produced by civilisation. Western culture is confronted with a dilemma: the Universe, the world, in other words what we can at last represent, has another meaning. It has become a context of the environment([41]).

Thus, what is constituted as a political crisis of reason, or a crisis of the classical paradigms present in the human sciences as a whole, is also present in the forms of thinking about the city and the 'built environment', especially those which insist on interpreting the city just as a fact, as an exterior object that is extraneous to the subjectivities produced in its entrails ([42]).

In order to consider Nature we should thus reconsider the relations and philosophical representations that which permeate and constitute the social and historical imagery of the links Nature / mankind, Nature / town.

These considerations could lead us to conclude that , more than explaining the absence of Nature because of the repression of its expression, the essential principle of the idea of Nature is kept in tact in conservative moulds, assigning to it the happiness of mankind, if only this could blossom forth.

The durability of a strong conservative content in environmental thinking should be the beginning of a long debate, which at this point is beyond the scope of this text. We can see the need to reveal the ideological content of thought about Nature and the need for historical studies as proposed by Mazzoleni ([43]). However this provokes us to examine the implications of the differing interpretations of Nature in the making of urban studies, which we now attempt.

Town and Nature

The association between images and ideas of Nature, and the utopian proposals of urbanism have been recurrent since the Renaissance.

The XVI century already witnessed the exposition of social utopias, dormant in the long period of the Middle Ages, implying an urban consciousness. Thomas More's *Utopia* was published for the first time in Latin in 1516, presenting itself as an idealisation of the English society of his time. Brandão Lopes, in the preface to the recent Portuguese translation, indicates the Platonic roots of More's ideas, also indicating the differences among his ideal formulations:

> More's platonism is responsible for many small details of *Utopia*, like the common holding of property. However, the differences between More and Plato are deep.…In Plato the central motivation is political: communism is necessary for the realisation of justice, and because an efficient and disinterested government will only be possible with justice. In More the motivation is economic, a reaction against the economic problems of his time. The difference between them would lie behind these aspects: Plato's communism only reaches the two upper classes; More's communism concerns the whole society and intends to set men free to work ([44]).

More, in conceiving his Utopia Island, suggests equality, but alongside the possible affinity with modern socialists, the Renaissance ideal prevails, as well as a Renaissance difficulty about expressing the future. The formulations of the ideas of Nature are, still, strongly linked to religion:

([40]) Santos, M, 1992.

([41]) Tassara, 1992.

([42]) See especially Guatara, 1992, where the author points out new dimensions of the urban element not as one but as the central element of the environmental question which he believes will permit the comprehension of the mental and subjective configurations in the contemporary thought.

([43]) Mazzoleni, 1992.

([44]) More, 1989.

> The utopian definition of virtue is to live according to Nature. When God created man, he gave him no other fate. The man that follows the dictates of Nature is the man who obeys the voice of reason... Reason inspires, firstly, all the mortal love and adoration of the divine majesty, to whom we owe our being and welfare. Secondly, reason teaches and instigates us to live happily....Nature invites all men to help each other and to share, in common, the happy enjoyment of life([45]).

In this way, Nature is essence, is principle, is the original domain as in Plato. The fifty-four towns of More's Utopia Island are identical and built according to the same plan. They are walled, like medieval towns. Their inhabitants are agricultural families, and alternate works in the town and the countryside. The urban form is restricted to four equal blocks, shaping adjacent rows of buildings lining the streets:

> There are vast gardens behind and among the houses. There is, in each house, a door facing the street and another facing the garden. Utopia's inhabitants apply there the principle of common possession. In order to abolish the idea of the individual and absolute property; they move to another house each ten years... The inhabitants of the towns treat their gardens with kindness; they cultivate vines, fruits, flowers and any sort of plants...([46]).

Tommaso Campanela's works, analysed by Lenoble(1989), the thought is also organised around Plato's ideas and his intrinsic animism. He states the nonsense of the natural science of the XVI century because, while the principle of inertia is accepted as a physical basis, the land is also accepted as a living being, capable of producing mutations at any moment. Its order can prove its wisdom:

> Every representation of Nature, even when they try to rationalise it, is organised around the mistress doctrine of the soul of the world; it is the 'mana' of primitive times, the enforceable power with whom is possible to enter into mystical communion, but it is also the rejection of the regular law and, therefore, of science. We have found it in the works of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), for whom the world has just one soul that vegetates inside plants, feels inside animals and reasons inside man. And here it appears in Campanella (1568-1639), whose great work *De Sensu Rerum* was published in 1620. A natural history inspires him....He explains to us that the earth lives because it manifests a rhythm with all living creatures: the natural laws, like those that bring storms in the spring and in the autumn([47]).

Campanella's corresponding urban utopia, the Town of the Sun of 1623, analysed by Penteado Coelho(1989), expresses a nascent rationalism in the terms discussed above. The details of organisation and life in the utopian town undoubtedly reflect the discursive construction of a foreseeable social future, the assertion that a thought future is conceivable, though one that excludes the idea of progress, freezing a standard of living and of personal satisfaction involved with work and religion:

> 'Wide and straight avenues spread out from the central square; the grid permits everyone to go everywhere without turning aside. The separation between the sites in which the population work and live, and that in which the utopia is represented, is clear. Social cohesion is also symbolised by the non-differentiation of the space in which people live. Backo says that, at last, everything is, at the same time, symbol and reality. The square or circular piazzas, the wide and straight avenues, the symmetry and the variety, the pavements of stone or marble, not only articulate the town, but are also and, especially, visible signs of the rational order to which the town is subordinated([48]).

In this way, Nature and its character is shown not only because it represents the possibility of domination given to humans, but also because it is possible to organise the forms rationally.

The ideal town of the Enlightenment can be thought of in the same terms – of the new geometry of Nature. The ideal proposes the order of things and the possibility of rearrangement through the transformative power of society.

([45]) More, *ibid*, P104.

([46]) More, *ibid*, P81.

([47]) Lenoble, *op cit* P244.

([48]) Penteado Coelho, 1989, p67.

Many formulations are presented there. Firstly, the idea of Nature's power over the human mind, because of the possibility of reconstructing its essence as a pre-condition to moral regeneration and common happiness, as an imitation of its perfection([49]). Secondly, the notion of progress, symbolically expressed in the organisation of the spaces in the town, now according to nascent science. Thirdly, the perception of the notion of the future as time understood, now, through historical references.

In the expression of the town allied to Nature's geometry, discussed by Vidler(1981), we emphasise Morelly (1750) and his utopia about the kingdom of Basiliade, Laugier (1755) and his broad avenues and the metaphor of the town as a forest, and Patte (1765), and his discussion of the surgical interventions in the town, particularly his ideas for Paris. Utopias and proposals expose an exemplary model of the Enlightenment's rationalist State, through the naturalist assimilation of the idea of progress and of material reason:

> …it was the authentic aspect of the reason of Nature, Locke's and Berkeley's material reason going through Condillac, that offered itself to humanity as an ideal that could at least engender an order that would solve all the existing contradictions between progress and reality, town and country, community and individual([50]).

In Morelly (1750), the utopian city of Basiliade shows in its urban form the imagined social structure. In Laugier (1755), the influence of Rousseau and his *Discourse upon the Origin of the Unequal* published in the same year can be recognised, when he establishes an analogy between the natural town and natural architecture; or yet again when he conceives the town as a park, inverting the utopian image of 'towns of rural sceneries' – their grasslands and cultivation areas a reference to the proximity of ways of life linked to Nature – to a 'scenery of the town'; similar to the apprehension of the natural order ([51]); Tafuri (1985) thinks that Laugier's proposals depict the formal reality of the town of the XVIII century:

> we no longer find archetypes of order, but the acceptance of the anti-prospective character of urban space; and even the reference to the garden has a new meaning: the variety of Nature, that is called to take part in the urban structure, contradicts the consoling, oratorical and formative naturalism which, during the whole epoch from 1600 to 1700 had dominated the episodic narrative of the baroque systemisations'([52]).

In the proposed paradigm of Ledoux for his ideal town of **Chauxs Salt-pain** (1773), analysed by Kaufmann (1980) and Vidler (1981) among others, Rousseau's ideas are present, now already expressed in 'the Social Contract' (aligned with the permanencies of the baroque and neo-classical project). If Kaufmann thinks that Ledoux's main purpose was to overcome the past and establish a new individualism ([53]), Vidler thinks that Ledoux's individualism is conditioned to the collective concept, introducing the idea of hygiene and establishing a connection between the physical environment and social and public welfare:

> Ledoux maintained a delicate balance between hierarchy and equality. His construction of a social street, under the new form that determined the demands of scenery, was a try – the last until Morris – at keeping the community (implied by the town) as an integration of the individuality that the countryside allowed with the code offered by the physical artefact, the town... The streets, the blocks of houses and the traffic no longer formed part of the direct experience of Nature. In its place meandered the narrow ways through the park-town connecting the building among themselves. In the wood, there were wide avenues with cultivated trees linking and triangulating the centres of social activity. Hence, this image was the reverse of Patt's proposed plan for Paris, and it returned Laugier's park to the countryside, whence it had come([54]).

It is in this context that the XVIII century will already see a great increase and intensification of the distinction between urban and rural life. The town of the XVIII century will be differentiated from the countryside in

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([49]) Vidler, 1981, p37-125.

([50]) Vidler, *op cit* p40.

([51]) Besides the discussion developed by Vidler(1981), see also Leatherbarro, 1983.

([52]) Tafuri, 1985, P14.

([53]) Kaufmann, 1980, P200.

([54]) Vidler, *op cit* P58.

more ways than the first signs that announced the modern town:

> In the Renaissance the town was a synonym of civility, the countryside with roughness and rusticity. To take men out of the forests and enclose them in a town was to civilise them. As an Elizabethan dialogue put it, a nobleman who was brought up in the town would be more civilised than one who had been brought up in the countryside. The town was the birthplace of apprenticeship ,of good manners, good taste and sophistication. It was the place of man's satisfaction([55]).

The idea of a 'naturalised' town, symbol of civilisation, is then considered as a therapy for man. There is a search for treatment for an infirm town, liable to deep interventions, in the name of the hygiene and sanitation of the human mind. The town is also a stage for new forms of presenting the public spectacles, because of the emergence in the town of crowds. The organisation and order of public parades should preempt the threat of tumults and disorder in the town:

> The influence of the moral upon health, the influence of political oppression upon health and, ultimately, the influence of freedom itself upon health, were themes explored with increasing fervour during the last years of the 'ancien régime'. The institution of a correctly organised State, with a population which, from childhood, had habits of cleanliness, of healthy exercise, as well as the habit of celebrating their liberation from social pathology... The town would thus get the role it had by right, the role of a place of health and the maintenance of health. And the street, the public realm *par excellence*, would recover the civic and festive functions lost since a more natural epoch. ([56])

Thus, if we can say '…that the XIX century was the century of hygiene in the European world…'([57]), it should be emphasised that the theme of Nature will appear as part of thinking about the city and urbanism..

These were the recurrent historical and social conditions of the long period of urban reforms of the principal European towns, since the middle of the XIX century, as we learn from Benevolo (1987), Vidler (1981), Tafuri (1985) and others. The search for interventions which would cleanse and embellish the towns now gained support for additional reasons. These interventions were conditioned to the rationalistic and scientific ideas which were also expressed in the forms of constructing the town; furthermore, they raised the urban bourgeoisie to the new position of promoting the 'naturalisation' of what is fundamentally artificial – the character of the city:

> …geometrical analysis established the form of the new complexes; the surgeon's techniques offered the instruments for their realisation. After a long pathological state, after the patient's deep agony, the body of Paris would be cured forever of its illness, of its cancers and epidemics, through a complete surgical action…. Pathologists, surgeons and also critics often repeated these metaphors deeply impregnated with the unconscious analogies of urban planning so that, now and then, the metaphor and the scientific nature of the action confused and fused with each other…. A new requirement, the science of hygiene, which came to complement the mere construction of streets, would endow the new suburbs with space, air, light, green and flowers: in one word, with everything that provides health([58]).

The utopias or the humanist utopianism tend in the same direction with Fourier (1808), and his initial treatise on a domestic agricultural association, including Falansterio's unified building, which would be so well adapted to community life and public health; or with Saint-Simon (1819), Étienne Cabet (1840), Robert Owen (1820) with his model towns of health, followed by countless examples in the XX century. The strength of the preoccupation with hygiene is strongly present in the construction of the urban proposals, despite the differences pointed out by Tafuri in his analysis.

Once we search for the roots of modern urbanism and its ideologies, the differentiation becomes fundamental. Firstly, the development of the Anglo-Saxon urbanism which, through 'utopian socialism', influences Howard's and Unwin's later proposals for garden-cities and

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([55]) Thomas, 1988, P290.

([56]) Vidler, *op cit* P50.

([57]) Monteiro De Andrade, 1992, P16.

([58]) Vidler, *op cit* P95.

suburbs at the end of the XIX century and the beginning of the XX century. Secondly, the urban proposals of social-democracy which, between 1910 and the 1930s influenced the urban projects of Frankfurt and Amsterdam. And finally the models elaborated from agrarian America – from the societies of the constructed utopias through to the naturalistic and conservative ideology expressed by the City-Beautiful movement, or in Olmsted's landscape architecture. All, states Tafuri(1985), were fundamentally compromised with a bourgeois ethic, which generated different visions of an associative life, but with only one type-form – the town:

> The end of utopianism and the beginning of realism are not mechanical moments within the formation of the modern movement and its ideology. On the contrary, since the fourth decade of the XIX century, realist utopianism and utopian realism overlap and counterbalance one another. The decline of the social utopia determines the surrender of the ideology to the politics of things produced by the laws of profit; to the urban, artistic and architectural ideology is left the utopia of form, as a project of recuperation of the human entity in an ideal synthesis, as a possession of the disorder through the order([59]).

In this way, the urbanism of the large town – the metropolis about which Hilbersheimer and Corbusier write – constitutes the finished expression of the reasoned town of the XIX century. The image is recurrent of the machine-town capable of sheltering and modelling a homogeneity of ways of life and consumption.

Some themes should be identified for further inquiry in this discussion. Firstly, the loss of the sense of 'place' in the town of movement, the mass town, i.e., abstraction in its logical form of reproduction. Secondly, the possibility of its endless repetition, allegory of a homogeneous world. Tafuri(1985), discussing Hilbersheimer and his purist manifesto, has written:

> Hilbersheimer's machine-town only holds, certainly, secondary aspects of the new functions determined by the capitalist reorganisation in great concentrations of tertiary work. However, in the context of the modernisation of the techniques of production and the expansion and rationalisation of the market, the architect who produces objects becomes an inadequate figure. It is not a question of moulding isolated elements in the tissue of the town any longer, neither, ultimately, of moulding simple prototypes. But it is a question of individualising, in the town, the real unit of the circuit of production...([60]).

Thirdly, the discussion of the theme of Nature expresses a perfect alignment with rationalist ideas, as we pointed out above, in the discussion about modern conceptions of the idea of Nature – conceptions that seem to sum up the debate through the history of philosophy between Nature and culture, Physis and Polis – the possibility of no longer apprehending Nature as a unity of forces transcending the capacity of the human action, but as a product of men's fabrication, as a construction of contemporary rationalism. Here we quote as an exemplary passage (even if it is out of context):

> Nature appears, considered superficially, as a magma of incidents that are constantly changeable and varied... But, once Nature is carefully observed or seriously experimented, it appears, therefore, not as a fantasy without a plan, but as a machine. Laws permit us to consider that Nature acts as a machine. From this extremely complicated machine comes out a very complex tissue, but a tissue over a geometric web([61]).

Thus, we understand that the possibility of attributing to Le Corbusier a neo-Platonic vision of the organisation of the Polis, is restricted to form and geometry, in which Nature, seen as a machine, is an intrinsic part of the urban artifice.

Perhaps the literal implosion of the vast block of modernist apartments in St. Louis, Missouri, USA, at the beginning of the seventies, could be the best image and expression of the possibility of discussing post-modernity and the town. Here, the old and new territories of ethnic, social and spatial segregation of large human and urban

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([59]) Tafuri, *op cit* P38.

([60]) Tafuri, *op cit* P74, commenting on ludwig hilberseimer, 1979.

([61]) Jeanneret, C E; Ozenfant, A, *Aprés le Cubisme*, Paris, Ed. des Commentaires sur L'Art et la Vie Moderne, vol1, 1918, p41, quoted in Ferreira Martins, 1992.

concentrations in the end of the XX century, witness the foolishness of reason's aims. It makes sense, especially with these inquiries, to think of the contemporary urban question and its relation to Nature discussed through the paradoxes pointed out in this text. Harvey (1992), says:

> …the Pruitt-Igoe housing development in St Louis (a prize-winning version of Le Corbusier's 'machine for living') was dynamited as an uninhabitable environment for the low income people it housed. Thereafter, the ideas of the CIAM, Le Corbusier, and the other apostles of 'high modernism' increasingly have way before an onslaught of diverse possibilities….The glass towers, the concrete blocks and the steel slabs that seemed set fair to steamroller over every urban landscape from Paris to Tokyo, and from Rio to Montreal, denouncing all ornament as crime, all individualism as sentimentality, all romanticism as kitsch, have progressively given way to ornamented tower-blocks, imitation mediaeval squares and fishing villages, custom designed or vernacular housing, renovated factories and warehouses, and rehabilitated landscapes of all kinds, all in the name of procuring some more 'satisfying' urban environment([62]).

The paradigm of Nature is recovered through the dramatic appeal of its own survival, or through the attribute of man's physical and mental health. The subject, contemporaneously re-taken, reproduces the reflections and the logical rule of rationalism; the discussion about the town, in the urbanised world, becomes the expression of the final construction of the idea of artifice:

> ...although the reality of industrialisation has produced a social dimension of Nature necessary to the reproduction and viability of its strategy, this dimension is concealed by the naturalisation of the subject. On the other hand, this naturalisation provokes the closing of the universe of discourse as a condition for standardising what is human – the urban, as a natural environment, becomes the natural environment of the urban([63]).

However, it is not a case of conceiving the artifice as having the properties of a Nature that holds rational and universal laws, as in the process of naturalisation of the urban developed since the XVIII century. The contemporary idea of the urban as Nature has other presuppositions: it states that the human environment is the urban one which, produced as artifice, is still thought of as such, although it is represented as Nature.

> When the environment, as Nature-spectacle, substitutes historical Nature, the workplace of all men, and when cybernetic or synthetic Nature substitutes the analytic Nature of the past, the process of obscuring of the meaning of history reaches its peak. And it is also in this way that is established a painful confusion of technical systems, Nature, society and culture([64]).

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([62]) Harvey, 1992, (p 40 of English edn 1989).

([63]) Tassara, *op cit* p5.

([64]) Santos, *op cit* p102.

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The historical variety of content in the garden city option of urban reform

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A Fabian psychosis : ' I walk about and alternately loathe the people and long to be one of them ' (Raymond Unwin, Manchester: April 1885) (1).

Introduction - the notions of utility, liberty and discipline

The garden city paradigm of urban reform at the beginning of the twentieth century represents an extraordinary achievement in many senses. As a paradigm, this urban form of encompassing capitalist social relationships inspired new forms of dealing with the urban expansion of large, industrial and commercial cities not only in the British Isles but also in France, in Germany, in the United States and in many other countries in an emerging capitalist world order. The achievement is also extraordinary in the sense of the historical continuities which the paradigm represents. It can be suggested that the model company towns and villages organised form the middle of the 19th century onwards by 'benevolent', 'philanthropic' or 'religious' industrial entrepreneurs represented an *anticipation* of a new relationship between capital and labour. This new relationship, while it implied new and more intense urban forms of control, supervision and regeneration of industrial labour, also implied a substantial material improvement of the living conditions of the working class.

As regards the 20th century improvement in labour's living conditions, the achievement represented by the garden-city paradigm should not be judged only by the restricted number of garden suburbs inspired by Ebenezer Howard's original utopia. In detailing this utopia, the new spatial, compositional and equipment norms and standards set out by Howard's followers had a major impact on the design of innovative public policies in town planning, in transport, sanitation, leisure and above all in the minimum housing standards discussed by government in the initial decades of this century, when the reproduction of capitalist labour power became a principal regulatory function of the capitalist state. Following the Second World War much of the welfare state's urban dimension would be elaborated on the basis of this heritage, to the extent perhaps that the name of Raymond Unwin should be added to the names of Beveridge and Keynes as the co-authors of the British welfare state. Certainly the post-war advances in the British new towns, in the Parker-Morris housing standards and in development control, the policies followed the lines suggested by work done by Raymond Unwin and Barry Parker, among others, in realising Howard's ' Dream of Tomorrow '.

Much work still remains to be done in understanding and tracing the political genesis of this urban reform utopia and its transformation into an outstanding urban reality of twentieth century capitalism. In an earlier paper (Gunn, 1991), it was suggested that the development of 19th century capitalism followed particular national trajectories influenced by the peculiarities of mercantile absolute states in the transition from a feudal to a specifically bourgeois order, by the presence or absence of colonial heritage and, above all, by the specific diachronic nature of capitalist accumulation. The uneven spatial diffusion of this accumulation process would signify widely differing patterns of territorial integration, complex differences in the relationships between town and country and, especially, differing forms of evolving patterns of urban segregation and social segmentation.

At the risk major errors of historical reductionism, it can be suggested that the historical evolution of capitalism involves not only a series of shifts from labour- to capital-intensive methods of surplus value extraction, but also a corresponding series of shifts in the liberties and disciplines of bourgeois social organisation created with the aid of a Benthamite calculus of pain and pleasure (Bentham, 1979). Much of the history of urban capitalist development is a story of pain (Bentham, 1979) expressed in the 18th century lithographs of Hogarth (Burke and Caldwell), in the 19th century panoptic descriptions of new urban technologies hidden in the work of Charles Dickens (1848) or in the 20th century condemnations of 'coke towns' (Mumford, 1966). Violence and pain seem to be endemic to the

developing urban order from the large scale urban incursions of the plague in the 18th and 19th centuries to the cataclysmic violence exercised upon the 20th century towns of Dresden, Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

The search for pleasure seems to be another story. But, as initially stated in the doctrine of utility, pleasure and pain are inseparable mirror opposites of the individual human condition. From the standpoint of bourgeois liberty and discipline, a carrot should preferably always accompany the stick. In late 19th century England and France, the increased discipline necessary for the pervasive extension of the large scale factory system seems to have been bought through the extension of electoral suffrage. In Bismarck's new Germany, the intensified police repression of the labour movement in the late 1870s would be accompanied by the capitalist world's first social welfare legislation. Later, in the United States, the draconian disciplinary extension of Frederick Winslow Taylor's production line, now in movement, would be masked by the carrot of Henry Ford's revolutionary 'six dollar day'.

The bourgeois conceptions of Liberty and Discipline, transformed as the prerequisites of social relations based on market commodities, should never be formally associated one with the other. As Michel Foucault has implied,

> 'Historically, the process by which the bourgeoisie became, in the eighteenth century, the politically dominant class was masked by the establishment of an explicit, coded, and formally egalitarian judicial framework, made possible by the organisation of a parliamentary, representative regime. But the development and generalisation of disciplinary mechanisms constituted the other, dark, side of these processes ' (Foucault, 1986: 211).

After the victory of capitalism the separation of the carrot and the stick was not always an easy task. As an intellectual leader of the victorious bourgeoisie, following the spate of urban revolts which plagued France in the initial decades of the nineteenth century, Auguste Comte proposed a complete solution for capitalist component social classes. On the one hand Comte, after seeing the effects of the 1948 revolution, concluded that,

> '...the people cannot be interested, for any length of time, in such conflicts [major political struggles], because the nature of our civilisation evidently prohibits the proletarians to hope for or even desire an important participation in political power...' (Comte, 1848, Discourse on the Positive Spirit, part 3, item xix, xx)

On the other hand, Comte offered his compensatory Proletarian Social Programme based on the twin aims of Normal Education and Regular Work. In many senses the welfare state carrot and stick paradigm of full employment and social services appears to have received its foundation stone ninety years before Beveridge and Keynes. If regular work can be thought of as the stick in Comte's programme it might be useful to see his programme for Normal Education based on the ' systematic popularisation of positive studies' as a carrot containing a Foucaultian dark-sided disciplinary mechanism. As Moraes (1989, 20-22) has suggested, science and knowledge were the major weapons used during the 18th century in the bourgeois surge towards power. The victory of capitalism required a firm doctrinal stance with science providing the basis for the advancement of capitalist productive forces and also for its assault on political discourse (Hirschman, 1977). But after its victory, science and knowledge would require a new reorientation based on the need for the continued consolidation and conservation of the victory, avoiding the revolutionary and subversive potential of knowledge. This reorientation of science towards 'positive studies' was to be realised through Comte's renewal of the great 18th century work of the Encyclopedians based on Diderot and others. In Comte's Positivist Catechism, the separation of the natural and human sciences was to be achieved in a new order with seven degrees of knowledge, each degree hierarchically articulated with one another in a progression beginning with mathematics and ending with sociology and moral science.

In the second half of the twentieth century, the systematic segmentation of science would receive an important stimulus with the acceptance by the main European governments of the need for primary and secondary education (Cipolla, 1969). The advancement of science would also receive a strong stimulus from the capitalist expansion of the social division of labour to new products and work processes as well as to new geographical areas. Capel (1981, 58) considering the importance of imperialist

rivalry at this time, cities the motto of a contemporary geographical journal, ' The Earth Will Belong to He Who Knows It Best '.

In social terms, the division of science into ever finer segments and specialities opened the way not only for a new system of normal education, but also for new systems of professions, public servants and an ever increasing profusion of new industrial, commercial, financial and service activities, in which the extension of the social division of labour fulfilled the requirements of extended capital accumulation. The increasing separation of manual and intellectual labour also helped widen the scope of the capital-labour social relation both within and between the public and private entrepreneurial segments of the institutionalised bourgeois society. In the history of the late 19th century urban reform movement, the administrative innovations of municipal government, led in Birmingham by Joseph Chamberlain (Briggs, 1968), would reflect the necessity of a reformed local government structure, producing the type of urban support mechanism required by large scale factory production. The extension of the industrial cities and an increasingly sophisticated range of new factory, colliery, port and railway-transport town structures appear as the required basis of capital growth. In the new legal, medical, accounting, engineering and architectural urban professions the need for urban reform would appear within disciplinary debates on sanitation, transport, housing, public administration, etc.

The formative political economy roots of the garden city paradigm

If urban reform theories would reflect implicitly the logic of innovation in the capital-labour relation from the point of view of capital, the opposite might also be true. Hygenistic theories of urban sanitary reform, mass urban transport and, as Peter Hall (1988) has indicated, the intellectual influences of Ebenezer Howard's ' Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform ' (1898, reissued as Garden Cities of Tomorrow, 1902), Edward Gibbon Wakefield's ideas on colonisation, Charles Booth's views on the urban poor and Canon Barnett's Toynbee Commission's proposal of 'compulsory work under human discipline' came from a multiplicity of sources. Among the specifically urban and rural roots of the garden-city utopia, Hall also cites Alfred Marshall's condemnation of inner city agglomeration and Kropotkin's (1898, Fields, Factories and Workshops) ideas on rural decentralisation. These ideas are understood to be further influenced by Herbert Spenser's and Edward Bellamy's ideas on land nationalisation and taxation. As regards the urban form proposed for this utopia, Hall cites as forerunners the model villages of J. C Lever's Port Sunlight, Cadbury's Bournville suburb in Birmingham, Frederick Law Olmsted's garden suburb of Riverside in Chicago and James Silk Buckingham's model town of Victoria in Australia.

Using such initiatives could also be seen in the possibility of differing political settings and orientations from Spencerian liberalism to Marxist socialism or Kropotkinite anarchism. George Lichtheim has indicated the initial years of the 1880s as a crucial formative moment in the birth of Britain's Labour Movement, marked also by the death of Karl Marx in 1883. Certain political groups were of special importance and were all formed during these years. On one hand, there was Henry Mayers Hyndman who founded the Social Democratic Federation in 1884 and, on the other, the Socialist League formed by William Morris, Belford Bax, Edward Aveling, Eleanor Marx and patronised, behind the scenes, by Engels (Lichtheim, 1975).

William Morris had come to socialism because of the influence of the Oxford socialist group of Ruskin, Maurice, Green and Toynbee and, as an honorary fellow of Exeter College, was later to astound the University's leading rectors (including the rectors of Keeble and of Merton as well as his friend John Ruskin) with his lecture on Art and Democracy when, in a fervent manner, he pronounced his socialism and his belief in revolution in the Radical Club in Oxford on the 7th of November 1883 (Elia, 1977, 25). In the following year, Morris was actively involved in the dispute between Hyndman and the others in the Socialist Federation and became the editor of the Socialist League's journal *The Commonweal*. In 1885, Morris travelled the country to promote the League's attempts to expand its organisation in the main regional towns. In September of the same year, Morris went to Manchester to help that city's socialist societies. Morris lectured on socialist tactics and organisations at the County Forum and lectured on *socialism: the end and the means* to the Ancoats Brotherhood, where he

made a deep impression on at least one of its members, the young Raymond Unwin (Day, 1981, 160) (2).

The following year, 1886, Morris returned to Manchester and founded the Socialist League there with Raymond Unwin becoming the League's first secretary in the city (Day, 1981, 161). Unwin had come to work in Manchester as a draughtsman-fitter in February 1885, working in the Queen's Park district of the city. Before this, Day has indicated that he 'travelled the country' and made an acquaintance with the socialist poet Edward Carpenter. Other formative influences on Unwin's development included the socialist humanism of the book *The Law-breaker* by James Hinton, a surgeon and socialist philosopher with a strong interest in land reform. Henry George had visited London in 1881-2 and his activities, according to Lichtheim, had stirred much interest in social reform (Lichtheim, 1975, 201). In 1882, Unwin with his father had attended the first meeting of Russel Wallace's Land Nationalisation Society (Day, 1981, 194 and Unwin, 1936). Unwin's viewed his Manchester experience, in terms of socialist militancy, as a relative failure and he moved to Staveley, Derbyshire and was employed by the Staveley Coal and Iron Company where he was to work on mining villages and miners' cottages from March 1887 up to 1896 when he formed his partnership with his half cousin Barry Parker. In 1893, Unwin had married Harry Parker's sister Heather and, one year earlier had began its collaboration with Parker when the Staveley Company had proposed and financed a church for St. Andrew's, Barrow Hill, where Parker had designed the fixtures and fittings. During this time, Unwin continued to write for the socialist press with articles both for *Today* and the *Commonweal*. Later, Day confirms Unwin Parker's membership of the Fabian Society.

In the 1980s, the history of the Fabian Society began with the

> 'wandering scholar' and ex-Scottish head-master, classical student, Dr Thomas Davidson, author of *Philosophy of Rossini-Serbati, Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals* (3). The society of the Fellowship of the New Life was officially founded in London on November 7th in 1883. Mrs Cole, in her story of Fabian Socialism, describes Thomas Davidson in the following terms:
>
> '...a Scottish schoolmaster who had emigrated to America, and in that land of cranks and Utopians had developed a cloudy philosophy which demanded that its votaries should pledge themselves to life according to the high ideals of love and brotherhood...Most of what Davidson wrote is confused and nonsensical ' (Cole, 1961).

Davidson spent two decades as a homesteader in the United States and Edward Pease, another founding member, called him a 'a descendant of the utopians of Brook Farm and the Phalanstery'. George Bernard Shaw mentions other founder members including the psychical researcher Edward Pease and Frank Podmore (Lichtheim, 1975 and Shaw, 1947: 7). Among others who were present (November 7th., 1883) there was the anarchist Mrs Wilson and the writer Edith Nesbit and her husband Hubert Bland, Dale Owen (grandmother of Robert Owen), and H H Campion. Campion later joined Hyndman's Social Democratic Federation. Davidson, like Henry George, was no socialist but believed in the need for heavy taxation on landowners. The question of socialism, however, became an immediate question in the new Fellowship in the following months.

In January 1884, there was a split in the Fellowship with Edward Pease, Frank Podmore, Charlotte Wilson, and Hubert Bland leaving and founding the Fabian Society. In the following two years, those who would effectively form the Fabian leadership, joined the society, including Sidney Webb, Sidney Oliver, George Bernard Shaw and Graham Wallace. The name Fabian society had been suggested by founding member Frank Podmore (4) when he made a reference to the elderly Roman commander Fabius Cunctador. Early Fabian texts apparently bear the motto ' For the right moment you must wait, as Fabius did most patiently, when warring against Hannibal, though many censured his delays, but when time comes you must strike hard, or your waiting will be vain and fruitless' (Lichtheim, 1975, 204). Lichtheim adds his contribution suggesting that those who awaited the Fabians to strike hard would have a long wait to Doomsday.

The new Fabian Society would await patiently the results of their main Cunctadorian mission. This, according to Lichtheim, was the conversion of the English

middle classes to socialism. But, in the beginning, it was not entirely evident what was meant exactly by socialism. William Morris, who considered himself a follower of Marx, was asked by an earnest questioner, 'Does Comrade Morris accept Marx's Theory of Value?' Morris replied, 'To speak frankly, I do not know what Marx's Theory of Value is, and I am damned if I want to know' (Pelling, 1965, 31). The first English edition of Marx's *Capital* would only appear in 1887 and not every Marxist would read it. Bernard Shaw had read the French version in the early 1880s, and a Marxist view of surplus value extraction can be seen in his writings of this period. Within the Fabians, Shaw and Webb had, however, different accounts of surplus value extraction and rent theory. Lichtheim cites a Fabian reading group working on Capital in Hampstead Public Library during 1885 and 1886, with Sidney Webb defending Jevons and Mill and with Bernard Shaw and Belfort defending Marx (Lichtheim, 1975). Shaw would eventually accept Webb's position.

Webb's version of a theory of land rent was based on the following understanding:

1. the wages paid to the skilled labourers employed on the worst soil, with the minimum of capital, and in the worst circumstances, will be the natural of the wages paid to unskilled workers;

2. assuming an unregulated growth in population, the minimum wage will equal the subsistence wage necessary to keep the unskilled workers alive long enough to rear a new generation of unskilled labourers; and

3. higher productivity resulting from the application of capital and unskilled labour, or from better soil, will yield a surplus which will, in turn, be divided up between various types of rent.

Such rents will arise in any circumstances where labour, land, ability and capital vary in quantity and quality, but the distinctive feature of capitalist society is that the bulk of the rent is appropriated by the owners of the means of production. Skilled and organised workers may get a proportion of the 'rent ability' but never the whole of it. Moreover, skill is related to education which, in turn, is unequally possessed, the offspring of the wealthy classes getting more of it. Thus the return to the various factors of production is heavily weighted against those who only have their labour to sell. The various factors are not remunerated in proportion to the contribution they make to wealth (or value) creation and there is an 'unearned increment' that goes to the owners of capital. In short, the capitalist is in the same position as the landlord: he is a monopolist even in a state of perfect competition. Fabian economics was the application to a capitalist industry of the Ricardian theory of rent but with a twist. The accumulation of capital was indeed necessary, but this did not justify the existence of a capitalist class, for saving could be done collectively by the community instead of being left to private individuals. As for the managerial function, this (as suggested in *Capital*) could be separated from that of the pure capitalists. The novelty of the Fabian concept of 'surplus' was that it did not depend on the labour theory of value.

Shaw's exposition of rent theory was published in 1889 in *Fabian Essays*. In his essay, Shaw first alludes to Mill's definition of rent as being 'the excess of its return above the return to the worst land for cultivation', and then proceeds, in an introduction in which he mentions Adam as the first proletarian, to an initial starting point before proceeding with an exposition of the landlord-tenant relationship; differential rent; the tenant cultivator's needs to sell his labour so as to feed his family; the principle of exchange value etc; before arriving at the level of wages in industry. His argument concludes with the assertion that 'shareholder and landlord live alike on the produce extracted from their property by the labour of the proletariat'. Lichtheim also quotes Shaw in the following terms:

> 'This, then is the economic analysis which convicts Private Property of being unjust from the beginning, and utterly impossible as a final solution of even the individualist aspect of the problem of adjusting the share of the worker in the distribution of wealth to the labour incurred by him in his production... on socialism the analysis of the economic action of individualism bears a discovery, in the private appropriation of land, of the source of those unjust privileges against which socialism is aimed' (Lichtheim, 1975: 210-211 and Shaw, 1950: 22-24).

According to Lichtheim,

> 'The Fabians did know or thought they knew what was Marx's Theory of Value and they

had concluded (still within a philosophy of socialism) that in economics J. S. Mill and Stanley Jevons were more relevant for their purpose' (Lichtheim, 1975).

The links with Jevons and J. S. Mill are not entirely explicit in the brief account given by Lichtheim, but both Jevons' theory of value as later expounded by Wicksteed and Mill's ideas on the counter-cyclical interventions of the State would have important consequences in the urban theories of Unwin and Parker. Jevons had attempted a complete rupture with the Ricardian labour tradition of value in his attention to the supply and demand laws of the market and, more particularly, to the conceptual Benthamite basis of utility in deriving a theory of exchange value. Jevons also used two concepts, regarded by Roll as being 'clumsy', the 'law of indifference' and the idea of a 'trading body'. Roll sees the first merely as a substitute for the idea of perfect competition on which the idea of marginal utility would initially depend. The 'trading body' was, however, an important and useful flexible subject. Using the idea of trading body, Jevons imagined that the exchange between two individuals could be applied to any body of buyers and sellers defined as trading bodies. The notion could be applied to any body. Jevons imagined that the exchange between two individuals could be applied to his equilibrium equations, without modification, to a multiple of buyers and sellers from the individual up to all the inhabitants of a given country (Roll, 1938, 384-385) (5). The treatment by Unwin of the transformation of agricultural land into urban use in the expansion of cities would show traces of a Jevonian formulation.

As regards J. S. Mill, the reference could signify a number of things including the development of British positivism which, in itself was an important consideration in the intellectual origins of Fabian thinking. But the importance of Mill can also be seen in discussions on the roots of State regulation and the use of the Public Fund. Given the political possibilities associated with public interventionism, this theme would have a prominence in socialist and social-democratic thinking on the problems of managing the political crises of capitalism. But, in terms of value theory and extended accumulation, state regulation of market competition and capital devaluation still depended on the ideas of Mill. The economist Ben Fine, in a discussion of Rosdolsky's treatment of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, has indicated 'Marx borrowed his list of counter tendencies from J. S. Mill', but in his chapter on the internal contradictions of the law, 'he only analysed those associated with the devaluation of capital, precisely because these exist at a less complex level than the others'. We find references to the other counteracting tendencies throughout Capital, but they are not related to the law as such, in a systematic way. 'This dependence on Mill for his 'list' of counteracting tendencies was first pointed out in English, as far as I know, in my article with Lawrence Harris in Socialist Register 1976' (Fine, 1978). Be this as it may, Lichtheim cites the society's most authoritative historian A. M. McBrair as saying that, 'the Fabians stood at the parting of the ways at the point where the modern attitude of the state diverged from the liberal-radical attitude of the 19th century'. Lichtheim concludes 'that is to say their dislike of economic laissez-faire took the form of a wholesale rejection of Liberalism but not of Benthamism' (McBrair, 1962, 73 and Lichtheim, 1975, 215). This left the door open for Jevons' theory of value.

But when Lichtheim also cites Hobsbawm, other political implications arise in the following terms:

> 'It is interesting that the Webbs should have found the most congenial political societies for so long in the group of liberal imperialists around that Bismarckian collectivist, R. B. Haldane. It is equally interesting that both the Webbs and Shaw should – partly in line with their debt to the economics of F A Walker, the American – have shown a marked preference for big, or even monopolist business over small or medium business, as both are more long-sighted, capable of paying higher wages and less committed to laissez-faire' (Hobsbawm, 1964).

Lichtheim concludes:

> 'To put it bluntly, they are authoritarians. Their brand of socialism was of a sort that Lasalle and Rodbertus had at an earlier stage represented in Germany and for which the Comteans had prepared the ground in Britain.... What they really were after was the forcible reorganisation of society by the state' (Lichtheim, 1975: 215).

The very evolution of the Fabian Society in the two decades afterwards confirmed an orientation emphasises by a membership largely drawn from the ranks of the civil service, the so-called liberal professions and academics. This specific orientation with institutional leanings in favour of state intervention coincided with the growth of the garden city movement of urban reform. Among the many factors which influenced the conversion of many aspects of Howard's 19th century utopia into a British 20th century urban welfare state, housing and town planning legislative reality, would include the Fabian influence of Unwin and Parker, especially in their projects for urban expansion through garden-city proposals and lower density suburban development.

The influence of the Fabian land-rent theories can be seen in their various writings on the possibility of lower housing densities and urban expansion at town edges.

The first assumption of an Unwin and Parker 'rent theory' would involve the conception of the 'landowners as a class'. In 1909, Unwin writes:

> 'The landowners as a class would not suffer loss if restrictions were to reduce the price of their land by half the difference between the building and agricultural values simply because double the number of building areas will be required' (Unwin, 1909).

The landowners become a Jevonian trading body as a corporate subject. The second assumption presupposes an unlimited supply of rural land, available for rural-urban value conversion at the fixed exchange rate implicit in the figures used to distinguish the cost of rural and urban building land. In an address given in 1912 to the London Garden Cities and Town Planning Association (partially republished in the second edition of *Town Planning in Practice* in the 1st French edition) Raymond Unwin expresses the rural-urban price division in quantitative terms. Rural land was quoted at £40.00 per acre and urban building land at £300.00 per acre before development costs (Unwin, 1967).

A Benthamite appeal to value-for-money is also apparent when Raymond Unwin presents the question of different housing densities in urban expansion with different implications for garden size and for development costs (see Table 1) and concludes

> 'The table shows what a much higher price per yard [meter] the tenant must pay when double the number of houses are erected on each acre and how seriously the size of his garden plot is decreased as compared with the slight reduction in the cost per home' (Unwin, 1967).

Barry Parker puts forward a complementary argument for the creation of public open space in urban areas:

> 'The enhanced value of land created by its urbanisation is not diminished by some of that land becoming an open space; it is transferred to other land. Some of it is spread and transferred to adjoining land and some of it may be transferred to land far away on the outskirts of the town, but none of it is lost....Yet the short-sighted say 'I can sell this piece of land for three thousand pounds tomorrow and you ask me to give it as an open space; this means giving away three thousand pounds, and that is all there is to it...The pity of it is that our system of land tenure is so stupid that its results are entirely fortuitous, and what one landowner does with his land enriches or impoverishes others impartially and indiscriminately....Our English habit is to spend public money on creating such values and then to make a free gift of them to whoever may happen to own the land to which they accrue'.

But the redistribution of urban land values in this form entails no collective loss to the urban landowners as a class.

> 'But this is not the whole story. Not only are land values not lost through the creation of open spaces, very great land values are actually created....The effect of dedicating a park is to spread the town in which it is and to bring more land on the outskirts of that town from 'agricultural value' into 'building value'... to create open spaces is to reduce the densities and experience has amply shown everywhere that to reduce densities does not diminish land values and creates new land values by bringing more land from 'agricultural value' into 'building value'.'

However, Parker in 1930, can now report initial results of Fabian urban reform:

> 'Where the land is subject to a town planning scheme under the Town Planning Acts, and open spaces are created on it, half the increased values in land can (at least theoretically) be recovered as 'betterment'....At present the provision of the Town Planning Act only apply to 'land which is in the course of development or appears likely to be used for building purposes'...It is now, however, universally admitted that the time is ripe for the extension of the powers conferred by the Town Planning Acts to cover 'built upon' land.' (Parker, 1930: 105)

In this formulation the liberal radicalism of the previous century gives way to a social-democratic understanding of state intervention through Town Planning legislation regulating rural-urban price transformations.

Thoughts on revisiting the heritage

It has been suggested in this paper that the Jevonian interpretation of markets was instrumental in allowing the subsequent question on rural-urban land rent to be contained within a distribution-of-surplus-value debate, where the state could be understood as the means of regulating the public and private appropriation of surplus value. The importance given by the Fabians to the role of the state has been judged by Lichtheim to have been authoritarian. To this end, he mentions the subsequent political positions of the leading Fabian actors, with Webb's adoption of British social imperialism during the Boer War and Shaw's later flirtation with Mussolini, as evidenced of authoritarian tendencies. State intervention in the regulation of town building and town renewal would in fact become a central feature of mid-20th century capitalism in Britain as in other European countries. With the need for post-war reconstruction after 1918 and 1945 and for providing a renewed basis for urban settlement and mobility in the decentralising age of the omnibus and motorcar and with lower density town suburbs incorporating houses complete with the new kitchen technologies and modern bathrooms. Aldridge has cited a study by Hall et al. (1973, vol. 1, p 83), showing that the built-up area of London increased its physical size five times between 1919 and 1939 (6). State intervention in this same period in house construction can be seen in the figures of Fraser (1950) with state-assisted construction responsible for one 1.5 million and the private sector building 2.5 million houses (Aldridge, 1979 and Frazer, 1950). In the subsequent period from 1940 up to 1958, the State would be responsible for more than 50 per cent of the total. In 1973, 263,000 houses were constructed with Local Authorities and New Town Corporations building slightly more than 90,000. State regulation of location and amenity also expanded: minimum standards for house-size, fixtures and fittings. Minimum house size had long been a preoccupation in the work of Unwin and Parker. In the 1930s, the Tudor Walters Report suggested standards which were officially adopted in the 1944 Housing Manual based on the Dudley Report. While emergency asbestos prefabricated houses had a minimum size of 600 sq ft (55.8 sqm) the Ministry norm became 900 sq ft (83.7 sqm). Later standards, approved in the 1960s, increased this limit to 960 sq ft (89.3 sqm) with the Parker Morris standard. A reversal of this form of intervention which began in the 1970s involved questioning the various locational and administrative forms of housing and Town Planning regulations which would subsequently form part of the neo-liberal critique.

Faced with a resurgence of market liberalism, it is not without historical significance that there is a renewed academic interest in land-rent theories which also began in the 1970s. T. A. Broadbent would feel the contradiction close to home. In 1975, he published the paper 'An Attempt to Apply Marx's Theory of Ground Rent to the Modern Urban Economy' as Research Paper No 17 of the Centre for Environmental Studies in London, shortly afterwards to be declared a quango in the neo-liberal onslaught which managed to have the centre closed. Much of the new land-rent literature would have a Marxist (Lipietz, 1974, Ball and Harvey, 1982) or at least a Ricardian (Scott, 1980) orientation. But most of the positions put forward followed Marx's original land-rent theories with the inter-class distributional problems these call into question. In 1985, this tradition was radically questioned by Deák (1985). Deák viewed land rent as the economic form of a social relationship between capitalists and landlords whose historical evidence would continue to justify Marx's exposition of land rent in the 1860s. When the landlords themselves become capitalists the social relationship ends and, therefore Deák concludes that its economic form could no longer exist. Deák proposed the alternative treatment of urban land price as the central basis for the

analysis of the production of urban space, but little new conceptual work has yet appeared in this area of studies or in the accompanying problems of state regulation of urban space production.

A second major area of concern in the Fabian heritage, epitomised in the work of Unwin and Parker, is the aesthetic dimension present in the Garden City movement. The thesis implicit in this paper assumes that Howard's utopia adopted by the Fabians paved the way for a welfare state realisation of this same utopia in various guises throughout British and German planning initiatives, including the New Town movement after the Second World War. However, Tafuri has placed severe restrictions on the possibility of seeing the utopian urban ideas of the 19th century as an anticipation of the 20th century 'modern movement' in urban studies. In the early seventies Tafuri suggested that:

> '...the utopian trend in 19th century politics was to have only very indirect relationships with ideas of 'modern movement'. Indeed, those relationships, which have been recognised by present-day historians, between the utopians of Fourier, Owen, and Cabet and the theoretical models of Unwin, Geddes, Howard and Stein, on the one hand, and those of the Garnier and Le Corbusier, on the other hand, are but suppositions in need of very careful verification. It is likely that these relationships will come to be considered as functional and as forming part of the same phenomena one wishes to analyse by means of them... It is not possible to treat with the same set of criteria both utopian socialism and its proposals for urban reorganisation, and the ideological foundation of the modern movement. One can only note the alternative role played by utopian romanticism in respect to those ideologies ' (Tafuri, 1976: 45-46) (7).

Tafuri's position begs the question of which utopian socialism is being considered in relation to the origins of the 'modern movement'. The conceptual basis of the work and of social organisation in Fourier, Owen and Cabet's socialist utopias in the first half of the eighteenth century might be very different from the 'realisable utopias' of Salt, Cadbury and J.C Lever in mid-century and especially from Fabian social-democracy at the turn of the century. But the realisable character of the 'paternalistic' factory owners and the Fabians interested in social reform in itself suggests the genesis of a peculiarly modernist viewpoint (Chaui, 1982:100) (8). Benevolo distorts the question in another way when he over-stresses the positive continuities between model factory towns and suburbs and the modernist forms of 20th century urban housing:

> 'Just as the technical proposals of the Utopians were to be easily separated from social innovations and used by paternalistic reformists precisely to conserve the social balance threatened by the revolution, so the various enterprises fostered by conservative forces, once realised, were to develop in a sense completely contrary to that of their original conception and subsequently be transformed into weapons to overturn the systems they had been supposed to consolidate. Thus the Napoleonic *Cités Ouvrières*, the model English villages and the Krupp settlements were the first links in a chain of experiments which were to lead to Garnier's *cités industrielles*, the districts designed by Berlage, the Siedlungen of Frankfurt and Vienna' (Benevolo, 1967: 146-147).

As well as the conceptual difficulty in understanding what exactly is meant by 'technical proposal' in Benevolo's formulation of the problem there is the other political difficulty of regarding Fabian socialism as part of the 'weapons to overturn the systems'. Lichtheim's judgement on the ineptness of the Fabian name becomes more understandable in this light. To justify or to object to the positive continuities in the links of Benevolo's chain, the differing forms of urban settlement logic as announced in differing English, French, German, or North-American urbanisation settings need to be more clearly stated. In addition, the history of state intervention and market regulation for the production of 20th century built environment still appears to be incomplete.

Tafuri's reference to the differing role played by utopian romanticism in the case of Fourier, Owen and Cabet and in the later model village period is also intriguing. In the case of William Morris and his influence on the ideas of Unwin and Parker the question of utopian romanticism raises other questions of historical continuities and ruptures. Unwin's 1909 planning manual emphasises the possible option of urban design according to 'regular and irregular' aesthetic treatment. The appeal to the irregular is, given a medieval ancestry with

an implicit appeal to a tradition emphasised by William Morris and heavily supported by the contemporary reference to German and Austrian city building models influenced by Camillo Sitte, both in relation to urban form and to nature.

The utopian romanticism of the socialist William Morris was anti-classical just as was the socialist John Ruskin's preoccupation with medieval gothic. This canonic difference might be seen as the reason why mid-19th century utopian romanticism appears as different from the late 18th century rupture with baroque regularity, still contained in classical models. An earlier 18th century utopian romanticism had been present in the works of William Blake and Lord Byron or in Rousseau. In architecture this romanticism would produce a revolt against the baroque best seen in the work of Piranesi. Tafuri has indicated the work of Piranesi as a 'negative utopia' in which forms dissolve and in which significance loses itself (Tafuri, 1980, 88) (9). In this sense utopian romanticism would have a permanent 18th century reference capable of being expressed in classical or, equally valid in the Piranesi negation of form, in non-classical modes of exposition. The 18th century revolt against baroque regularity would contain other important starting points for the late 19th century inclusion of irregularity and the garden contact with nature. In a book ironically published in a place called Garden City, New York, in 1966, Elizabeth Holt cites William Blake saying that there was neither line or outline in nature (10). In the latter part of the 18th century other signs of change might be seen in the distinction between the post-Palladian regularity in formal architectural building of William Chambers and his exposure of free nature as the garden setting for his architecture. The Georgian use of filigree curves by Robert Adam was another contemporary manifestation of breaks with baroque regularity. It should be remembered that Piranesi's major work on the plan of the Campus Martius in Rome was dedicated to Rodert Adam (Hegemann and Peets, 1988, 32).

A romantic utopian preoccupation with the irregular should not, therefore, be restricted to the study of medievalism, as suggested in Unwin's planning manual but should investigate to a greater extent the aesthetic revolts in the 18th century and other formal roots as well. The garden-city heritage provides much to be revisited.

Notes

1. quotation from M. G. Day, 'The Contribution of Sir Raymond Unwin (1863-1940) and R. Barry Parker (1867-1947) to the Development of Site-Planning Theory and Practice c.1890-1918' in Sutcliffe, A. (ed) (1981) *British Town Planning: the Formative Years*, footnote 20, p.194, St. Martins Press, London and letter from R. Unwin to E. Parker, April 1885, Hitchcock Collection.
2. Day expresses the influence of Morris on Unwin, stressing the latter's adhesion to Morris' architectural principles.
3. According to Lichtheim (1975, 201) they aimed the reformation of mankind along Rosminian lines – Rossini-Serbati was the founder of an unorthodox catholic religious order: the Brethren of Charity in conflict with the Jesuits, closed be Leo 13th in 1887.
4. Described by Lichtheim as an Oxford graduate and Post Office clerk.
5. Roll mentions the fact that in the later Walras explanation of marginal utility in isolated exchanges the ratio of exchange can be determinate within certain limits.
6. In this study Aldridge mentions the various official reports and new legislation which appeared in the first half of the century. These initiatives included the Chamberlain *Unhealthy Areas Committee Report* in 1921, the *Town and Country Planning Act* of 1935, *The Marley Report on Garden Cities* in 1935, the *Barlow Report on Industrial Location* in 1940, the *Uthwatt Report on Compensation and Betterment* in 1941, the *Dudley Report on Housing Standards* in 1944, the *New Towns Act* of 1946 and the *Town and Country Planning Ac*t of 1947.
7. Tafuri adds 'But its developments, particularly the practice of Anglo-Saxon planning, should be compared with the models elaborated by the New Deal'. On the significance of the ideology of work, that within the socialist tradition so strongly influenced the rise and development of nineteenth century and twentieth century theories of city planning, see the fundamental article by Cacciari, M. (1970) 'Utopia e Socialismo' in *Contropiano,* no. 3, 562-686, footnote 23.
8. Chaui has expressed the genesis of the realisable utopia in the following terms, 'There has been what we can call a positivisation of the utopian imagination, an effort to diminish the distance between

the imagined and the real city, between desired and real history. With this then... the future is dragged to the frontiers of the present. And the notion of possibility is transformed into prevision. Utopia becomes a social reform project in the guise of applied science. One doesn't want to know what is the dominion of the social imagination but of knowledge and social action...That is, the value of an utopia becomes measured by a norm which is not utopian: scientific previsability and the historical unity of progress'.

9. While this position might be seen erroneously as opening the door for the eclectic jumble of 19th century architecture, Tafuri provides another more radical interpretation 'in the ambiguity and in his choice of working tools, freely chosen could appear as a critic of the illustration hypotheses ... His criticism remains...in the sphere of pure possibility. In this architecture it is only sign and arbitrary construction. In this there is an intrinsic unity in the discovery by Piranesi of absolute 'loneliness' in which is submerged the subject who recognises the relativity of his own action. In this point lies one of the great anticipations which can be identified in his work in the construction of what would be the ethic of an emerging dialectic of vanguard art; of that art which, in the words of Fautrier, can only destroy itself and which only by destroying itself can continually renew itself'.
10. See Holt, E G (ed) (1966) *From the Classicists to the Impressionists - Art and Architecture in the 19th Century*, p 103, Doubleday / Anchor, Garden City, New York, 1966. Curiously Blake's view of poetical and historical invention heralds the utopian romantic national tradition. His view of beauty and reason is set in a discussion of the plight of King Arthur's last battle where only three ancient Britons survive: beauty, strength and ugliness. But in a commentary which would have pleased the medieval longings of the later William Morris, beauty is described as pathos while reason is seen to be ugly.

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Urban renewal and restructuring; economic versus social renewal in Rotterdam

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During the mid-80s the central government of the Netherlands began a transition from socialised to privatised housing and a planning policy intended to stimulate private investments. Important reasons for this fundamental change of policy were the economic recession at the end of the '70s and the widening gap between the 'socialised costs' of the welfare state and government revenues. The dramatic growth of unemployment and thus of expenditure on unemployment benefits, the decline of net wages and rising rents increased central government housing expenditure.

At the end of the '80s, the national parliament, with reference to the memorandum *Housing in the '90s* (TK, 1988 / 1991), reached a decision regarding housing policy. There was a change from general construction subsidies in social housing towards market rents with some individualised (assistance) subsidies for the least well-off and a shift from publicly-let housing to housing in the market sector and stimulation of owner-occupation.

A few years later, the ministry of VROM (VROM; 1991) published a memorandum about the future of urban renewal which attempted to define the end of urban renewal especially in financial terms. The central government mantained that the urban renewal programme had to be completed by 2005. However, local governments, and those of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the Hague in particular, argued that they had not even started to tackle the second and most difficult part of the programme. In this period of fundamental changes, politicians and other planning actors put new approaches and strategies on their agenda.

The last two decades have been characterised by various approaches to urban renewal. After a period which placed a great emphasis on traffic schemes intended to improve the accessibility of the new city centres from the suburbs, a new period, which focused on "Building for the neighbourhood", started. In Rotterdam and in other cities thousands of houses were put in demolition programmes. At the beginning of the 70s urban renewal became an issue in local politics.

Urban renewal was mainly seen as a housing problem. Sometimes the pressures from tenants who opposed the decline of old districts prevented their total demolition. In 1974 the social democrats gained control of the Rotterdam municipal council. They supported the demands of tenants' organisations. "Building for the neighbourhood" was the leading motive. After a few experimental years more integral programmes were necessary.

In the '80s urban renewal had to face new challenges imposed by fundamental changes. The Central Government, through new policy, tried to reduce the budget for, and its involvement in, housing and urban renewal programmes. Decentralisation, deregulation and privatisation were encouraged.

"Building for the neighbourhood" ceased to be the central issue as now urban renewal had to fit into city-wide programmes of change. The focus on housing was also lost as more emphasis was placed on other urban problems such as those related to industry and employment. At the same time, urban renewal processes became increasingly dependent on market initiatives and interests. This new situation imposed new questions. Could upgrading initiatives, revitalisation projects, for instance, in one area have adverse effects on other quarters? Would economic renewal coincide with social renewal?

Urban renewal and socialisation of housing

In Rotterdam, in the '70s, the urban renewal approach was mainly seen in relation to housing. The bad conditions of the housing stock in districts of low income households was seen as a problem especially because most of the tenants had no possibilities to improve their housing situation.

The "Building for the neighbourhood" approach marked the beginning of a period characterised by local government experimental initiatives. Local authorities developed a planning model designed to create a consensus between conflicting interests. Representatives of

local government, tenants organisations and, a few years later of housing associations, formed "project groups" and took decisions about planning at the district level. This new model interrupted the tradition of blueprint planning which had characterised the 60s, it speeded up the decision making process and it incorporated the participation of tenants. The dialogue between local authorities, architects, housing associations and the tenants enabled the former to gain a better understanding of the problems of a particular district. The discussions surrounding the plans for new housing improvements enabled the professionals to see the possible social consequences of their technical arguments.

It was also resolved that the existing inhabitants of a district should be given priority of access to the new or improved dwellings generated by the schemes, Until the end of 1980s all the new housing units provided within the urban renewal districts were built in the social sector. Both the new and the improved dwellings had to be affordable and suit the demands of the local residents. Thus rents were lower than in other parts of the city and the floor plan of new the dwellings responded to the demands of the tenants. This period of tenants' involvement in the planning and decision making process also saw the realisation of numerous quality development experiments concerned with new forms of living.

Between 1976 and 1990 the structure of tenure in Rotterdam changed dramatically and not in line with the rest of the Netherlands. As well as being the main builder in the districts affected by the programmes of renewal, starting in 1975, the local government bought the majority of privately rented properties in the same districts. This was because the improvement of this part of the housing stock by the private owners seemed unsuccessful.

From 1976 to 1990 rental social housing increased by 22 percentage points while the owner-occupied sector registered an 8 point increase (see Table 1). At the same time the share of the privately rented sector shrank by 30 percentage points. Both the relative importance of different types of tenure and these trends were not to be found anywhere else in the country. In addition, in Rotterdam, a lot of the pre-war public housing stock was either replaced or renewed. By 1992 nearly 60.000 dwellings were completed. This was because the local policy was centred on the socialisation of housing provision. In this way, many social groups could improve their housing conditions. Up to the end of the 1980s there were also possibilities to achieve user quality' (Stouten, 1987) and, in fact, the modernisation of pre-war housing was a way to meet new criteria of need (BSW Rotterdam, 1986:128).

Towards the end of 1980s, however, the programme of urban renewal was subjected to fundamental change. Although only a bit more than half of the programme was completed, the project groups were abolished. A new organisation, in charge of the maintenance of the district, was set up. This was also supposed to provide solutions to such problem as a malfunctioning residential environment. In the same period, the discussion about the future of urban renewal policies centred on the financial constraints. Housing and environmental quality were dealt with in relation to expenditures, affordability, changing access to housing tenures of different socio-economic groups, availability of required housing, household preferences and also changes in income, unemployment and changes in household composition.

Planning and housing policies towards privatisation

The new policies were presented in the *Vierde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening'* MVROM, 1989) and in the *Nota Volkshuisvesting in de negentiger jaren* (TK, 1988 / 1989). The future policy for urban renewal was published in *Beleid stadsvernieuwing in de toekomst - Belstato* (MVROM, 1991)

The new policies dealt with methods of finance, subsidies, building programmes and introduced a new division of expenditure and responsibility between central and local government and housing associations. Their existence marked the end of a period of strong state intervention in the field of housing and urban renewal.

Indeed, some of changes formally introduced by the new policies had already occurred in practice in the mid-1980s. In 1988 the state stopped giving loans for the construction of social housing. Sources of finance had to be provided by the market. At the same time, the social sector was increasingly subjected to privatisation, and private tenure encouraged. Now the production of rental housing in the public sector is decreasing both in relative and

absolute terms, and the government is stimulating owner occupation further. It aims to increase this form of tenure from 45% to 55% by the year 2000. In fact, the non-subsidised sector in the building programme will increase to 44% by the mid of the '90s. This is remarkable because, on average, since the war, the percentage of owner occupation housing within the building programme was 17% with a peak at 33%. In 1975, 46.7% of the programme was realised in the "sale sector". By 1990, this percentage rose to 62%. The central government also intends to sell 10,000 rental housing units per year to the present occupiers. As yet, the result of this operation is not successful. Housing associations and tenants organisations and some advisory boards of the central government like SER (social-economic advisory board) and RAVO (advisory board of housing policies) pointed out the disadvantages (SCP, 1990). The main objection is that the best parts of the social housing stock will be sold and therefore the average quality will decline and maintenance problems increase.

The position of the parties in the social sector, central government, local government, housing associations and tenants will be changed because of the new housing policy in the '90s. The most important aspects are decentralisation and cutting off housing associations from public funds. The risks are shifted from the central government to the housing associations. The financial position of non-profit housing associations becomes an even more important factor in maintaining and improving housing. Housing associations are almost forced to choose between conflicting priorities. On one side, they want to be committed to the tenants by offering good housing affordable by the lower income groups, while, on the other hand, they have to play the part of a landlord, keeping management costs balanced against rental income. Housing associations in a bad financial situation get into problems and will then not take initiatives to improve housing conditions.

Whether these measures will give more scope for policies on the local level is rather ambiguous. Local associations are constrained by central government limits on the quota for social housing in the building programme and by the general trend for rents to rise faster than incomes. The basic principle in rent setting is that (within certain limits) tenants and landlords can agree on changing the rent. However, by the year 2005 the rent has to cover the real costs and the social rental sector becomes self-sufficient: the realisation of social housing without direct subsidies to the producers. This decline of subsidies and extra rises of rents of new built houses has been under way since the mid-'80s.

The position of the tenants is uncertain. They have to pay a greater part of their income for housing. Since 1984 there have been various cuts in the subsidies paid to individuals. Yet state expenditures for those purposes continues to rise, mainly because of the evolution of the income distribution, but also due to real increases in rents. More than 60% of the households who receive individual housing subsidies have a 'minimum income'. Between 1981 and 1986 the number of 'minimum income' households receiving this subsidy increased two and a half times. Between 1981 and 1989 the housing expenditures by tenants rose faster than incomes (SCP, 1991:190). In the same period the ratio of housing expenditures to income for owner occupiers decreased. This regressive divergence is caused by the rent increases dictated by central government and decrease of the expenditures for owner occupiers because of declining interest rates. Lower income people, especially tenants, pay relatively more of their income on housing than higher income people. (SCP, 1992:190).

Future policy will be influenced by the government's attempt to reduce its direct involvement in the housing sector to minimise the financial burden this imposes. However, state expenditure in housing will continue. Home owners not only receive direct subsidies but also less visible support through tax-relief. In 1990 the bill for helping owner occupiers in this way came to over 6.2 thousand million, three times that of 1977. Shifting the emphasis from social rental housing to home-ownership may have unexpected consequences. Unpredictable reactions and initiatives of investors and building contractors will lead to a reorganisation and marginalisation of the social sector. Housing will only be built when investors are willing to take the risk and owners dare take initiatives. Rises and falls of the market are dependent on three variables: the variations of purchasing power, building costs and, especially the interest rate on mortgages. When interest rates go up demand suffers an immediate decline and tax-relief expenditure increases due to the higher price of both new

built and "second-hand" housing. In 1992 prices in the sale sector increased by 8%; mainly because rents increased and interest rates fell. It is questionable whether the market allows for quality improvement as the tendency is to minimise costs. Yet, in the belief that the 'consumer' is powerful enough to influence the standard of output, the government only set a minimum quality requirement. The central government is resigned to the view that it is more or less impossible for lower income households to improve their housing situation.

The recent past can help us understand what may happen next. Some ten years ago, many households bought a house in urban renewal districts. A lot of them had no alternative because, despite their low income, they had no access to the public rental housing (Van den Ham, Stouten, 1987:37). As a consequence, the prices of the type of (badly maintained) homes they bought rose. At the same time, these households seemed not to be able to afford appropriate maintenance of their properties. Later, due to the recession, many of these home owners had to face either unemployment or falling incomes while the value of their houses were falling. Some moved in search of work, selling their home at a loss (Van den Ham / Stouten, 1988:246). Others fell in arrears with their mortgage repayments increasing their debt with the lending banks[7]. At the same time, the distribution of the advantages generated by state expenditure is increasingly socially selective. Those who are within the top ten percent of the income scale get four times as much public financial help for housing as the bottom ten percent (SCP, 1981). Figures from 1983 and 1987 indicate that this trend is not changing (Pommer E.J. et al., 1990).

It is clear that housing opportunities are increasingly linked to the individual's ability to pay. While it seems that low income households will have fewer opportunities to secure reasonable quality housing, the opportunities for the rich will improve. One indication for this is the cost / income ratio. It is striking that while tenants get less subsidies as their income grows, the reverse is true for owner-occupiers. Against this background of ownership promotion, the policy developments which concern rents and subsidies acquire a special meaning. By increasing the ratio between rents of the housing stock and by cutting state expenditures, housing policy aims to reduce the price difference between the rental and the owner occupied sectors.

Urban renewal and restructuring; the future of Rotterdam

In 2005 the central government will cease to provide financial support for urban renewal. Their intention is to encourage private investors to participate in building projects and to form so-called 'Public Private Partnerships'. Besides the increasing importance attached to commercial development, two other general trends in urban renewal and restructuring need to be recognised. The first is the enlargement of scale: regional planning and development is becoming more important. Secondly there is uneven development in cities; alongside districts which attract high investments, there are others which lack investment. In Rotterdam the stimulation of economic renewal gets a high priority. Planning in cooperation with market interests like pension funds and banks is on the agenda. The city of Rotterdam wants to compete on the international level. Measures are taken to transform old waterfront buildings and industrial locations into luxury apartments and business centres.

Arguments advanced in relation to urban renewal include the following (Stouten, 1992):

*The original urban renewal strategy was in many respects successfully completed. A large part of the housing stock has been improved. Resources (managerial and financial) can now be channelled in other directions.

*Austerity policies of the central government force local authorities to look for new possibilities for continuing the urban development process. It seems unavoidable to build for richer households and to cooperate with private investors.

*In line with national planning policies and because of the European market, it is necessary to create internationally competitive settlements.

*Since 1975 social democrats have been dominant in Rotterdam's local government. One of their principles is that tenants should be able to influence policy. However, this party has

[7] The government sometimes gave financial guarantees for individual mortgages. From 1979 until 1987 in Rotterdam, comulative liabilities for those guarantees total more than 90 million guilders; in the period 1982-1984 new guarantees reached a peak of more than 20 million each year (B&W Rotterdam, 1989:33).

virtually stopped opposing the market-led approach to housing supported by other parties.

Until 1988, the Rotterdam local authorities had, through the urban renewal strategy, made an effort to stop unequal development between districts. However, the "building for the neighbourhood" approach was then replaced by a new practice: "building with residential differentiation". Now local policy aims to attract people from outside the local boundaries and thus it attempts to make housing districts more attractive (B&W Rotterdam 1988).

At the same time, the local government intends to create internationally attractive office locations. Between 1974 and 1984 housing production was greater than office production but, since 1984, the reverse is true. Last year the supply of office floorspace was augmented by twice as many square metres as housing. Between 1984 and 1992 the total amount of office floorspace increased by 26% (COS, 1992). Between 1982 and 1992 office vacancy grew from 4% to 7.2%. The vacancy rate is relatively higher in the city centre. It must be said that the (inter)national competition between urban settlements is a rather artificial one. Competition takes place between cities as well as between locations inside a city. In absolute terms, the rents of the 'top locations' in the Randstad are the lowest in the world. The office market is dominated by demand and transition; "one moves when the wallpaper gets dirty" (Lie, 1991). So-called top locations are planned but don't attract much interest from the investors. This is striking because, in general, investors are increasingly interested in the city and the region of Rotterdam. One of the reasons for their lack of interest in "top-locations" is that there is little difference between land prices and rents. The quasi-uniformity of land prices in Dutch cities is due to their rather even development. As a consequence, unlike in Paris, London or Brussels, there are no real top locations (Lie, 1991). Investors are deterred both by the fact that cities offer a series of comparable locations and by the low land prices which are unlikely to generate large profits (Rosemann, 1992:33). The investment required by the local governments of Rotterdam and Amsterdam to make their centres attractive to property investors is considerable.

As explained above, policy changed dramatically; the privatisation of housing provision is in conflict with the original aims which rested on the belief that housing is a "merit good".

For the central government, the two main issues of 1980s are the following:

*Decentralisation: the government freed itself from the risks involved with carrying out and financing the housing programme which became the responsibility of local governments and, mainly, of the housing associations.

*Privatisation: the central government induced the private sector to play a prominent role in housing provision; it encouraged owner-occupation by minimising the subsidies paid to tenants and making them liable for the bulk of their housing costs.

Although, since 1988, the urban renewal programme has been paying more and more attention to environmental improvement, the environmental quality of the socially built housing environment declined. Between 1980 and 1986, 3,600 new social houses were built each year. Between 1986 and 1992 the annual production dropped to 2,400 (B&W Rotterdam, 1993:12). It is estimated that in the period between 1993 and 1996, 1,300 new houses will be added yearly to the rental stock of the public sector. However, less than the half of these will have affordable rents. Between 1990 and 1993 the share of the social sector to which low rents still apply will be reduced by nearly 60%.

At the same time the programme for modernisation of pre-war social housing dropped between 1988 and 1992 by nearly 40% and, according to the programme, will fall by 86% between 1993 and 1996. These declines are the results of the central government's policy. Housing in the market sector increased; from 14% in the period 1985-1989 to 40% at the beginning of the 1990s (Klerk, 1989:38).

Uncertainties are determined by environmental requirements, conflicts about type of production (for instance offices or housing ?) and financial risk. In 1992 only 35% (106 dwellings) were completed under the special programme for the market sector. This was mainly due to the lack of initiative by private investors but also to the uncertainties about whether potential tenants could afford the housing. During the last 8 years, purchasing power declined by 10 - 15% and this mainly because of increased housing costs. Paying for rent and energy consumption is a problem for more and more people and 9.000 households

participate in a local project set up to reduce its extent and severity (Commissie Sociale Vernieuering, 1989, 17). At present, within urban renewal districts, some low income groups face more housing problems than others. This is because, due to lower rents, it is easier to gain access to recently upgraded properties than to the newly built stock

However, in the future, fewer people will benefit from this relative advantage of refurbished housing as improvement programmes are being marginalised. Given the large size of the un-modernised housing stock (see table 2) the run-down of the modernisation programme seems paradoxical. It is interesting that the need for renovation is particularly strong in the private sector. This includes a large proportion of houses (both for rent or for sale) which were built before 1946 and which were never modernised.

Economic versus social renewal

Employment in the Rotterdam region (Rijnmond) declined by 15% between 1970 and 1982 (Laurier et al, 1987, 93). The labour market tends to segmentation. The highest segment is international in character. It comprises top and middle managers as well as highly skilled technicians. The second highest segment comprises skilled professionals. Both segments experience acute labour shortages.

The third segment consists of semi-skilled workers. In this segment labour supply is plentiful and demand, which depends on the conjunctural situation, fluctuates causing temporary unemployment . Workers in the lowest segment, have very few employment opportunities (Laurier et al., 1987:95). The nearly 9,000 enterprises located within the urban renewal districts employ 80,000 (33% of total employment in Rotterdam). Of these 75,000 live in the Rotterdam region.

Unemployment has been rising dramatically. In 1978 there were 14,500 unemployed but there were 45,000 in 1992. Of these 33% had been unemployed for more than three years. The spatial distribution of the unemployed presents a picture of social segregation. The unemployment rate in the urban renewal districts can be as high as 40%. Social problems, especially in the older districts, are manifold. This situation prompted the local government to try and reduce polarisation and devise a new programme called 'social renewal'. Unlike its predecessor, this programme had the ambition to search for simultaneous solutions to economic and social problems.

The housing market situation of urban renewal areas has changed. For instance single-person and two-person households with low incomes (mostly new households) depend on cheaper housing. They formerly started in these areas. But these new households now find these districts increasingly unaffordable (Van Erkel, 1991:343).

In large and middle sized cities the proportions of higher income households increased between 1983 and 1987: in 1983 11% were in the highest income echelons against 20% in the Netherlands and 15% in 1987 against 20% in the Netherlands (though these higher incomes are less represented in urban renewal districts). This change has been especially marked in the four largest cities (Rigo, 1990, 62). But still there is absolute and relative growth of households who have only a minimum wage: 38% of Rotterdam households are at that level and the proportion will increase to 40% by 2000 (COS, 1992).

Segregation can be a problem where the concentration of an income group in certain districts is caused by filtering processes on the housing market. There is a lot of pressure on the less popular part of the housing stock from groups like new households living on minimum income, single-parent families and traditional immigrant families. Concentrations of immigrants exist in five districts where two thirds of the immigrants and one third of the total population of Rotterdam live (Bestuursdienst Rotterdam, 1993). In some areas 40% of the population is immigrant. Concentration of minimum income households averages 45% the in urban renewal districts and in some areas is more than 50%. The problems of unemployment are concentrated in the lower echelons and ethnic minority groups.

Though these concentrations exist, the dominance is not so strong that they can truly be described as ghettos (Brand, A. et al, 1992, 250). In research on the living conditions of 840 households receiving social benefits at a minimum level, the housing expenditures for tenants living alone averaged 38% of income and for households with children 24%. Both are high compared with national figures (SCP,1992:32). The report *Minima zonder marge*

shows that nearly 50% of these 80,000 households regularly run into debt (Oude Engberink, G., 1987). Families with children and immigrants are over represented in the group. They often live in the urban renewal districts and pay relatively high rents. Poverty not only means a lack of money but also isolation.

The urban renewal districts have heterogeneous populations in which different groups fight for social provisions, like housing, public space and services. It is more that the 'different' tenants live at cross-purposes than that they clash (Anderiesen, G. et al, 1992). The concentration of unemployed and otherwise deprived households is not as severe as in many American ghettos. But the results of the research do not exclude the possibility that such concentrations do exist at a micro level: some streets, one street; a few blocks. But if mass unemployment persists we could experience more ghetto situations, as in other countries (Brand et al, 1992).

In Rotterdam the educational and skill levels of those who finish school is lower than in most regions of the Netherlands. So, in the future a high level of unemployment is likely. Programmes based on active labour market policy, stimulating the participation of women, ethnic minority groups and long term unemployment seem necessary to break down the persistent divisions – between different labour categories and also divisions between employed and unemployed. One line of action in the fight against unemployment is training and education. Recently more energy has been invested in this approach. A combined effort is made by the local government and the unemployment bureau. Special attention is given to opportunities for those who have been out of work already for more than two years. This is done by stimulating education, offering work-experience projects, coordinating the administration, and improving help and support.

The combination of education and paid work experience is seen as very important: many of the unemployed do not like abstract education and prefer a regular, paid and meaningful job. The programme to improve the qualifications of the unemployed through education and paid work experience is supported by the central government and a growing amount of money is being made available for projects in this field. Those projects can either be initiated from the top (the local bureaucracy) or the bottom (the inhabitants of the urban renewal districts, or their district based organisations) and 15% of all unemployed participate in these programmes. In Rotterdam in 1992, 370 million guilders were spent to fight unemployment and 250 of the 3,700 participants succeeded in getting a regular job.

Conclusions

The strategy 'building for the neighbourhood' was developed in a period in which improvement of housing conditions had priority. During the last few years, however, urban renewal has been confronted by a reduction of financial resources and by growing control of building programmes by the government. The days of strong state intervention in housing are over. The market rules the programme. In Rotterdam new concepts like 'revitalisation' are mainly restricted to derelict harbour locations. They concern other tenures and job locations rather than those in the urban renewal districts.

With 'Vernieuerung van de stadsvernieuerung' the local government attempts to look for strategies in response to changing conditions. Residential differentiation, district-maintenance programmes and more attention to quality of public space are new issues (B&W Rotterdam, 1988). But since 1980 various urban problems have rapidly increased as a result of the economic crisis. Urban renewal is confronted with far reaching problems related to industry, social provision, unemployment etc. The change in economic structure causes a change in demand for labour skills. One problem is the growing gap between the demand for highly skilled labour and the supply of mainly less-educated people. Important social questions are that more than 45,000 people are unemployed. So revitalisation should include even those who are not 'vitalised'. If economic renewal only means development of new locations for offices, gentrification close to central districts and areas with particular amenities, filtering down processes occur. Than residential revitalisation is only the bright side of a process of increasing polarisation (Musterd et al, 1991).

Next to unemployment, affordability problems in newly built and improved housing is still a matter of conflict. Conditions for

housing provision have changed on the local and central level. The affordability of housing is especially a problem for lower income people. Today the good and affordable part of the housing stock shrinks as a result of urban renewal and demolition. Half of the affordable houses are in bad condition. The good and cheap part of the stock is mainly the product of modernisation and new building in the social sector in the urban renewal districts. Steep increases of rents in the near future will undo these benefits.

The central government want to define the end of urban renewal in 2005. The case for this is mainly argued in financial terms. But, looking at the economic and social issues, urban renewal will still be a matter of conflict and more and more problems have to be solved. Though the 'first half' of the urban renewal programme has been a success, close consideration of social need and of the condition of the housing stock shows that the other half still has to be done.

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Table 1: Housing tenures in Rotterdam and the Netherlands (%)

	Rotterdam				Netherlands	
Year	1976	1980	1984	1990	1975	1990
Social rented	35.7	46.8	49.7	57.7	41.0	42.0
Private rented	56.3	37.0	35.7	26.5	20.0	13.0
Owner occupation	8.0	16.2	14.7	16.4	39.0	45.0

Source: Statische overzicht Volkshuisvesting Rotterdam 1987 and 1990

Table 2: Condition of the housing stock of Rotterdam 1-1-1993

Year of construction	Before 1946		1946 - 1967		After1967	Total stock
	not mod.	mod.	not mod.	mod.		
social rented	21.500	32.000	22.000	24.500	59.500	159.500
private rented	33.500	5.000	16.000	3.000	13.500	71.000
sale	17.500	2.500	11.000		14.500	45.500
Total	72.500	39.500	76.500	87.500	87.500	276.000

Source: (B&W Rotterdam, 1993)

Past and present low-income housing patterns in Rio de Janeiro

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For Brazil, as for Latin America in general, the eighties have been described as a lost decade. According to some authors, such as Morse, the entire twentieth century, and not just the last decade, may be considered lost: in Brazil, for instance, at the eve of the twenty-first century, levels of education, welfare, and political participation are equal to or lower than they were in the nineteenth century (JB, 15 Dec. 91). The eighties are seen as the time of crisis, marked by recession, unemployment, and inflation. In addition to economic disaster, less developed countries have had their meagre resources drained off to service their foreign debt. In Brazil, the State is bankrupt, so that investments in the social sector have dwindled, the already deficient services and infrastructure have deteriorated, and education and housing are in critical conditions.

To top it all, the ruthless system of income distribution increasingly concentrates wealth in the hands of the upper classes. The last decade was a time of impoverishment for the country, for the State and, most of all, for the poor. Per capita income remained stable at about US$1,850pa, but its distribution changed: the average yearly income of the poorer half of the population decreased from US$1,200 to US$900pa, while the average income of the top 1% of the population grew from US$30,000 to US$48,000 (PNAD, 1989). Thus onto the crisis is added the impoverishment of the population. This phenomenon may already be considered a characteristic of Brazilian society in recent years. Left-leaning US analysts have used the term `Brazilianisation' to refer to any situation in which the middle classes shrink and the lower classes grow more numerous (JB, 22 Dec. 91).

However, the pauperisation of Brazil is expressed, not only in statistical data, but also in well-known everyday manifestations: misery, social tensions, urban tensions, urban violence, epidemic disease, homelessness and child exploitation.

New trends in the spatial distribution of the population are becoming apparent in the nineties. In cities and, in particular in the metropolises, an extreme process of ghettoization (Vainer and Smolka, 1991) and changes in urbanisation patterns reflect economic and social changes. These phenomena are now beginning to be studied, pending the results of the decennial census, which was not held in 1990 as scheduled because the federal government allegedly had no resources to fund it. Nonetheless, in the Municipality of São Paolo surveys and analyses were made which conclude that there is a change in the peripheral growth pattern, the dominant form of metropolitan structuring, with increasing growth rates in the inner city and its environs and slower growth in peripheral rings. This phenomenon has been called the 'inflection of peripheral growth pattern' (Pasternak, 1990). Other authors speak of a 'metropolitan involution' (Santos, 1990). Underlying these concepts or structural changes are the increasing numbers of people in urban centres – in the inner city or the environs, or in ghettos or favelas.

Rio the Janeiro is perhaps the city that best exemplifies Brazilian society and its problems. With a present population of 5,536,176, Rio concentrates the wealth , activities and urban resources of a vast metropolitan area of almost 12,000,000 inhabitants. The city shows signs of changes of different sorts. On the one hand , some of the typical processes observed in First-World metropoli, such as the upgrading of the inner city area. On the other hand, there are characteristic LDC phenomena, such as destitute people occupying and transforming areas, causing a sort of downgrading that has been dubbed 'Africanization'. In order to examine this strange form of urban renewal, it is necessary to analyse the issue of housing and the performance of government agencies in relation to such problems as low-income housing and urban renewal.

Low income housing

The major patterns of low-income housing in Rio de Janeiro may be identified together with the urban structures corresponding to specific periods in the city's history. By pattern of low-income housing we mean the dominant type of a period including, not only the building itself but also its distribution and conceptualisation in the urban setting. Three historical types will

be examined: slums (cortiços), favelas, and irregular settlements in the periphery.

The first symptoms of the housing crisis in Rio de Janeiro date back to the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first three decades of the twentieth century. This was a time of urbanisation and industrialisation, of economic, social, political, cultural and spatial change. The period saw the replacement of slave labour by hired labour, the rise of markets and the commodification of goods, the decay of coffee growing, the development of the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, migrations, and the formation of new ruling elites, with the fall of the Empire and the proclamation of the Republic. Urban growth was intense (from 235,000 inhabitants in 1870 to 522,000 in 1890). A modern infrastructure and public services were created.

A numerous lower-class population eked out a meagre living in the central area, where residences and offices were concentrated and urban life was intense. At this time the urban structure was limited to an agglomeration of activities and population around the core; it was only through a gradual process that urban space came to be specialised so that commercial, residential, and industrial areas were delimited. And in the centre there appeared a kind of residence affordable to this population: the cortiços.

The cortiços (roughly 'courts' in English) were small and precarious residential units for rent, usually overcrowded, with insufficient and inadequate lighting, ventilation and sanitary facilities, created through the subdivision of the backyards of old houses. The insalubrious character of this environment was associated with the decaying health and morals of the working classes. As the city's sanitary conditions worsened, these collective residences, which at one point sheltered between 20 and 25 per cent of the population (Vaz, 1985), were seen as one of the causes of unhealthy and schedules for demolition, to be replaced by hygienic housing.

Modern hygienic housing was built in the new areas into which the city was expanding, but the cost of the new houses were beyond the means of the poor, who remained in the inner city slums until they were violently ejected in the 1902-06 Urban Reform. In this process of urban modernisation, state intervention through the Reform and urban legislation, together with the action of the real estate market, dealt the death blow to this traditional form of low-income housing and determined where the majority of the population would now have to live: those with modest means in the suburbs, the impoverished on the hillsides.

By the 20th century, the suburbs had become too expensive for the poorest strata of the population, who began to build their precarious shacks in the empty spaces left in the city. The hillsides, where there are traces of rustic cabins dating from as early as the late 19th century, were generally occupied, and the first favelas were formed. They grew rapidly, covering areas that were vacant, and unattractive to the real estate business. Beginning in the 1930s when population growth was intense, the expansion of favelas increased, following the major sources of jobs for the lower classes: in factories for the industrial zones, in bourgeois households and on construction sites in the coastal districts.

It was only around the mid-20th century that the problems of low income housing came to the foreground again. This time the focus was on the favela. This self-help housing pattern is characterised by its illegality on the juridical plane and its irregularity on the urban plane, as well as the precarious and the insalubrious character of the dwellings. When it was no longer possible to deny their existence, favelas came to be denounced as 'festering wounds': they had to be extirpated, their population removed. The so-called eradication policy transferred about 146,000 people to large housing projects in the periphery between 1960 and 1980 (Santos 1984). It was only with the re democratisation of Brazil that the proposals to upgrade the favelas, which residents had long been calling for, were incorporated into Federal policy.

As the urban sprawl reached beyond the city limits and a metropolitan area was formed, a new pattern of low-income housing developed. The available space within the city was gradually exhausted by the favelas, so the urban population was pushed further and further away: from the 1950s onwards, irregular settlements mushroomed in these distant peripheral areas, characterised by small lots, no urban infrastructure, inadequate transportation, and, consequently, affordable prices.

The official policy of favela eradication and construction of housing projects in low-price

and remote peripheral areas encouraged the process. The new metropolitan pattern of low-income housing was now the development of irregular settlements and self-help housing, and the new urbanisation pattern was the move to remote peripheral areas.

However, the expansion of the periphery did not imply the end of favela growth within the city limits (see Table 1). This recent favela growth is more a consequence of pauperisation than of migration. Thus it may be said that 'decidedly Brazilian cities are becoming huge squatter settlements' (Pasternak and Sachs, 1990). Nevertheless, heterogeneity prevails: new practices, new trends, and new patterns of low-income housing may already be detected.

Table 1: Rio de Janeiro City - Population 1950-1960

Year	Population in Favelas	Total Population
1950	169,305	2,336,000
1960	335,063	3,307,167
1970	554,277	4,251,918
1980	718,210	5.090,700
1990	977,768	5,536,179

Source: IBGE and Secretaria Municipal de Urbanismo e Meio Ambiente (municipal Secretariat for Urbanism and the Environment).

Low income housing today

By the late 1980s, an estimate 500,000 people lived in the peripheral areas and 1,000,000 lived in the city's 545 favelas. During the same period and through the early 1990s, new patterns of low-income housing were observed, symptoms of the increasing difficulty of living in a metropolis.

Practically all the Rio favelas are the result of a gradual process of occupation, the sum of total of individual and family settlement and house-building. But a new, different pattern is increasingly common: the invasion (Barbosa, 1991). Pressured by rising rents, encouraged by the recovery of civil rights, and often incited by leaders, legitimate or otherwise, thousands of people invade vacant lots and divide it into family plots, in fast, collective, organised operations. These invasions (with their popular governors or leaders), mobilise the invaders themselves and, when the owners of the land sue, the police, local government, and the courts. When summary expulsion is unfeasible, compulsory negotiations ensue between parties, resulting in new settlements that are usually called 'occupations' by the residents themselves. Since they are the product of planned action, they include a regular street grid, unlike the traditional favelas with their irregular pathways.

The struggle for the available spaces led to the building of shacks in the most unlikely places – for instance on narrow strips of land where no buildings are legally permitted, such as long avenues, rivers, and canals, under over-passes and elevated freeways. The sight of long rows of shacks under viaducts has become a familiar one in the city; it is estimated that 30 occupations of this 'linear favela' type already exist (JB, 30 Dec. 90). According to a recent statement by the city government, 600,000 people live in irregularly occupied plots (JB, 4 Apr. 1991).

Now that there seems to be more room for new favelas to develop in the city's nucleus, where the permanence of most established favelas is practically ensured, two trends can be clearly observed: on the one hand, the peripheralisation of the new favelas, on the other the densification and the verticalisation of the old and consolidated favelas. Since there are no longer any vacant areas within the city limits, the new favelas being formed – 205 between 1982 and 1990 (IPLAN Rio) – are located in outer suburbs. In some of the older favelas, new housing is being built for rent: brick houses (most of them previously wooden shacks) are expanded into four-, five-, or even six-storey buildings with a large number of rooms and apartments, a new version of the old cortiço (G, 7 June 1991). Favela agglomerates are also being formed, as old favelas expand and merge, forming larger complexes. Lastly, areas are now being occupied that are subject to floods and landslides during the rainy season (JB, 4 Apr. 1991).

One of the most shocking aspects of the situation of crisis and impoverishment is the problem of the homeless population. Estimates vary but it seems that tens of thousands of people seek shelter under bridges and canopies, on sidewalks and public squares, in parks, in any available niche. Contrary to what was originally supposed, most street people are not beggars, alcoholics or hoboes, but workers, retired and unemployed people, and most of all whole families whose income is insufficient to afford any sort of housing. There are also those who have a home in a distant peripheral area but cannot afford the cost of commuting, so that during weekdays they remain on the sidewalks of the busiest streets (JB, 16th March 1989).

There are also large numbers of persons who lost their homes in the 1988 rains, and probably a considerable number of jobless construction workers. The crisis deeply affected the real-estate industry which used to provide, not only jobs, but also temporary shelter for thousand of unskilled workers ; these have now joined the masses of street people.

Among street people different categories may be distinguished: there are those who have settled in a specific place (canopy, ruined building, public urinal, etc) where they build precarious shelters, or mini-favelas (G, 28 Oct, 90) until they are thrown out; others use tin cans, boards, pieces of cardboard, and blankets in order to delimit their territories on the side-walk every evening, in a sort of daily ritual that begins when office hours are over (G, 3 Aug, 91).

Finally there is a form of lower income housing that is difficult to survey: the countless rooms for rent to be found in all kind of buildings. Here we must not only include a large number of boarding houses and cheap hotels but also the *cortiços* or *casas- de-cômodos*, rooming housing formed by the subdivision of rooms of old houses. This form is being revived in the inner city and its downgraded environs.

Since there are no conclusive studies of the present situation of low-income housing in Rio de Janeiro, one must start from hints, trends and comparisons. On the basis of the hypothesis that the process of peripheralisation of poverty is reverting and returning to the centres, we now turn to the inner city.

The inner city

By inner city we mean the CBD, its immediate environs where residences, port facilities and shops are found side by side, together with the adjacent neighbourhoods. The core is the oldest part of the city which was shaped from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century and which has been in constant change in the present century. One aspect of Government policy in the process of urban renewal must be emphasised. Although the rationale for state intervention has varied from one historical period to the next, for nearly a century, there has been a common denominator for all the official actions: the intent to move low-income populations out of the centre and to avoid residential use of the downtown area.

The great urban reform of 1902-1906 changed old colonial Rio, a small, insanitary Portuguese city, into a modern, sanitary, Frenchified capital. The new port was built, the city's core was cleaned up, streets were widened, straightened and paved, major avenues were opened. The Reform marked the beginning of a constant cycle of destruction and reconstruction. In 1922, the city underwent major surgery once more, as Morro Castelo (Castle Hill), where the city was founded, was razed; in the forties a mammoth thoroughfare was opened to provide access to the downtown area, causing the demolition of hundreds of houses. Other avenues were built and, in each case old densely populated neighbourhoods were destroyed. The belief in an almost unlimited expansion of the CBD led to the devastation of vast areas that were not taken up by downtown functions and could not be turned into residential districts. Wide empty spaces were combined with downgraded areas around the core region. In the surrounding residential areas, particularly the middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods along the coast, state intervention had the additional goal of eradicating favelas.

Although its alleged purpose was to improve health conditions or circulation, beautify or simply modernise the city, government policy and market forces had the combined effect of producing a 'socio-spatial purification (Santos 1983). On the expulsion of the lower classes from the city core, Santos writes: 'the history of recent urban revolution must be summed up as progress in ways to create privileged areas and 'cleansing' them of undesirable presences'. No wonder that modern metropolitan space is marked by hierachisation and exclusion.

It seems that the 'undesirables' are no longer kept at a distance. New patterns of low income housing indicate that a trend nearly a century old is beginning to change. The distinctions between favelas and city, core and periphery, formal/legal city and informal/illegal settlements are no longer as clear as they used to be, now that excluded populations are increasingly present where they once were not allowed.

Other oppositions seem to break down too: residential space and working space are mixed, areas are occupied both legally and illegally, old favelas blend into new *cortiços.*

Thus the aggravation of the crisis points to a new housing and urban situation, new to the extent that the phenomena described imply changing trends but, in a sense old as well, for nineteenth century phenomena are making a comeback: street people, *cortiços*, epidemic diseases, etc.

New ways of dealing with old problems must be developed. It is to be hoped that the old 'solutions' will not be the only ones, that new proposals will be made that will take into account the realities of the city and not an idealised version of Rio and that the right of every citizen to live in the city will be acknowledged.

Abbreviations

UFRJ – Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.
JB – Jornal do Brasil (a Rio daily).
G – O Globo (a Rio daily)
INPLAN RIO – Instituto Municipal de Planejamento (Municipal Institute for Planning)
PNAD – Presquisa Nacional por Amostragem a Domicílio (National Survey by Housing Sampling)
IBGE – Instituto Brasiliero de Geografia e Estatística (Brasilian Geographical and Statistical Institute)

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Labour on the move and transitions in the building process

A preliminary approach to the transitions in capital / labour relations resulting from manufacturing restructuring in São Paulo.

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In the last decade the metropolis of São Paulo, although listed in the sixth position among the world's urban agglomerations in terms of population, did not maintain its previous growth, either demographic or economic. Since the mid seventies this metropolitan area had experienced an industrial decentralisation process that lowered the share of manufacturing in value-added with a simultaneous decrease of jobs in the sector.

The decentralisation process of the manufacturing sector in São Paulo can not be explained except in terms of the globalisation issue. The Brazilian industrial sector has been linked historically to international capital and nowadays this linkage means participating in the global production process in compliance with the requirements of the greatest multinational corporations.

The recent globalisation process has been imposing new features on industrial and trade relations within the world capitalist accumulation and established capital / labour relations have also been affected. Industrial sectors which are intensive in fixed capital experience increases in productivity and thus shed a great number of workers. The introduction of advanced technologies, replacing traditional jobs, results in a reduced global job offer, and a higher demand for qualified labour force. In regional terms, technically advanced companies, those with recent transformations on the assembly line and management linked to the introduction of micro-electronic equipment, can more easily be located in new places. Those systems allow the production of components in different industrial plants, some of them located even out of the headquarter country.

The insertion of some Brazilian manufacturing companies in the global production process required a restructuring designed to update technologies. Since São Paulo Metropolitan Area constitutes the major industrial centre of the country, it is also there where the effects of the restructuring process can best be observed. The impact of this process on metropolitan population growth rate was strong, affecting especially the rate of inward migration. Migration had been 2.18% pa in the 70s but declined to less than 0.8% pa during the 80s. Although the total population growth rate had decreased to 1.76% pa (well below the 4.46% pa registered during the previous decade), the population had increased by almost 2.7 million to 15.2 million inhabitants in 1991, accordingly to the national census. The increase of the total employed population, from 1985 to 1990, was around 2.1 millions, just 23% of which was in the manufacturing sector. In fact, the unemployment rate within the experienced labour force in this latter sector increased from 11% in 1981 to 14.2% in 1990 (SEADE,1993).

The changes imposed on capital / labour relations resulting from the industrial restructuring in São Paulo State deserves a deeper investigation. There is also a lack of empirical research concerning qualifications in specific segments and concerning the typology of the manufacturing that has being restructured and / or transferred outside the São Paulo Metropolitan Area. Top this end, the paper presents some structured data relating to recent manufacturing performance in the State of São Paulo and in its metropolis, as well as the evolution of the local employment, as a preliminary approach to understanding the relevant transitions in the capital / labour relations.

The recent industrialisation process

Brazilian industrial development had started around the early twenties, located mainly in the São Paulo Metropolitan Area. During the fifties, a new stage in the industrialisation process, characterised for a strong implementation of dynamic factories based on foreign capital, had reinforced this centre as the national economic and industrial leader. Brazil had experienced, from 1968 to 1973, a period of such economic growth that it

has been called an 'economic miracle'[8]. In short, this accelerated growth was based on a strong increase in exports of raw materials and some manufactured products, and in an internal growth of upper class demand through credit facilities and growth of higher salaries, at the expense of lower salaries.

The State of São Paulo registered, during the 'miracle' period, a general manufacturing production growth and a high increasing in its agricultural output, which represented the most advanced in the country. São Paulo agriculture was oriented to produce industrial crops and export commodities, based on improvements of agricultural machinery and on an intensive use of agrochemical products. This also constituted an impulse for industrial growth. The strength of São Paulo's economy can be indicated by the evolution of its share of national manufacturing value-added (Table 1), which peaked, both for the region and the metropolis, just before the end of the Brazilian 'miracle'.

The eighties had represented for Brazil a recurrent economic crisis, which can be represented by GDP performance, which during the last decade registered an increase of 15%, compared to the increase of almost 100% in the previous decade (Leal & Luque, 1991, 75).

The first years of the nineties are proving to be a deeper crisis, since GDP registered a fall of 4.7% between 1990 and 1992, at the same time that the GDP per capita fell by around 10%[9]. Those economic indicators suggest the worsening of the income distribution and the extent of the social crisis Brazil is facing. This crisis represents the effects of economic transformations which have occurred mainly since the seventies, of which the most relevant are the ending of the national and international conditions that had made possible the accelerated economic growth during the 'miracle' period, and the increasing globalisation of the economy, which has privileged the central capitalist countries. The main characteristics of the globalisation of the economy, for the manufacturing sector, are related to an increasing introduction in the assembly line of advanced technologies based on micro electronic controls. These had, on the one hand, greatly increased productivity with less labour force, and on the other hand, permitted the diffusion of the 'flexible production' process, which means that from a same machinery it is possible to produce goods oriented to segmented markets. Important transformations have also been introduced in management with the help of electronic controls and a general tendency of 'tertiarisation' of some former internal departments, being transferred to external firms. The territorial effects of those technological changes are the splitting of components production between different plants, some located even in foreign countries, chosen for their particular features like proximity to segmented markets or to supplies.

To update equipment requires high private investments, at the same time that there are demands for great State investments in regional infrastructure like energy, telecommunication, highways. Both demands represent constraints for a technical restructuring of most Brazilian companies. Effective insertion in the changing global production process is thus restricted mainly to the subsidiaries or associates of multinational corporations, which have their Brazilian head offices mainly located in the metropolis of São Paulo.

The State of São Paulo's manufacturing GDP was 47% of the Brazil total in 1980 and 42% in 1990. Almost 60% of this regional output in 1980 was produced in the manufacturing centre of the metropolis. A decentralisation of this huge industrial agglomeration began in the late 70s, with a partial transfer of manufacturing plants towards the interior (i.e. periphery) of São Paulo State and towards some regional capitals.

The main theoretical hypotheses concerning the determinants of this manufacturing decentralisation emerges from the capital / labour conflict. Storper (1984) emphasises the loss of control of salaries by the local employers, after late seventies[10] which had forced the manufacturing decentralisation from

[8] The yearly growth rate for the main economic indicators in that period was: GNP: 8%; manufacturing sector: 12%; exportation: 24%; agricultural produce: 5% , with an increase in the specific share oriented to exportation.

[9] Data from the National Planning Office, as published in the Brazilian *Gazeta Mercantil* (4/1/93:3).

[10] In 1978 there had been a strong strike in the industrial municipalities of the metropolitan region of São Paulo, which lasted for four months and had involved around 280,000 workers. Storper (1984) argues that this period marks, for employers, the end of a quite easy control of the salary growth, which had always previously been maintained below the increase of productivity.

the main industrial centre of the country. The strategy of the ruling class sought to recover its economic control over salaries by reducing the local Trade Unions' power after decentralising some manufacturing. At the same time, it aimed to concentrate capital and to improve the productivity of some manufacturing segments to achieve competitiveness in the international market commanded by the global production system. This theoretical approach, albeit certainly valid, still requires a deeper survey regarding the characteristics of the manufacturing segments decentralised, although we can certainly see an increase of salaries in this sector, compared to other main Brazilian metropolitan areas between 1985 and 1990 (Table 2). At the same time its unemployment rate registered a yearly average of 10% (SEADE,1993), considerably higher than the national average rate which amounted to around 5% for the last years.

The main features of capital / labour relations in the São Paulo manufacturing sector.

In general terms, the State of São Paulo and its metropolis had been declining in their shares of national manufacturing value-added (Table 1) since 1975. At the same time Amadeo & Camargo (1991:196) have indicated that the profits of this sector located in the State of São Paulo had represented the highest in the country. The ranking of the 30 major manufacturing companies by Sales located in Brazil in 1975, 1980 and 1990 (Tables 3 to 5) indicate that the State of São Paulo was the headquarters of 21 in 1975 and 1980, and 16 in 1990, signifying the increasing tendency of the manufacturing plants to decentralise outside the metropolitan industrial agglomeration. Analysing the 20 major companies by profitability in Brazil for the same dates, it emerges that the companies located in São Paulo are still leaders (Tables 6 to 8), since they represented 11 in 1975 and 7 in 1980, increasing to 11 again in 1990.

Another relevant indicator concerning capital restructuring is the presence of capital intensive companies located in São Paulo, as a proportion of all companies, since the former normally require less labour force. Analysing the manufacturing companies located in the State of São Paulo and in Brazil, accordingly to their specific areas and products (Tables 9 and 10), it appears that the more advanced ones are still located in this State. There is a general consensus that the spreading of advanced technologies and microelectronic equipment on assembly lines and in business management is causing higher unemployment[11], at the same time as it generates a selective demand for more qualified labour force. The traditional insertion of the Brazilian industry in the international accumulation process was based on the low qualification of its labour force, which permitted some cost advantages through low wages. Nowadays these changes in labour demand represent both a grave hindrance for national economic development and a further barrier preventing un-skilled workers from attaining jobs.

Recent research[12] has pointed out that industrial jobs on offer for un-qualified workers have been decreasing, at the same time as salaries in the tertiary sector for such workers have been unattractive. The economic crisis Brazil has been facing in the last decade has generated unemployment resulting from the economic conjuncture. In fact, the national unemployment rate has increased from 3.4% in 1989 to an average of 5.2% during the last three years, which represents severe social problems in a country like Brazil that has a very weak unemployment benefit system[13].

Associated with the unemployment resulting from the economic conjuncture, the technical improvements in the more modernised manufacturing companies, mostly of them located in the State of São Paulo, are generating technological unemployment. There are few systematic surveys on these issues for Brazil. Prado(1988), however, analysed a company making components for motor vehicles, advanced in the sense of being thoroughly

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[11] Some authors such as Fleury (1988), however, consider that the development and production of those equipments are also generating manufacturing jobs. Even if this is true, those jobs are probably generated in the central countries, responsible for the development, control, and diffusion of advanced technologies.

[12] Research developed by Fundacão Sistema Estadual de Analise de Dados (SEADE), as published in Gazeta Mercantil (4/6/93:1,6).

[13] Unemployment benefits were created in Brazil only in 1988 and had assisted only 5% of the unemployed, each receiving a total amount corresponding just to one month's salary, accordingly to Chaia's recent survey(1988, 17). This author has also indicated that around 50% of the Brazilian unemployed survived thanks to the wage of another member of the family, and that almost 20%, as well as benefiting from the wage of a relative, also work in sporadic informal jobs.

engaged in the global production process, and found evidence of this technological unemployment. This research also found out that the more qualified labour force working on more advanced machinery was earning higher salaries than the workers operating traditional equipment. Even so the total increase of productivity more than covers the increase of the company wage bill.

Another mechanism (which needs further investigation) is the tendency to 'tertiarisation' in the sense of contracting out (or 'externalising') of some departments by manufacturing. The transfer of traditionally internal functions and areas like informatics, legal and catering services to special firms or consulting groups represents a real cut of direct jobs in the manufacturing firms, which tends to fragment the manufacturing labour force and weaken the trade unions' power.

The impact on the labour force of these processes may be gauged from the distribution of the employed population in 1989, by class of income according to economic activity (Table 11). Although São Paulo's share of national manufacturing value added has shrunk, its employed population, in all economic sectors, has higher salaries than the Brazilian average.

Conclusions.

The Brazilian manufacturing sector has been restructured to support its insertion in the global production network, which is spreading from the more advanced countries. This restructuring requires technological improvements which are attained only by few manufacturers, particularly the ones associated with or subsidiaries of multinational corporations, and after an increasing process of capital concentration. As regards the territorial effects, this industrial restructuring has been involving a decentralisation process from the main Brazilian industrial centre, which is the metropolis of São Paulo.

The understanding of the decentralisation process require analysing different determinant processes, and among them the role of the Trade Unions deserves a deeper investigation. From the late seventies in São Paulo there was a significant strengthening of the trade unions which, for the first time, seriously limited the power of employers to keep swage growth below productivity growth. Although some industrial plants have been transferred towards specific cities in the more remote parts of the State of São Paulo, and to a lesser extent towards the main regional capitals, the more profitable manufacturing companies are still located in the São Paulo State.

As a general impact on the salaries, both formally registered and total employed population working in the São Paulo Metropolitan Area were, in the eighties, enjoying faster real growth of wages than those in other Brazilian Metropolitan Areas. This lends support to the argument here about the role of the trade unions and their influence on the manufacturing decentralisation process. Even so, we need a deeper understanding of the transformations of the capital / labour relations in this industrial centre. Further research is needed, mainly on the technological industrial restructuring of the last two decades, its effects on labour relations and the labour markets.

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Table 1
Manufacturing value-added as share of national total
State of São Paulo (SPS) and São Paolo Metropolitan Area (SPMA) as % of Brazil

year	SPMA/BR (%)	SPS/BR (%)
1960	39.8	54.5
1970	42.2	56.6
1975	38.0	54.7
1980	32.9	52.4
1985	26.8	47.4

(BR=Brazil)
Source: FIBGE: Annual Statistics & Industrial Census

Table 2
Average annual real growth of salaries for the total employed and the registered employed population.
Main Brazilian Metropolitan Areas. 1985-1990 (% p.a)

	Recife	Salvador	Belo Horizonte	Rio de Janeiro	São Paulo	Porto Alegre
Total Employed Population	1.77	1.40	2.02	2.21	3.46	2.45
Registered employed population	-0.01	-0.91	-1.11	0.37	1.28	0.68

Source: Cacciamali (1991:18)

Table 3
Major manufacturing companies by sales
Brazil / 1975

rank	company	main office (State)	property	Sales Cr$ million	Sales US$ million	sector
1	Petrobrás	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil (public)	46,013.6	5,576.0	chemicals & petrochemicals
2	Volkswagen	São Paulo	Germany	14,316.0	1,734.8	vehicles
3	Ford	São Paulo	USA	8,253.8	1,000.2	vehicles
4	General Motors	São Paulo	USA	7,761.6	940.6	vehicles
5	Mercedes Benz	São Paulo	Germany	6,005.6	727.8	vehicles
6	Copersucar	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	5,980.0	724.7	food products
7	CSN	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil (public)	5,337.3	646.8	steel
8	Usiminas	Minas Gerais	Brazil (public)	4,775.1	578.7	steel
9	Sanbra	São Paulo	Argentina	4,769.0	577.9	food products
10	Pirelli	São Paulo	Italy	4,089.3	495.5	plastic and rubber
11	Souza Cruz	Rio de Janeiro	United Kingdom	3,899.0	472.5	tobacco
12	Nestlé	São Paulo	Switzerland	3,327.1	403.2	food products
13	Rhodia	São Paulo	France	3,297.1	399.6	chemicals, petrochem.
14	Massey Fergusson	São Paulo	Canada	2,907.2	352.3	transportation equipment
15	Cosipa	São Paulo	Bazil (public)	2,855.6	346.0	steel
16	Philips	São Paulo	Holland	2,594.0	314.3	electronics
17	Ericssson	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	2,346.0	284.3	electronics
18	Goodyear	São Paulo	USA	2,321.0	281.3	plastic and rubber
19	Mannesmann	Minas Gerais	Germany	2,114.3	256.2	steel
20	Belgo Mineira	Minas Gerais	Brazil (private)	2,049.6	248.4	steel
21	Petroqímica União	São Paulo	Brazil (public)	2,022.2	245.1	chemicals & petrochemicals
22	General Electric	Rio de Janeiro	USA	1,855.4	224.8	electronics
23	Anderson Clayton	São Paulo	USA	1,824.1	221.0	food products
24	IBM Ltda.	Rio de Janeiro	USA	1,812.0	219.6	computers
25	Inds. F. R. Matarazzo	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	1,810.2	219.4	metallurgy
26	Alcan	São Paulo	Canada	1,624.7	196.9	metallurgy
27	Gessy Lever	São Paulo	Holland	1,616.1	195.8	personal care
28	Brahma	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil (private)	1,580.2	191.5	beverages
29	Olivetti	São Paulo	Italy	1,573.0	190.6	office equipment
30	Swift-Armour	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	1,476.8	178.9	food products

1US$=Cr$8.252 (average value)
Source: EXAME / Maiores e Melhores, 1976. (the Best and Largest Enterprises Review)

Table 4
Major manufacturing companies by sales
Brazil / 1980

rank	company	main office (State)	property	Sales Cr$ million	Sales US$ million	sector
1	Petrobrás	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil (public)	872,683.3	16,155.5	chemicals & petrochem.
2	Souza Cruz	Rio de Janeiro	United Kingdom	124,052.4	2,296.6	tobacco
3	Volkswagen	São Paulo	Germany	110,093.0	2,038.2	vehicles
4	Copersucar	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	72,906.0	1,349.7	food products
5	General Motors	São Paulo	USA	72,221.3	1,337.1	vehicles
6	Ford	São Paulo	USA	69,700.8	1,290.4	vehicles
7	Mercedes Benz	São Paulo	Germany	68,431.4	1,266.9	vehicles
8	CSN	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil (public)	61,591.6	1,140.3	steel
9	Usiminas	Minas Gerais	Brazil (public)	60,626.4	1,122.4	steel
10	Pirelli	São Paulo	Italy	54,463.6	1,008.3	plastic and rubber
11	Cosipa	São Paulo	Bazil (public)	50,892.7	942.2	steel
12	Sanbra	São Paulo	Argentina	40,364.0	747.3	food products
13	Nestlé	São Paulo	Switzerland	39,651.0	734.1	food products
14	Fiat	Minas Gerais	Italy	37,088.9	686.6	vehicles
15	Rhodia	São Paulo	France	35,891.3	664.5	chemicals & petrochem.
16	Copene	Bahia	Brazil (private)	35,587.2	658.8	chemicals & petrochem.
17	Goodyear	São Paulo	USA	28,727.1	531.8	plastic and rubber
18	Brahma	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil (private)	27,692.6	512.7	beverages
19	Philips	São Paulo	Holland	25,939.0	480.2	electronics
20	Mannesmann	Minas Gerais	Germany	25,788.7	477.4	steel
21	IBM	São Paulo	USA	25,178.0	466.1	computers
22	Gessy Lever	São Paulo	Holland	24,418.4	452.1	personal care
23	Acesita	Minas Gerais	Brazil (public)	24,136.5	446.8	steel
24	Alpargatas	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	23,825.4	441.1	clothing and textiles
25	Petroqímica União	São Paulo	Brazil (public)	23,759.1	439.9	chemicals & petrochem.
26	Philco	São Paulo	USA	23,045.0	426.6	eletronics
27	Ultrafèrtil	São Paulo	Brazil (public)	22,839.1	422.8	chemicals & petrochem.
28	Anderson Clayton	São Paulo	USA	22,578.5	418.0	food products
29	Cargill	São Paulo	USA	22,291.6	412.7	food products
30	Firestone	São Paulo	USA	22,005.5	407.4	plastic and rubber

1US$=Cr$54.015 (average value)
Source: EXAME / Maiores e Melhores, 1981. (the Best and Largest Enterprises Review)

Table 5
Major manufacturing companies by sales
Brazil / 1990

rank	company	main office (State)	property	Sales Cr$ million	* Sales US$ million	sector
1	Petrobrás	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil (public)	1,078,913.5	11,430.3	chemicals & petrochem.
2	Autolatina Brasil	São Paulo	Germany / USA	481,633.0	5,430.9	vehicles
3	Souza Cruz	Rio de Janeiro	United Kingdom	257,281.3	2,890.6	tobacco
4	GMB	São Paulo	USA	211,131.5	2,394.2	vehicles
5	Gessy Lever	São Paulo	Holland	139,430.9	1,632.8	personal care
6	Nestlé	São Paulo	Switzerland	140,245.6	1,609.9	food products
7	Copersucar	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	134,540.7	1,582.6	food products
8	IBM do Brasil	Rio de Janeiro	USA	127,000.0	1,448.8	computers
9	Mercedes Benz	São Paulo	Germany	124,751.7	1,419.8	vehicles
10	Usiminas	Minas Gerais	Brazil (private)	116,950.2	1,363.0	steel
11	Fiat Automóveis	Minas Gerais	Italy	112,796.9	1,291.6	vehicles
12	CSN	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil (public)	111,796.9	1,112.9	steel
13	Cosipa	São Paulo	Bazil (public)	86,313.4	1,090.4	steel
14	Philips	São Paulo	Holland	94,300.0	1,075.7	electronics
15	Brahma	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil (private)	82,317.4	896.6	beverages
16	Ceval	Santa Catarina	Brazil (private)	72,069.9	878.2	food products
17	Sadia Concórdia	Santa Catarina	Brazil (private)	73,713.9	805.5	food products
18	Goodyear	São Paulo	USA	58,343.3	691.6	plastic rubber
19	Rhodia	São Paulo	France	55,912.9	673,8	chemicals & petrochem.
20	Copene	Bahia	Brazil (private)	58,912.4	665.3	chemicals & petrochem.
21	Embraer	São Paulo	Brazil (public)	53,713.3	631.9	transportation equipment
22	Brastemp	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	49,190.7	628.3	electronics
23	Copesul	Rio G. do Sol	Brazil (public)	54,844.7	614.8	chemicals & petrochem.
24	Pirelli Pneus	São Paulo	Italy	51,122.9	600.8	plastic rubber
25	Consul	Santa Catarina	Brazil (private)	46,726.6	585.2	electronics
26	Alcoa Alumí nio	Minas Gerais	USA	55,438.7	563.2	metallurgy
27	Hoechst	São Paulo	Germany	46,488.0	536.4	chemicals & petrochem.
28	São Paulo Alpargatas	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	47,884.7	535.3	clothing and textiles
29	Sanbra	São Paulo	Argentina	45,465.2	534.0	food products
30	White Martins	Rio de Janeiro	USA	45,885.5	523.4	chemicals and petrochem.

* value calculated monthly by EXAME
Source: EXAME / Maiores e Melhores, 1991. (the Best and Largest Enterprises Review)

Table 6
Major companies by profitability
Brazil / 1975

rank	company	main office (state)	property	profitability (%)	sector
1	Polioliolefinas	São Paulo	Barzil (private)	91.0	chemicals and petrochemicals
2	Conforja	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	85.0	mettalurgy
3	Transformadores União	São Paulo	Gewrmany	83.2	electric equipment
4	Cargill Agrícola	São Paulo	USA	81.9	food products
5	Promon Engenharia	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	75.9	civil engineering
6	Docenave	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil (public)	73.8	transportation services
7	Sotreq	Rio de Janeiro	Barzil (private)	73.3	vehicle distriibution
8	Cia. Basiliera Tratores	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	71.7	trucks
9	Cominci	Minas Gerais	…	64.2	non-metallic monerals
10	Cia. T. Janer	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil (private)	63.1	wholesale
11	Morrison Knudsen	Rio de janeiro	USA	62.7	civil engineering
12	Singer Sewing	São Paulo	USA	61.0	electronics
13	Sobraço	São Paulo	…	59.8	…
14	J. H. Santos	Rio Grande do Sul	Barzil (private)	59.0	retail
15	Mannesmann	Minas gerais	Germany	59.0	steel
16	Confab Industrial	São Paulo	Barzil (private)	58.2	metallurgy
17	Cia. Lopes Sá	Rio de janeiro	…	57.6	…
18	Cimetal Siderurgia	Minas gerais	Brazil (private)	55.6	Steel
19	Cimento Portland Barroso	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	54.7	non-metallic minerals
20	Super Mercados Eldorado	São Paulo	Barzil (private)	54.6	supermarkets

(… not available)
Source: EXAME / Maiores e Melhores, 1976. (The best and largest enterprises review.)

Table 7
Major companies by profitability
Brazil / 1980

rank	companies	main office (state)	property	profitability (%)	sector
1	Docegeo	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil (public)	86.9	mining
2	Grendene	Rio Grande do Sul	Brazil (private)	77.2	wholesale
3	Iretama	Rio de Janeiro	USA	58.4	chemicals, petrochemicals
4	Coamo	Paraná	Brazil (private)	54.9	agricultural products
5	Saab - Scania	São Paulo	Sweden	53.1	vehicles
6	Cotia Comercial	São Paulo	Bfrazil (private)	50.7	wholesale
7	Agrofértil	Pernambuco	Brazil (private)	48.5	chemicals and petrochemicals
8	Brasilera Estireno	São Paulo	USA	47.9	plastic and rubber
9	Berkau	Bahia	Brazil (private)	47.3	food products
10	Sul Fabril	Santa Catarina	Brazil (private)	47.1	clothing, textiles
11	J H Santos	Rio Grande do Sul	Brazil (private)	46.8	retail
12	Veplantec	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil (private)	46.4	civil engineering
13	Benafer	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil (private)	45.3	wholesale
14	Luchsinger Madörin	Rio Grande do Sul	Brazil (private)	44.8	chemicals and petrochemicals
15	Tabacos Brasileiros	Santa catarina	Holland	42.9	tobacco and beverages
16	Cocap	Paraná	Brazil (private)	42.4	agricultural products
17	General Motors	São Paulo	USA	40,9	vehicles
18	Tonolli	São Paulo	Holland	40.4	metallurgy
19	Brasiliera do Rayon	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	40.1	textiles
20	Makro	São Paulo	Holland	39.6	wholesale

Source: EXAME / Maiores e Melhores, 1981. (The best and largest enterprises review.)

Table 8
Major companies by profitability
Brazil / 1990

rank	companies	main office (state)	property	profitability (%)	sector
1	Souza Cruz Trading	Rio de Janeiro	United Kingdom	589.2	trade
2	White Martins Gases	Rio de Janeiro	USA	114.2	chemicals and petrochemicals
3	OAS	Bahia	Brazil (private)	72.4	civil construction
4	Roche	Rio de Janeiro	Switzerland	69.4	pharmaceuticals
5	Editora Globo	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	68.4	publishing
6	Starexport	São Paulo	Germany	64.2	trade
7	Equitel	Paranà	Brazil (private)	63.9	electronics
8	Kibon	São Paulo	USA	59.3	food products
9	Agip Liquigas	São Paulo	Italy	58.1	chemicals and petrochemicals
10	CNEC	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	55.9	civil construction
11	Q-Refresco-Co	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	53.5	food products
12	NEC do Brasil	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	51.1	electronics
13	OAS Empreendiment	Bahia	Brazil (private)	50.3	ciiivil construction
14	Ipiranga Serrana	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	50.2	chemicals
15	White Martins Indls.	Rio de Janeiro	USA	50.0	chemicals and petrochemicals
16	Xerox	Rio de Janeiro	USA	48.0	trade
17	Semp Toshiba	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	46.4	electronics
18	Minagàs	Minas Gerais	Brazil (private)	44.9	chemicals and petrochemicals
19	Ercsson	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	44.6	electronics
20	Tostines	São Paulo	Brazil (private)	44.5	food products

Source: EXAME / Maiores e Melhores, 1991. (The Best andLargest Enterprises Review)

Table 9
Distribution of manufacturing value-added by sector.
State of São Paulo and Brazil / 1980-1990

In percentage						
Sector	Distribution of manufacturing value-added					
	State of São Paulo			Brazil		
	1980	1985	1990	1980	1985	1990
Total	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**	**100.00**
Nonmetallic minerals	3.91	3.61	3.94	5.61	4.78	5.00
Metallury	10.88	10.15	9.52	11.41	11.11	10.98
Mechanics	12.78	8.93	8.49	9.74	7.52	7.63
Eletric and communications equipment	7.95	7.16	7.05	7.04	6.77	7.79
Transport equipment	10.34	8.67	7.85	7.99	6.69	5.92
Paper and cardboard	2.78	3.38	4.31	2.86	3.37	3.73
Rubber	1.75	1.85	1.97	1.27	1.27	1.41
Chemicals	15.13	19.10	19.11	14.65	18.38	17.07
Pharmaceuticals and Veterinary products	2.10	2.67	2.72	1.73	1.93	1.95
Perfumes, soaps and candles	1.08	1.40	2.04	1.00	1.24	1.62
Plastics	2.60	2.51	2.48	2.37	2.18	2.19
Textiles	6.47	6.31	5.64	5.56	5.94	5.68
Clothing, footwear and cloth goods	3.98	3.87	2.64	5.05	5.00	3.90
Food products	7.99	8.94	10.38	11.01	12.05	12.77
Beverages	0.75	0.77	1.24	1.30	1.24	1.73
Tobacco	0.28	0.18	0.19	0.67	0.86	0.95
Other (1)	9.23	9.70	10.42	9.74	9.67	9.68

Source: IBGE, SEADE. (1) Lumber, forniture, leather and fur, publishing industry

Table 10
Manufacturing value-added: real average growth by sector
State of São Paulo and Brazil / 1980-1990

Sector	Distribution of manufacturing value-added Real Average Growth percent per year (brackets show negative growth)			
	State of São Paulo		Brazil	
	1980-85	1985-90	1980-85	1985-90
total	**(1.07)**	**(0.52)**	**(0.47)**	**0.43**
Nonmetallic minerals	(2.63)	1.19	(3.62)	1.35
Matallurgy	(2.45)	(1.78)	(1.01)	0.20
Mechanics	(7.91)	(1.52)	(5.50)	0.72
Electric and communications equipment	(3.12)	(0.82)	(1.26)	3.29
Transportation equipment	(4.51)	(2.47)	(3.95)	(1.98)
Paper and cardboard	2.85	4.45	2.85	2.50
Rubber	(0.01)	0.81	(0.43)	2.48
Chemicals	4.49	(1.30)	4.14	(1.04)
Pharmaceuticals and Veterinary products	3.85	0.17	1.81	0.57
Perfumes, soaps and candles	4.31	7.32	3.99	5.92
Plastics	(1.69)	(0.83)	(2.13)	0.50
Textiles	(1.54)	(2.74)	(2.42)	(0.47)
Clothing, footwear and cloth goods	(1.62)	(7.86)	(0.65)	(4.47)
Food products	1.18	2.53	1.34	1.60
Beverages	(0.52)	9.28	(1.28)	7.30
Tobacco	(9.74)	0.94	4.40	2.46
Other (1)	0.14	0.90	(0.62)	0.45

Source: IBGE, SEADE. (1) Lumber, forniture, leather and fur, publishing industry.

Table 11
Distribution of employed population by income group by sector.
State of São Paolo and Brazil 1989

Sector	Percent of employed population (1) in each income group (MW = minimum wage)							
	0-2 MW		2-5 MW		5-10 MW		> 10 MW	
	State of São Paulo	Brazil (2)	State of São Paulo	Brazil (2)	State of São Paulo	Brazil (2)	State of São Paulo	Brazil (2)
Agriculture & cattle raising	60.6	76.2	28.7	16.6	4.8	4.1	5.9	3.1
Manufacturing	24.9	42.2	43.6	35.3	17.5	12.4	14.0	10.1
Civil construction	28.6	50.5	48.0	36.7	14.1	7.9	9.3	5.0
Other industrial activity	15.1	29.2	31.9	33.6	31.3	18.8	21.7	18.5
Trade	33.9	47.5	34.8	30.4	15.6	11.1	15.8	10.9
Services	55.2	71.4	28.4	19.0	9.4	5.9	7.0	3.7
Auxilliary services of economic activity	22.8	30.4	31.7	29.1	17.8	16.2	27.8	24.3
Transport and communication	12.5	25.2	44.9	42.9	25.9	19.1	16.7	12.8
Social	25.1	45.7	38.7	29.9	21.1	13.2	15.2	11.2
Public administration	22.0	38.0	40.6	32.6	22.4	15.9	14.9	13.5
Other activities	10.1	21.7	39.2	30.2	20.6	18.5	30.0	29.6

(1) Persons without income and without declaration are excluded.
(2) North Region rural population excluded.
(3) Minimum wage at September 1989

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Converging trends in state policy and urban development in Europe

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Introduction: the State and Spatial Development

What is particularly evident in all countries in Europe are a weakening of state intervention and changes in its form, especially in the field of reproductive investment. It is also evident that contemporary long term state policy now coexists with an increasing number of new policies promoted by national or supranational agents at various spatial levels.

Alongside this change, another process of transformation is now evident: shifts in the administrative structures, involving different levels of government (central, intermediate and local) leading to a fusion of competences and policy domains.

These changes reinforce the need for a diversified conceptualisation of the role of the state, different from the ones developed in the 1960s and 1970s.

In fact, since the late 1970s and early 1980s there have been contributions, by various scholars all over Europe, which attempt to introduce new conceptualisations of the state, basically seen in relation to the continuing crisis and the process of internationalisation of the economies. Murray was one of the first who stressed the fact that, within a 'macro-level' problematic, the fact that

> …the multinationalisation of capital has introduced a new political economy of nation states. They are brought into competition not through the exchange of goods and services on the international market but through the attraction of multinational investment on the one hand and multinational declaration of profit on the other (1985, 49).

Moulaert, Swyngedouw and Wilson, adopting a more 'internal view' of the role of the state and its functions, argued that

> Although the capital logic remains in place, state functions have been modified substantially. There are important shifts in their forms, their relative weight and the level of political (de)centralisation to which they apply. The theories of the state as they have been developed up to now, do not always account for these developments and most of the path towards a theory of the post-Fordist state still has to be covered (1988, 22).

Moreover, the marked and sustained changes in local-level function all over Europe – both quantitative and qualitative – have further driven the debate. A number of writers have emphasised that these changes bore little relation to theories of the state which viewed local government in isolation from the central state and from larger economic and local structures. They thus stress the need to re-define or further elaborate on state theory. According to Häussermann

> …critical social research in the 1970s, particularly in the wake of Marxists' attempts at state theory, took for granted the centralisation thesis linked with the centralisation and concentration process of capital as well as with the necessity of increasing state intervention. These attempts were implicitly based on a theory regarding the democratic quality of a decentralised state organisation. But this theory was not very well developed and was not connected with corresponding concepts for the economy in developed capitalism (1991, 116).

Preteceille argues that

> The complexities of policy changes and territorial restructuring of the state are an invitation to develop further the lines of research...which. inspired by Poulantzas (1978), treat the state as a concrete historical process of material condensation of relations of power between classes. There again a number of interesting but limited descriptive works have been produced, but the question of the state has been largely left aside, and theoretical analysis has even gone backwards (1991: 143).

The change in the form and content of state intervention, becomes particularly evident in the field of spatial development. And in this respect, the relative weakness of theory in

relation to the changing role of the state severely affects our understanding. In all EU member states however, there are marked changes concerning the institutions involved, the investment patterns being promoted and also the actual problems which state policy attempts to deal with in public action in space. Since unemployment, for instance, appears as an overwhelmingly dominant problem for cities and inner-cities, it conditions and leads to the formulation (through informal and formal mechanisms) of a new policy rationale.

Within this context, as shaped by the crisis conditions experienced, and by the overall process of European integration, some common and overlapping policy and institutional features are now evident in the European urban development field. The most clearly identifiable common features are the following:

- the adoption of economic policies sharing a common austerity basis;
- the growing importance of EU institutions and policy;
- the increasing number of social and economic policies acting in parallel with normal state policy; and
- the increasing number of positive developmental interventions of an exceptional character.

The predominant economic policies in the Member States

The overall trend towards internationalisation of economic relationships in Europe has been accompanied by the application of the main principles of supply-side economics and austerity policies.

The generality of current policy tendencies could in a way be compared with the common Keynesian interventionist basis shared in the early post-war decades by the European countries (varying from the welfare state in the United Kingdom, the Markt-Wirtschaft in Germany, the Social Contract in Belgium, etc.) at a time when most economies had to comply with the requirements of a supra-national policy, based on the Marshall Plan, the installation of the IMF and the first attempts to liberalise international trade in the setting of the GATT.

What is important to stress here, however, is that austerity policies have been leading nearly everywhere to specific spatial repercussions and have been determining new conditions for local governments and localities in general (Edwards, 1991;1993; Lipietz, 1985). In turn, particular forms of local adjustments have taken place, involving to varying degrees the expansion of private market relations in service provision, the privatisation of social services, the adoption of de-regulation doctrines in urban planning, the sale of public assets, the liberalisation of labour markets and so on.

Irrespective of the nature of austerity policy and the mode of implementation, it results nearly everywhere in a severe testing of the locality's capacity to resist centrally-imposed changes. Austerity also forces localities to find new patterns for the delivery of services as well as pursuing new objectives for positive development initiatives.

The growing importance of EU institutions and policy.

EU institutions and policies prove to be increasingly important development agents: they interfere at various governmental and spatial levels. The impact of the EU is strongly felt, both directly through the structural actions and the promotion of actual investment initiatives; and indirectly through the introduction of new common regulations and policy principles (partnership, subsidiarity) at various levels.

On the whole it could be argued that there is no clearly defined spatial (and especially urban) policy pursued by the EU. The outcome is only shaped within specific contexts, depending heavily on the capability of areas to utilise existing resources and institutions. In this respect, the Commission's report *Regional Studies* , concerning urbanisation and the functions of cities, expresses a number of concerns with respect to the current EU spatial policy. 'These include concerns about the failure to integrate different Commission policies which impact upon cities, its limited spatial targeting, its failure to address some crucial urban problems and the anomalies created by its eligibility criteria' (CEC, 1992).

There are, however, many indications which tend to confirm a move towards the

formulation of an overall urban policy doctrine. There is, for instance, a move towards the harmonisation of planning regulations. This tendency seems to spring from the Single European Act, the increasing interest of the EU in environmental matters and the reciprocally-shaped European legislative measures that directly or indirectly affect planning (e.g. the 1985 Environmental Impact Directive) (*The Planner* 1992: 13). Moreover, within this context there also appears to be a vague attempt to determine an overall European planning policy doctrine. This has been expressed by the urban pilot projects funded by article 10 of the European Regional Development Fund. But the strongest expression of this tendency was the Commission's Green Paper on the Urban Environment, advocating a general policy perspective such as a 'compact city solution' (CEC 1990; Breheny, 1992).

As part of a more co-ordinated approach to the problems of the cities, the EU has more recently launched the initiative URBAN. This is aimed at 'neighbourhoods within cities and large towns where there are particular problems of social exclusion. The programme is based on innovative projects which form part of a long-term integration strategy combining all dimensions of urban life, and emphasising the transferability of results to other cities particularly in a European context' (*Planning Week*, 1994, 9). A further indication of the Commission's interest in spatial and urban problems in particular are the activities of the Committee of the Regions.

Finally another area of EU policy of relevance in urban development, are the single initiatives and the European networks. There are now 12 European Networks supported by the ERDF. The most important of these are the Network of Eurocities and Commission des Villes (Dawson 1992, 7). Even in its early stages, networking becomes indicative of an urban focus (since most of the networks concern primarily cities and regions) and of a tendency towards overcoming traditional institutional settings by putting localities and cities in direct touch with each other.

This proliferation is indicative of some inherent difficulties faced by European Union policy. These relate to the need to reconcile demands posed by the competitive international environment and the protection of the local social economic and cultural context. And also the tension between the need to maintain local and regional autonomy (thus relying predominantly on the existing organisational, policy formulation and implementation capabilities of the localities) and the constitution of a coherent broader policy. EU policy, although still in an ill-defined manner, proves to be far more sensible in many respects than many national institutions: a lot of its actions tend systematically to extend beyond a narrowly economic rationale, seeking to embody democratic control criteria, cultural criteria and above all social cohesion objectives in policy making.

The increasing number of policies acting in parallel or independently from normal state policy.

In most European countries, there is a marked increase in the number of policies related to specific social groups (youth unemployment, vocational training for school leavers, combating social exclusion etc.) and to specific economic sectors (textile, mining, shipbuilding etc). Broadly speaking these policies are implemented outside the normal state policy structure and tend to fall to of regions, local government, or quasi independent institutions; they are frequently supported by EU funding and exhibit a time-limited or occasionally urgent character. To a certain extent these policies illustrate the limits of state policy to deal with or respond to emerging problems in contemporary social and economic crisis conditions within the normal existing budgetary and other constraints.

These are policies which tend to deal, even though in a temporary, limited and disjointed manner, with new problems – problems which relate to phenomena such as the 'new poor' (Neef, 1992,.205) – which are being targeted by EU structural policy and by national policies. Among these initiatives, the contributions by the ESF to improving the employment situation of disadvantaged categories (long term unemployed, young people, women and migrants) and the Poverty III programme (for the fight against social exclusion and poverty) are specially important. Moreover, EU initiatives of a sectoral/locational character or initiatives concerning specific social/population groups are obviously examples of these specific forms of policy.

With respect to predominantly national level policies reference should be made to the Plan for Action for Employment and Industrial Reorganisation in France which has given priority to the reconversion of declining industrial regions and the 'Big Cities Bottleneck Programme' in the Netherlands, aimed at improving economic conditions for disadvantaged population in the largest Dutch cities (Fox-Przeworski, 1991). As similar initiatives in the UK one could mention the City Action Teams, the Inner City Task Forces , the City Challenge and the Ethnic Minority Programmes.

Positive Developmental Interventions of Exceptional Character

Another expression of this kind of policy-making relates to specific geographical areas. A major trend here involves the increasing number of 'positive' developmental interventions of an exceptional character relative to existing policy settings, legislative frameworks and investment patterns. These interventions have been developing mostly in relation to major infrastructural projects (especially transportation), technology enclaves and abandoned or derelict land. They generally tend to promote concentration of services, tourist and leisure activities, retail, insurance and banking capital, often taking for granted the continuation of pre-existing trends. They are legitimised by the promise of cumulative effects at the regional and local level. Projects are in general administered by quasi autonomous organisations, based on private-public partnership schemes and incorporating local institutions to a varying degree (according to the national setting).

The pioneering developments in this sphere undoubtedly come from the UK with the founding of new institutions such as the Enterprise Zones (EZs) and the Urban Development Corporations (UDCs). In France also, a country with a long-standing tradition of public-private cooperation, a similar 'exceptional investment' trend is also evident. The development policy in the Nord-Pas de Calais Region (N. France) for instance and in particular in the Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing conurbation, relies heavily on concentrated investments for exploiting the new accessibility conditions created by the TGV, the Channel Tunnel and the strategic situational advantages of the conurbation (e.g. the *EuraLille* Project in Lille, the *'Archives du Monde du Travail'* and the *'Euroteleport'* in Roubaix). Examples of positive interventions of an exceptional character are many in Italy, in spite the fact that it difficult to have a clear idea of their overall long term importance especially at the institutional policy level (e.g. the *Lingotto* project in Turin, *FIAT* at Novoli in Florence, the *Bicocca* project in Milan, *Montecity* in Milan, the *'Fiera di Milano'*, the *Sdo* in Rome, the *'Centro Direzionale'* in Naples, the *'Fondiaria'* in Florence and numerous other projects (Indovina, 1992, 14).

In Germany it seems that there has been an exploitation of the flexibility of the existing system, depending on the activities of the municipalities and their subsequent demands/claims addressed to the higher levels in the administration. Without introducing any major institutional changes, federal and Länder resources are often channelled to non-profit associations and private businesses, since their claims are treated 'equally' with those local institutions. It is obvious that this has been operating against the needs of many local governments and has been contributing to the crisis faced by many cities (Häussermann, 1991, 111). Moreover, in the former East Germany the role of special-purpose development agencies combining these various partners is becoming increasingly important' (Krebs, 1991, 62).

In *Belgium* some large cities like Antwerp or Liège suffer from a severe public financial crisis, only partly relieved by central and regional authorities' support. In fact, the cutbacks in the share of local authorities in the overall public budget has been offset by a spectacular increase in the spending capacity of the regional authorities. But this also means a shift in functional emphasis, away from social service to the entrepreneurial state. Furthermore major real estate development initiatives seem to be increasing, especially in the Brussels region as determined by the expansion of its international/ European role (Mens en Ruimte, 1992).

Conclusions

The changing performance of the state and the transitional phase which is currently being experienced in Europe, could in a way be

understood through the growing presence of exceptional actions in the form of special programmes and measures promoted by EU and/or national institutions.

Undoubtedly normal or conventional public policy and fiscal flows are still the overwhelmingly dominant ones. Exceptional policy, however, seems to be concentrating in areas which conventional policy is unable to deal with or is severely constrained under the current austerity climate and institutional limits.

EU policy appears as the core institutional structure in position to shape a 'normal' alternative. This could be justified by simply taking into account the highly internationalised nature of contemporary economic and social problems and the corresponding need to produce an overall European response. There do exist significant elements within the EU, trying to define an overall policy rationale and support framework for local democratic institutions, through the adoption of specific policy principles, and through the concrete channelling of resources to (or through) local and regional elected governments. It would seem, however, that for the moment these elements appear to be weaker compared to trends which involve

- (a) the weakening of local institutions through the shifting of resources away from locally elected bodies and
- (b) the channelling through exceptional policies of considerable financial resources (due either to inherent limits or existing constraints).

The perpetuation of these trends embodies a risk, that is to 'drag' spatial policy developments towards a new rationale, which has little to do with any notion of democratic control; and this (among others) is obviously a major challenge for EU policy.

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Two documentary films of miners' struggles and lives in the 1930s

...*Shown and discussed by Jaques Lamaître...*

[English text follows the French original.]

Manifestation pour Tayenne,1933

Le week-end du 9 au 10 juillet 1932 fut marqué par de violentes confrontations entre grévistes et for ces de l'ordre au cours de la grande grève. Le 10 juillet, un jeune ouvrier du nom de Louis Tayenne perdit la vie lors d'une fusillàde a Roux. Le Secours Rouge International prit en charge le sort de la famille de la victime et organisa ses funèrailles sans autre incident ultérieur. Afin de garder vivant le souvenir de Tayenne et de la grève, le SRI décida de mettre sur pied un mémorial Tayenne annuel. Le dimanche 9 juillet 1933 eut lieu la première commémoration en présence de 10,000 manifestants. Jean Fonteyne et Albert Van Ommeslaghe, tous deux avocats, membres du SRI et cinéastes amateurs, se trouvaient parmi l'assistance. C'est de leurs prises de vue du 9 juillet 1933 que naquit le film muet 16 mm *Manifestation pour Tayenne.*

Le film donne un remarquable aperçu des evénéments ayant marqué la cérémonie commémorative. Sur un fonds de "châssis à molette", les manifestants défilent en rangs de par les rues du village minier de Roux en direction de la maison familiale de Tayenne. On peut voir clairement l'endroit où est tombé Tayenne de même que le slogan inscrit sur le mur, mal gré les tentatives d'effacer le texte. L'image se déplace ensuite vers le cimetière où Tayenne est inhumé. On y aperçoit la pierre tombale érigée grâce à la collecte de fonds organisée par le SRI. Le film se clôture sur des images de la manifestation finale et des orateurs (parmi lesquels Pierre Vermeylen, Xavier Relecom et Julien Lahaut) ainsi que du public des travailleurs.

Manifestation pour Tayenne constitue un document remarquable. Le film montre en effet des prises de vue ponctuelles issues d'une culture politique qui n'aura laissé que peu de traces ultèrieures. Qui se souvient encore de la milice ouvrière, dans ce cas le Front Rouge, de son salut (le poing fermé) et de son uniforme ? Or tout cela se retrouve dans le film.

De plus, il est frappant de constater que les orateurs ne sont pas présentés au public au moyen des sous-titres. Manifestement, Fonteyne et Van Ommeslaghe estimaient une telle présentation superflue, étant donné que le public potentiel connaissait parfaitement les personnages mis en scène.

Le film se caractérise par une évidente absence de prétention, les réalisateurs se sentant conscients de leurs propres limites. Ce qui par contre en fait la force est la sobriété des images tournées. Malheureusement, il n'a jamais touché le public en son temps, vu l'inexistence en Belgique d'un quelconque organisme de distribution des films ouvriers.

Realisateurs: Jean Fonteyne, Albert Van Ommeslaghe.
Lieu de conservation: cinémathèque Royale, Bruxelles (16 mm noir et blanc, muet, ± lO min.).

Autour du Borinage, 1933-36

L'avocat Jean Fonteyne, en sa qualité de membre actif du Secours Rouge International, visitait régulièrement la région minière hènnuyere, non seulement pour assurer une aide juridique aux travailleurs dans le besoin, mais également pour porter témoignage de leurs conditions de vie. Fonteyne rédigea plusieurs rapports écrits de ces visites mais dans certains cas il réalisa même des enregistrements filmés, grâce à sa caméra 16 mm. Les différentes prises de vue issues de ces contacts furent ensuite rassemblées par Fonteyne en un film au titre provisoire de *Autour du Borinage.*.

Les prises de vue datent de la période allant de 1933 à 1936, et illustrent les méthodes de travail de Ivens et Storck au cours du tournage de leur film Bori nage, jusque et y compris la grève couronnée de succès dont la classe ouvrière allait retirer des avantages notoires. Le film montre Ivens et Storck a l'œuvre, et l'on peut entre autre y admirer le talent pédagogique d'lvens lorsqu'il apprend le salut du Front Rouge au plus jeune fils de la famille Cage. Les prises de vue de Fonteyne reprennent encore la visite d'André Gide et d'Yves Allégret en 1935, ainsi que les barricades érigées par les travailleurs lors de la grève de 1936.

Autour du Borinage n'a jamais été destiné au public, comme il ressort clairement de toutes ces composantes (dont le montage et l'absence de titres). Mais c'est précisément le caractère plus ou moins fortuit et artisanal de l'assemblage de ces documents filmiques (avec pour fil conducteur récurrent la voie ferrée et les wagonnets vides et pleins) qui rend le film si fascinant.

Realisateurs Jean Fonteyne.
Lieu de conservation: cinémathèque Royale, Bruxelles (16 mm noir et blanc, muet, ± lO min.).

Memorial demonstration for Tayenne, 1933

The weekend of the 9th to the 10th of July 1932 was marked by violent confrontations between strikers and the police during the "great strike". On the 10th of July, a young workman named Louis Tayenne died in an indiscriminate rifle shooting in Roux. SRI (*Secours Rouge International*) took responsibility for the future of the family and organised the funeral without further incident. In order to keep the memory of Tayenne and of the strike alive, the SRI decided to set up an annual memorial service. On Sunday 9th July 1933, the first commemorative celebration took place in front of 10,000 demonstrators. Jean Fonteyene et Albert Van Ommeslaghe, both lawyers, members of the SRI and amateur film makers, were among those attending. It is from their filming of the scenes of the 9th of July 1933 that the 16 mm film, "Manifestation pour Tayenne" was born.

The film offers a remarkable interpretation of the events which distinguished the commemorative ceremony. Against a background of "châssis à molette", the demonstrators marched in lines along the streets of the mining village of Roux, towards Tayenne's family house. One can clearly see the place where Tayenne died and also the slogan written on the wall, despite the attempts to erase it. Then the images progress towards the cemetery where Tayenne is buried. There is a view of the tomb stone which was erected with money collected by the SRI. The film ends with the images of the final demonstration, the speakers (including Pierre Vermeylen, Xavier Relecom and Julien Lahuat) and the audience of workers.

"*Manifestation pour Tayenne*" is an extraordinary document. The film shows a sequence of particular scenes generated by a political culture that leaves behind few traces of itself. Who still remembers the militant workers, or the *Front Rouge* and its salute (a closed fist), who still remembers their uniform? In the film we find all of this.

Moreover, it is revealing to see that the speakers are not introduced to the audience using subtitles. Apparently Fonteyne and Van Ommeslaghe considered this superfluous, taking it for granted that the potential audience would perfectly know who the characters were.

The film is characterised by an explicit lack of pretentiousness as if the film makers were very conscious of their own limits. However the real strength of the film lies in the sobriety of the images shown. Unfortunately it never reached the public of its time given the non-existence, in Belgium, of organisations distributing the films of the workers.

Around the Borinage 1933-1936

The lawyer Jean Fonteyne, as an active member of the SRI, regularly visited this mining region, not only to give legal aid to the workers but also to document their conditions of life. Fonteyne wrote several reports of his visits but he also produced filmed records thanks to his 16 mm camera. The different shootings that his visits generated were then put together, by him, in a film with a provisional title – "Autour du Borinage".

The shooting, which spans the period from 1933 to 1936 (and refelcts the working methods of Ivens and Stork, in their own film *Borinage*) extends up to and includes the strike, crowned with success for the working class which yeilded notorious benefits. The film shows Ivens and Storck at work. One cannot but admire Ivens' pedagogic talent while he teaches the *Front Rouge*'s salute to the youngest son of the Cage family. Fonteyne also shows André Gide's and the strike of 1936.

Autour du Borinage was never meant for an audience, as we can see from its lack of structure (rough editing, no titles). But it is the more or less fortuitous and casual character of this document (which has the railway and its empty and full wagons as an underlying theme) which makes the film so fascinating.

Privatisation: summary of the workshop discussion

Lutz Luithlen

To facilitate discussion in relatively small groups it was decided to split the participants into two groups. Group A dealt with those papers which focused on privatisation as a process, whilst Group B placed privatisation in the broad context of urban restructuring and urban rent. The following is an account of the discussion taking place in Group A where the following papers were presented:

Jonathan Charley: Dead zones: notes for a workshop,

Derek Kerr: International capital, the nation state and uneven development

Pavlos Delladetsima: EU and nation states: subordination and ordinary state expenditures under " special spending"

Philip Gunn: The historical variety of content in the garden city option of urban reform,

Dick Pratt: UK city centres in crisis: a review of some policy responses

Yara Vicentini: Urban theory and the concept of nature.

Lutz Luithlen presented a sheet with Notes on a theory of privatisation.

Mark Deakin presented a paper on urban rent.

Summary

Lutz Luithlen (LL) briefly explained that privatisation should be seen in the context of two related tendencies. The first is the expansion of the basis of commodification, a tendency inherent in the development of capitalist relations. The second is a more specific, historically conditioned, tendency of restructuring state expenditure in favour of capital and to the detriment of collective consumption. It was suggested that the section on 'action to be taken' was too elementary and needed expanding. Unfortunately the discussion did not come back to this issue.

Mark Deakin's (MD) paper on privatisation in the Ukraine reflected the author's long-standing interest in property and his recent involvement in privatisation in the newly established republic. He stressed that the process of privatisation must be located in the context of both production and exchange and that it is a process with a spatial as well as temporal dimension. He argued that the production and exchange relations of the former USSR must be taken into account (referring to dependency theory). There is little logic in the present programme of privatisation, but there are indications of separating land from property. The main problems to be faced were implementation and the valuation of assets.

Jonathan Charley (JC) drew our attention to useful work by Simon Clarke[14] which explains that the basis for commodity relations and entrepreneurial culture were not given in the former Soviet Union and that new structures of property relations needed to be created. It was also pointed out that the 'old' bureaucracy was still essential and that the discrediting of the apparatchiks was dangerous. MD's presentation highlighted the importance of rekindling interest in property and related class relations including rent.

Jonathan Charley in his brief talk made two eloquent pleas: (i) not to mystify our writing through cumbersome and turgid prose à la Tafuri, and (ii) for a utilitarian approach to critical literature, whether Marxist or not. He drew our attention to what he called essential reading, referring in particular to Marcuse, Foucault, Davis, de Bourg, Adorno and Horkheimer. Negative and positive aspects of privatisation were discussed, and the danger of monopolising space (a response of capital to the unique qualitative aspects of space in its locational context) were highlighted in connection with concentration of production and distribution. The debate stumbled several times over the term 'post-modernism' which, it was said, was frequently mystifying in the way it was used. It was agreed that a clear definition of the term and a thorough analysis of its nature should be attempted. The discussion of privatisation should account for the integration

[14] (Editor's note: see Clarke, S, Fairbrother, P, Burawoy, M and Krotov, P, 1993 *What about the Workers? Workers and the transition to Capitalism in Russia,* , London, Verso.

of state and market and the changing class relation of property.

Yara Vicentini's paper introduced the concept of nature into the BISS debate. It was structured in three parts: (1) the concept of nature, (2) its historical development, and (3) Nature and urban utopias. Nature was characterised as an artifice requiring a redefinition of the urban. The green-environmental movement was a form of utopanism. For a revolutionary understanding of Nature we were referred to Nietzsche and the Frankfurt School. LL suggested that more emphasis be given to the Romantic movement (e.g. painting and literature) as an expression of the alienation from Nature during the early stages of capitalist development in Europe. JC drew our attention to 'dis-urbanism' in Russia in the 1920s which was particularly concerned with the question of how to distribute Nature equally.

Dick Pratt (DP) made reference to Sophie Watson's paper on 'Gilding the smoke stacks' (at the Paris BISS[15]) and adopted Harvey's definition of the capitalist landscape as a 'palimpsest of many formations'. He highlighted the tendency of capital towards homogenisation of space which is accompanied by a decline in quality and by social exclusion (in particular through privatisation). The state plays an important role in monopolising space through what the author called 'growth coalitions'. The paper finished with a typology of approaches to rehabilitation on the lines of two polarities: public-private and replacement-renewal. JC mentioned the concepts of 'hetero- topicality' by Foucault and 'symboloc capital' by Bourdière. There followed a discussion about the question of identity and the symbolic landscape of capitalism. A new industry is emerging, concerned with the reproduction of the past, reflecting a deeply felt concern about how it was, for instance, in the docklands of Glasgow. Mark Page mentioned 'iconography' and its importance in the post-modern (sic) debate and indicated the danger of Disneyland escapism. More needs to be known, it was agreed, about the ideology behind this movement. Dieter Besch thought that it was part of bourgeois culture and as such a reaction to alienation. He referred in this context to Peter Weiss: *The Aesthetics of Resistance.*

Philip Gunn reported on the Fabian movement and developed as his main theme the question of rent in relation to the state. He contrasted two views on rent: Jevons' and a Marxian view. Although the latter proved to be very influential for Webb's ideas, it was Jevons' approach, considering rent a question of distribution separate from production, which became the basis of Fabianism. However, in this doctrine the question of rent in relation to the capital-labour contradiction and the relationship of the state to collective capital are ignored. In this connection PD mentioned Oliveira who defined the state as 'anti-value'. Mike Edwards drew our attention to a paper by MacMahon on zoning policies in the US[16] in which it is argued that the contradiction attached to deregulation lies in the fact that the state has embarked on dismantling the rules on which capital has come to depend, leading to all manner of crazy investors' behaviour.

Pavlos Delladetsimas reported on a cross European study focusing on the changing role of the state. The retrenchment of the state, he argued, and the ascent of the EC was leading to new principles of policy formation and implementation: specific policies are targeted on particular areas and sectors by way of major projects. There is an inbuilt emphasis on infrastructure (see EC structural fund). This approach is necessarily selective and fragmented; it is also accompanied by an attack on social policies. Policies are oriented on the principle of functional zoning and can have disatrous consequences.

There followed the merger of both groups with the aim of briefly reporting on the discussions and setting an agenda for future BISS meetings. Yvonne Mautner outlined the discussions of Group B and suggested that rent was the most important issue for future dicussion.

Richard Falllow reported for Group A and suggested that BISS should focus on the following themes in the future: (1) Privatisation, the market and the state, (2) the class relations of rent, property and land use, (3) Identity and the understanding of the past, and (4) Ecology and nature.

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[15] Watson, S (1992) 'Gilding the smokestacks: the new symbolic representations of de-industrialisaed regions' *Biss* **11**: 175-182.

[16] McMahon, M (1986) 'Zoning, a contradictory form of regulation' *Biss* **7**: 279-288.

Finally, both groups agreed on a proposal by Jonathan Charley who suggested that in addition to the traditional concerns of BISS such as the labour process, accumulation , etc. the following themes be added:

1)A materialist geography: space and property,

2)Nature: appropriation and alienation,

3)The production and reproduction of knowledge.

To introduce these themes it was agreed that good key-note speakers (not necessarily stars) be invited to participate.

Notes on a theory of privatisation: Two trends and one historical process

Lutz Luithlen, De Montfort University, Leicester

[Workshop contribution.]

There are two trends in the present historical juncture of capitalist development in the UK which bear directly on the phenomenon of privatisation.

(1) The expansion of commodification based on market-oriented production. This expansion, after a long process of commodification in the sphere of industrial production, is now targeted on the service industries. The dismantling of personal services to be replaced by the production of commodities for individual (mass) consumption is not new. However, in order to achieve what Joachim Hirsch has called Durchkapitalisierung (commodification of all spheres of production and consumption), it is necessary to wrest the provision of services from the agencies of the public sector and to open them up to valorisation by (private) capital: services as the last frontier of commodification.

(2) Restructuring of state expenditure as a consequence of a falling profit rate. This process is conditioned by the pressure towards commodification. Under certain historical conditions privatisation appears as an effective vehicle for reducing the burden of the state in its function of providing public services (i.e. collective consumption). Commodification is always privatisation. There are immediate advantages for the capitalist state in that the tax burden can be reduced for both production firms and consumers.

It would, however, be a mistake to think that these trends progress in a straight line. During the 1950s and 1960s, for instance, public services were rapidly expanding as part of the post-War welfare state programme. The capitalist state was called upon to ensure that there was a reasonably healthy and educated workforce to be engaged in mass production, and that there was the necessary infrastructure for the movement of both goods and people. Now, after several crises have shaken capitalist economies, the global economic situation is reshaping itself, the socialist economies have collapsed and new production and distribution methods have replaced many of the old ones, it is not surprising to find that the social relations between capital and the state are also being restructured. This process is largely characterised by a movement towards a greater degree of commodification, in response to the burden the state has taken on during previous decades. This brief diagnosis does, of course, not pretend at an adequate historical analysis. Its sole purpose here is to highlight that the present restructuring process is governed by specific historical conditions under which the general trend, or 'tendency' as Marx presumably would have put it, is borne out of its opposite appearance' in preceding decades.

The privatisation of public spaces

The sale of public sector assets, including land, is an important pillar of this policy, for it reduces state expenditure on purchasing costs for buildings and infrastructure as well as on maintenance and labour. At the same time it expands the valorisation base of capital. (See in particular the privatisation of social housing and New Town assets in the UK.) These measures have, temporarily at least, brought relief to the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). There is also an ideological motive in tempting the small investor to become a rentier or financial capitalist and thus a trustworthy Conservative voter.

Political implications

The reduction in publicly owned assets amounts to a reduction of political control over spaces, infrastructure and buildings and thus environmental conditions in favour of private capital. Private investment decisions are generally governed by the profit criterion. Privatisation therefore results in a reduced control over use of and access to these facilities by public authorities and the public itself. Furthermore, in this process employment is transferred to the private sector creating more flexibility in the allocation of privately owned resources. Not only is the asset base of the public sector broken up but also the unity of industrial action upon which the continued existence of the former depends. Fragmentation manifests itself, once again, as a basic principle of capitalist development. Reproduction is

thrown back at capital whose agents will only undertake the task in isolated bits and under the condition that the capital advanced can be valorised. At first sight this looks like a coherent and promising strategy in the interest of capital in general…

Contradictions

…Until one looks at this process more closely. Most important, there is the main contradiction between use value and exchange value: the public sector is oriented towards the collective use value of facilities. Planning decisions are thus governed by a loosely defined criterion of collective use value (commonly referred to as the 'public interest'). The private sector, however, is on the look-out for private use value as in the case of machines and buildings used in production, or (private) exchange value as in the case of selling commodities. Particular problems arise with landed property in the sense that its use value in general depends on the connectedness with other use values on neighbouring sites. Locational use value is based upon a network of physical as well as social relations. Individualisation of these use values for the sake of exchange value is therefore problematic, and 'full' privatisation impossible. This may be one of the reasons why many public places and properties tend to be substantially devalued before the private sector sees fit to take them over (see, for instance, the sale of council houses and the privatisation of utilities in the UK). Finally it may be anticipated that the change to a higher organic composition of capital, due to private investment, may lead, in the long run, to a reduction in the flexibility of sites and the attendant problems of obsolescence.

The media hype, fuelled by Thatcherite political ideology, has not only completely obscured the contradictions (which is to be expected) but also managed to publicly display this process of privatisation as an equation without negative signs. A critical theory of privatisation would have to develop these contradictions further in their historical manifestation and show that the present policies are dictated by myopia, political expediency and ignorance. Such an analysis might even conclude that present policies are not in the long term interest of capital: a rather unexplored contradiction between the politics of the capitalist state and capital!

Action

Given that the process of privatisation is a structural tendency of capitalist development, it is going to be difficult to mobilise forces effectively against it. However, as a general rule it may be advocated to concentrate the struggle for publicly controlled assets on those areas where commodification (i.e. fragmentation) is problematic, and there are plenty of instances in the Thatcher-inspired programmes of the UK. On a national level this fight would have to focus upon such public assets as transport in favour of public means rather than road construction for private cars (building roads is thus a form of privatisation), energy, telecommunications, etc.

The defence of an efficient planning system, public secondary and higher education and other social services may be conducted most efficiently at the level of central government through the ballot box. The defence of individual public spaces is predominantly located in the local political arena. Its aims are pursued through tactical operations, e.g. direct action, demonstrations and petitions, pressure on council members, committees and service departments (see in this context the endeavours of INURA based in Zurich, Switzerland). Local elections again are an important vehicle to stop the post-Thatcherite privatisation bandwagon.

The Dead Zone: notes for a workshop

Jonathan Charley, Strathclyde University, Glasgow

We live in an era of intense paranoia and self doubt, when the crushing weight of continual crisis is hidden by the happiness that comes from the race to find yet more pleasure devices. It is here, in the contemporary orgy of consumption, that democracy at last becomes defined as the relentless pursuit of new and awesome commodities that satisfy, but do not enable. But, in the corners of the pub and the lecture room, rumblings of discontent can be heard at the implicit arrogance of such a polemic which tells the listener and the student that they are not as happy as they thought they were, that the life they lead is somehow misguided and skin deep, and that the contradictions that structure such a life are not something that individually they can do much about.

It is not so much a crisis of criticism as a complete paralysis, as an unwillingness to question an industrial society which for many and for countless years has been indelibly stamped under the skin with the discrete mark of terror. For the children of the sixties, this is a familiar Marcusian story of the modern individual traversing the trenches of modern life and of being gently but unequivocally drawn into the technological community of the administered population, revelling joyously in the acceptance of what were for Marcuse repressive needs.[17] It could be argued that the de politicisation of consciousness, being as rooted as ever in the process of reification, is not only an ancient tale but a pre-condition of life in capitalist societies.[18] Inevitably, the hysterical critics of this world have, like Lukacs, struggled with the question of how a class and political consciousness might arise, not only to criticise, but to change the capitalist arcadia. But by the time of Marcuse, the process of mass deception that was already so clear to Adorno[19] had reached untold new heights in the Warfare States of the post war period. Emerging in this heroic period of consensus, politics was not only the containment but the assimilation of opposition. Hippies became businessmen and MP's, Punks became Ambassadors of High Culture and, compared with 69, the summer of love of 89, had none of the politics but all of the savage consequences of bad drugs and bad sex. With the fall of the Eastern empire and the absence of a sustained and mass opposition in the west, capitalism becomes not only the unquestionable and historic victor, but synonymous with nature.

Again, this is not such a shock. As an economic system, capitalism has been resilient at recovering from major crises. When coupled with the consistent improvement in the quality of life for the electorally vital part of the population, and backed up with an ideological and media machinery that convinces us of the desirability of commodity culture, the rumblings of discontent at the necessity of critique is not so surprising. There is also the possibility that those providing the criticism, still languishing in the search for truth and objectivity in history, have not been doing a very good job in countering bourgeois hegemony either on the barricades or in the classroom.

This is just one of the reasons behind the popularity and proliferation of the pre-fix 'post', and the confidence exuded by the advocates of the post modern, post industrial, post historical and, by implication, post capitalist society. It is not my objective to enter into this interminable debate, rather just to note one thing in particular. That is the way in which the obsessive referencing of some undefined present and equally elusive promise of a future reproduces many of the same contradictions, rather than distancing itself from the world of Fordism, automation, reason and enlightenment. In its desire to transcend the ruptures that mark the Modern World, there is revealed an equally profound hope

[17] Much of this will be familiar to those who were students in the sixties. l was still in shorts. Marcuse's book still reads well in the late century as a paranoid tale of the terror of technology. Marcuse, Herbert, *One dimensional man,* Ark paperbacks,1986

[18] My own modest investigations into a negative and critical theory of ideology can be found in the BISS Proceedings - Paris 1989 -Ideology, Production andXXXXX-, and Brussels 1992 -Ideology and the Labour Process- filed under CHARLEY, Jonathan

[19] Adorno, Theodore, Horkheimer, Max,The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as mass deception, in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*,Verso 1989 pp120 -168

that utopia is coming in to land. If the *avant garde* and the Moderns erected myths, then what distinguishes and has driven the 'post people', especially within architecture, is pure mythomania: what Jameson refers to as a symptom of social and historical impotence.[20] The production and dissemination of myth is one way in which a social system seeks to reproduce itself. For myth enables us to mystify the present and forget the past though the construction of distorted and idealised visions of both.

The space of social life

From a global perspective, the rhetoric of the 'post industrial' rapidly emerges as a rather facile joke.[21] There is nothing very post industrial or post modern about a world which is still dominated by the profound contradictions that arise on the basis of class, race and gender. Similarly, within the built environment, whilst there have occurred transformations that are, at first glance, persuasive in convincing us that a new age has arrived, a closer inspection quickly shows these changes to be less a break with history, than an entirely predictable continuation.

Uneven development and underdevelopment, the tension between the national and international, town and country, of socio-spatial disparities within the urban itself, are contradictions that, not only represent crucial aspects of what we might call the spatial history of capitalism, but are disparities that, within our era, far from being surmounted, are becoming intensified. Equally, the alienation of men and women from nature, from the means of production and from each other, not only marks the advent of the modern world, but structures these tendencies in the built environment. As the material basis of our alienation expands, so the shock waves intensify which fracture the fabric of social life. The complexity of ideology deepens, disguising such wounds and making knowledge of the world increasingly elusive. The more labour is accumulated and objectified in the machine, the more it becomes separated and alien from us. The fact that the process of capital accumulation may have left the classic Fordist model in the older capitalist economies, is more a question of tacking in the wind to maintain speed, rather than any profound change in direction.

It comes as no great surprise then, that one of the most profound problems that we face within our cities at the end of the twentieth century is the simultaneous destruction and privatisation of public urban space, and the rapid development of zoning patterns that are fragmenting cities on strict class and race lines. The rapid acceleration of private land ownership, of the privatisation of space and of the development of effective exclusion zones that divide the city, are as old as capitalism. Indeed such phenomena are but just some of the manifestations of the law of uneven development which has characterised the history of capitalism for all of its three hundred years.

Like any historically specific type of society, capitalist society is defined by the development of dominant social relations which structure the way in which things are produced, reproduced and consumed. But these social relations are not only temporal but spatial in character: what Soja has christened the spatio-temporal structuring of social life[22], the socio-spatial dialectic. This current re-ascendance of the question of space is of immense importance in the quest to provide a convincing and materialist critique of architecture and urban design.

Making space a productive force

Whilst the control over the building labour process is at the heart of any evaluation of the built environment, our understanding can only be enhanced by the inclusion of space as a productive force. The spatial organisation of the factory informs us, not only about the overall massing and form a building will take, but crucially about the social organisation of the labour process. Quite simply, the labour process does not occur independently of space. Standing, as it does, at the centre of material production and the material transformation of the world, the labour process always implies a simultaneous transformation of space, a

[20] Jameson, Frederick, Postmodernism, or, the cultural logic of late capitalism, Verso 1991, p369

[21] Callinicos, Alex, *Against Postmodernism. A Marxist critique*, Polity, 1989, p121. As can be deduced from the title this is one of the most powerful counter-arguments. Callinicos dismisses the concept of Post-Industrial Society as nonsense.

[22] Soja, Edward, *Post modem geographies. The reassertion of space In critical theory*, Verso 1990, p129

transformation which, in turn, produces new conditions on the labour process itself.

From the boulevards and barricades of Hausmann's Paris, to the Imperial Budapest of the Austro-Hungarian autocracy, and to the 'third Rome ' of Stalin's Moscow. From the satanic mills of nineteenth century Britain to the suffocating Ford Car factories of early twentieth century USA, it is clear that the control over space, and therefore the labour process, is an essential pre-condition for the reproduction of a particular class and social system. Urban design in this sense can be seen as the spatialisation of politics. Space becomes a political instrument, that underpins production and property relations. It can also be argued that it assists in the reproduction of gender relations not only with respect to issues such as the experience of women in man-made, man-designed environments, in the context of the colonisation of space by gay and lesbian communities, but to more obscure issues such as Alberti's endorsement of patriarchal authority and of Payne Knight's phallocentrism. As such, space, along with time, is more than a pre-condition of social life. It is through space that social life is concretised[23] and alienation and powerlessness are confirmed. Implied in the work of Foucault is the parallel argument that, if control over space is a source of social power, then it must assist in the objectification of the human subject. This is obvious in the case of the prison, but there are far wider allusions made in the concept of the *carceral city,* and the *panoptic society*. This is the world of perpetual observation and discipline.[24] A rather nightmarish vision in which emancipation seems impossible. Where, at long last, the technologies of discipline and normalisation are fully integrated into social life and, therefore, into space.

Ideology of the popular

One of the most obvious ways in which this happens is in that part of the built environment that is never talked about. This is the architecture of mass consumption, and includes the new Beazer Home suburbs, leisure centres, fast food chains and shopping emporia. This is the physical world where architecture achieves full commodity status. A complex of spaces in which the whole of social life can take place. It is the celebration of complete confusion, where access to greater quantities becomes mixed up with quality. Buildings such as the MacDonalds, the Safeway store, and the universal timber-framed house, are all products of highly sophisticated technologies and are heavily dependent on factory pre fabrication. As in all such industrialised systems, the gates are open for increasing the rate of capital accumulation by the continuing shift to the production of relative surplus value. Its secondary aspect lies in the fact that many of the new leisure complexes are, of course, the locus for buying more commodities. A new race has been inaugurated between regions and cities to organise even more spectacular consumption centres hoping to attract more capital and people through the image of the spectacular.[25] Harvey talks of Baltimore. Of course, we have Liverpool docks, the old London docks, and a great national tendency to commodify and romanticise history in the form of Heritage Centres. Marshalling all of the depths of cynicism, for Strathclyde, this means the steelyards of Ravenscraig become a theme park devoted to the history of heavy industry, and the docks of Govan become a fairground with virtual reality shipyards.

Alongside all this, remains the home. As ever the house earns its keep by establishing status for its owner and as a potential commodity always ready to re-enter the market. This is an aspect of a new phase in the government of individuals and their lives. The society of the spectacle twenty years on, where every aspect of social life is governed by the expansion of commodity production through space.[26] We arrive at the illusion of the choice of one unfreedom from another.

Within architecture this manifests itself in an increasing homogeneity of design. Difference is reduced to the limited possibilities of organising the same components. Even if flexible technology develops far enough to

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[23] Lefebvre, Henri, *The production of space,* Blackwell 1991, pp352- 401, the chapter on contradictory space, and see Cohen, G A. *Karl Marx's theory of history. A defence,* pp47 -55

[24] Levebre, Henri, *The production of space,* Blackwell 1991 p 349

[25] Two recent books on these and related issues are, Wilson, Elizabeth, *The Sphinx in the city,* Virago, 1991 and Colomina et al, *Sexuality and space,* Princeton Papers on Architecture, 1992.

[26] Soja, Edward, *Post modem geographies-the reassertion of space in critical theory,* Verso p129

allow the Lego and Meccano dream of the assembly of infinite types of building, within the conditions of a competitive market driven economy, this would be impossible.[27] Here is but one example of the political limitation of the development of technology. The point is finally reached at which ideology reveals its full weaponry. In the place of the heterogeneity of possible human relations, social life becomes projected as the uncritical adulation and accumulation of objects, a shopping list of things to be bought, the diversity of which is a chimera, and one that is strictly controlled by powers beyond the individual. But such powerlessness is smothered by a far greater threat. For the origins of real fear lie in the end of shopping. Again, the effectiveness of ideology, not as a matter of representation, but as something that is lived and that masks such contradictions, lies in the successful creation of contentment amongst the population aspiring towards the confirmation of the normal. Its critique, that of the call for democratic social ownership of land and the means of production, for the possibilities of free and creative self determination, of gender and racial equality, become concepts so unnecessary to make them alien. Why should I demand control over the building industry, and therefore control over the production of need if I have the certain promise of what I want?

Telling tales on two cities

Such tendencies in the organisation of daily life and in the development of the built environment can only engender conflict, since access to the promised land of perpetual spending is guaranteed, not only by the opportunity to enter the labour market, but, once there, by the ability to sell labour at a sufficiently high price. Despite the persuasions of the economic and philosophical right, there is no sign of the reserve army of labour disappearing from the historical and global geography of capitalism. Indeed, whilst within Europe during the 1980's there were indications of a restoration of profitability, this has been achieved by an equal and opposite trend towards increasing inequality in wages and in the distribution of such profits through tax breaks and the availability of services from the welfare state.[28]

The class division of a city like Glasgow far from being ameliorated has been sharpened during this period. Having in the sixties witnessed the forced migration of working class communities to peripheral estates, we are now seeing these slowly collapse both physically and socially. Whilst there are attempts to stitch these communities together by converting some of the homes into curious parodies of the mythical English cottage, the ghetto cannot be hidden despite the simultaneous construction, alongside these schemes, of more Beazer-type rehabilitation and new build kit homes . At the level of the visual alone, we are left with a violent confrontation between Sunny Valley Housing Corporation and Shanty Town Inc, between the New Utopia and the Old Dystopia. Back in the city centre this is accompanied by the selling into the private sector of prime inner city sites, by the occupation of what could be public spaces by luxury speculative housing. A few blocks away and we find the triumphant replacement of the *panopticon prison* by the shopping mall. For the dispossessed, we have the ramshackle end of Argyll St and the Barras where the affluent can observe the poor and, around the corner, the great bourgeois consumption palaces, such as Princess Square, where the poor can worship the affluent.

Many of these new configurations of space operate under a discrete, almost military type supervision. In the nice housing areas we have Neighbourhood Watch and protective policing, in the schemes' protective solidarity against aggressive policing and poverty. Within the city centre we have another level of control. This is achieved through the use of increasingly sophisticated methods of surveillance connected with camera and video. Unity, the recognition of difference and social integration, become ever more elusive when confronted by the continuing segregation and separation of society along class and spatial lines. These are just observations of events in Glasgow. They are however mirrored in virtually every major city in Europe and the U.S.A. amongst which Los Angeles must be at the cutting edge, a frightening indication of

[27] Of special interest here; Foucault, Michael, *Discipline and punish*, Penguin 1987 pp195 - 228 Panopticism, and pp293-308 The carceral, and in The Foucault Reader, ed Paul Rabinow, Penguin 1991, *Space, Knowledge and Power* pp239 -256

[28] Harvey, David, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Blackwell 1989, pp88 -98

where we might all end up as American hegemony tightens its grip. Meanwhile, as the insidious and subtle militarisation of the city gathers pace, the word urban, and city has slowly vanished from the American political vocabulary as the core becomes peripheralised and the edge city becomes the focus of electioneers seeking votes.[29] This is accompanied by a corporate architecture housing the bureaucracy who arrive in the daylight hours and flee before darkness falls. Such building has little to do with the post modern promise of choice and diversity. We have instead an architecture of mirrored glass, fake marbles, and triumphant entrances, an architectural language that has been described as the *archisemiotics of class war*.[30] This is the architecture of the Dead Zone the administrative fortress of governing bureaucracies, alive in the daytime but above or separate from the rest of the city, a graveyard at night. Such spaces are already in existence not only in the States, but in the heart of cities all over Europe. Brussels has the new European Parliament and office area that abuts it, Paris possesses the cemetery that surrounds the Arche de la Défense, Glasgow built its Hilton and business centre on an old working class village and London is drowning in the mirrored contempt for the rest of the city that is Canary Wharf.

Despite all of this, the British tendency is to say "well it could never really happen here this is after all Britain, not America". However, at the very least, the successful abolition of the GLC would indicate that the inner city of the capital can be dispensed with in the pursuit of national power. More importantly, these spatial transformations are not historical accidents. They mirror political and economic developments that are occurring at a higher level of generality, such as the simultaneous centralisation, concentration and globalisation of capital, the emergence of transnational finance blocs, the technological integration of what appear to be diverse and different practices, the weakening of local State and national State regulation, and the dominance of free market theories of social and economic development.[31] The crucial issue is that the process of capital accumulation has a dual character. It is at once both global and nationally specific. It is always contradictory and, whilst it throws up different and curious hybrids, it also produces fractures and social contradictions that bind us together across time zones. So, whilst on the one hand the social formation that is Britain is different from that of the USA[32], we should be on our guard that the surveillance city, which is the symbol of the institutionalisation of civil war, does not catch us unarmed.

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[29] *The Society of the Spectacle*, by Guy Debord still remains, despite the drift into hypereality, an essential critique of the world of the commodity.

[30] The reliance of the old Soviet building industry on pre-fabricated concrete had encouraged a lot of research into the possibility of building greater flexibility not only into the types of component produced but the way they could be assembled.

[31] Glyn,. Andrew, Inequality and stagnation, *New Left Review*,195 ps4-95

[32] Mike Davis, Who killed L.A ? *New Left Review*,197, 1993 and his *City of Quartz: Excavating the future In Los Angeles*, Verso 1990, p 231. This book has to be one of the most entertaining and inspiring books yet written on the city. Edward Soja, *Post modem geographies: The reassertion of space in critical theory*, Verso 1990, pp 184 - 189

International capital, the nation state and uneven development

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[Resumé of workshop paper.]

The aim of the paper is to provide a general and background theoretical framework for understanding the changing nature of international real estate markets. It is based on the premise that the built environment is not some ahistorical natural or physical object whose secrets can revealed directly through comparative statistics or indices (such as yields, rents or price indices). Rather, the built environment is more adequately conceived of as a continually changing spatial objectification of, and means of imposing order on, those social relations and practices that constitute modern society. In other words, to understand the form, content and changing nature of the built environment, it is necessary to uncover the logic and dynamic of those social relations and practices that constitute social reality and the ways in which they attempt to spatially objectify and impose order on themselves in and though that built environment.

The implication of this approach, then, is that it is necessary to initially abstract from those various indicators (e.g. yields, rents etc.) that are usually used to describe the property market in order to uncover their social conditions of possibility. From that ground it is then possible to return to the property market in such a way as to be able to explain how and why those market indicators manifest themselves in the ways that they do. Those social conditions of possibility are taken to be the social relations and practices that constitute capitalist society.

Here the paper will focus on the contradictory interrelations between the economic and political forms of social reproduction. The economic form is global (universal) and subject to the processes of geographical uneven development while the political form is fragmented into a number of particular nation states, each of which attempts to mediate and modify those processes of uneven development. However, the nation state is limited by the logic of the economic form and subordinated to the international movement of capital (hence the attempts to develop international institutions such as the IMF). Those social relations and practices that constitute the economic and political forms can only find expression in and through the built environment. The changing dynamic of these relations and practices therefore results in the continual production and transformation of the built environment and in the process gives rise to a specific division of labour that specialises in the production and circulation of that built environment.

The above theoretical framework is important in attempting to understand and explain the changing nature of international real estate markets. Starting from this basis and considering how these economic and political forms have developed and restructured themselves through crisis (e.g. the credit and financial crises) it then becomes possible to contrast and compare different real estate markets. It also becomes possible to explain why concepts such as "affordability", "securitisation", etc. come into being when and where they do and then become universalised across different property markets. Finally, by grounding the built environment on the political mediation of the economic form of social reproduction, it also becomes possible to explain the changing nature of and differences between the form of state intervention across property markets in terms of such issues as privatisation and housing policy.

The methodology entailed is one of conceptual and historical elaboration rather than statistical analysis. It will draw upon a fairly wide literature base (e.g. critical geography, economics, state theory, etc.) to develop the theoretical argument and will also briefly illustrate its relevance in terms of some contemporary changes within the international real estate markets.

General discussion

Lutz Luithlen in the chair; note by Mark Page

Jonathan Charley opened the session by proposing that BISS should not end but should continue. There was general agreement about this. Dick Pratt suggested that proposals for *how to continue* need to be discussed before the final session of the Roubaix meeting. He also noted that there was a problem with the workshop groups and discussion in general at BISS and more particularly in how to handle disagreement.

The discussion moved on to how information, presentation of new books and arguments could improve the exchanges at future BISS meetings. Martin Schwartz and Lutz Luithlen made points on this theme and Jonathan Charley suggested that BISS consider a publication project which could make the BISS discussions more accessible to a wider audience. The EFBWW newsletter could also be a forum for some of these discussions.

The meeting was side-tracked for some time by a discussion of the significance of "neighbourhood watch" schemes in England, which will not be noted here.

Dick Pratt returned to the need for more tolerance and constructive engagement with controversial ideas and interpretations of current trends in society and the production of the built environment, because we are confronted with many more cleavages and distinctions in society than the capital/labour cleavage.

Mark Deakin indicated that he saw a problem with the perspective of BISS, which was too pre-disposed to certain discussions and not open minded enough, that it had a tendency to reduce theoretical discussion to a political position and that the workshops should be geared more to engagement with popular consciousness of the issues we are confronting.

Michael Edwards saw a greater need to look closely at social reality, at the new forms of organisation that contain elements of the state at micro, national and global levels. He felt that the small group discussions in BISS can be very helpful for this, because they can often be very detailed and precise.

Philip Gunn argued for the need to clarify the central theme of BISS, which he saw as the intellectual problem of maintaining a materialist approach to the built environment. In asking who our intellectual enemies are, he put forward the view that post-modernism and how to confront it was the key question. In analysing modern global tendencies and national specificities, he felt that the French Regulation School should be seriously debated, and in drawing on the history of urban reform and intensive accumulation in Brazil, marxist categories of analysis and marxist rent theory have became resurgent as new marketization of society has begun to take hold. Historically, he felt that the debate about the aesthetics of the built environment has usually become more intense as a reaction to new triumphs of capitalism, and that, at the end of the twentieth century, there was a greater requirement for another such reaction, and for this reaction to also be an aesthetic movement.

Jörn Janssen suggested that there was a problem with BISS using the label "marxist" in a general sense. BISS always had a greater participation of people when it had a well organised project for the meeting, and was always smaller when it resembled a club. He questioned why Hegel or a marxist approach or regulation theory should be a starting point for BISS discussions, as may have been suggested by the opening speakers.

Mark Page argued against any idea that the BISS should have a manifesto at all. BISS should be a forum for discussion about new developments drawing on the experience and understanding of a wide range of people. Such discussions should be critical in the broad sense of the word and not confined to one perspective, and we should really try to get to grips with understanding real social and the built environment and the different ways of looking at these social relations. He drew from his experience of last year's workshop session on privatisation of space to illustrate his regret at a failure in providing a more pluralist atmosphere for debate.

Linda Clarke suggested that a reassessment of the role of the state would be helpful, seeing different forms of production and different forms of state.

Dick Pratt argued that BISS should develop itself as a school. Post modernism rejects totalising views of history, but is itself a totalisation of cynicism, and people are looking for a serious reaction to it. However, there should be patient engagement with post-modernism. Explanation of the modern town-scape with an eclectic mish-mash of post-modernist ideas demonstrates the need for co-operation from people with materialist approaches. We should take great care to develop new constituencies of people to future meetings of BISS.

Second session

Jonathan Charley proposed that BISS needs to take seriously debates about theory and gender, which BISS has never included on its agenda. Writers like Elizabeth Wilson (The Sphinx in the City) raise very important issues which we cannot ignore.

Derek Kerr felt that there was a crisis of class analysis including problems of the spatial nature of class relations – regional, local, national and international characteristics.

In response, Michael Edwards suggested that there were two ways of looking at class – class and real relations lying at the basis of society and the consciousness and also the activity of people. He pointed to the importance of E.P. Thompson's work on the *construction* of class.

These points prompted a considerable discussion about the nature of class experience and consciousness with Dick Pratt, Jonathan Charley and Lutz Luithlen making a number of points about how class struggle can be seen. Jörn Janssen noted at some length that class struggle may not be the main contradiction in modern society. He disputed that the abstract understanding of class will always materialise. If there is not strong evidence of class struggle, then to what extent is it possible to say that class exists ?

Mark Page suggested that it was essential to return to examine the structures and activity surrounding the built environment in daily life, and that marxism did not provide sufficient tools for analysis in this way. This is why it is very important to be involved in debates with other perspectives from the post-modern tradition and other traditions, because otherwise we are denying ourselves some very useful tools of analysis.

Lilian Brafman suggested that looking at mass consumption and built space we can see included and excluded sectors of society, and the problem of marginalisation is very important.

Linda Clarke and Michael Edwards returned to a discussion of class conflict and the extent to which it is clearly still a reality, but a reality which required careful analysis in each instance.

Philip Gunn argued the need for the role of architects to be seen within the foundations of class analysis, not separate from productive forces, nor from social relations. The social division of labour leads to a discussion of the economy and the interests that are represented in the social division of labour.

Jacques Aron intervened to set a context for the discussion. In looking at global and local relations, we need to see what theoretical approaches are capable of explaining historical change. Historically, after 1917, capitalist growth was constrained, but now with the collapse of communism in Europe, capitalist growth was not now so constrained. There are now a multitude of reactions and adaptations to global development, some of them economic, cultural or ethnic. BISS should not produce a manifesto, but formulate new questions as a theoretical contribution over problems and struggles that are developing.

Jörn Janssen returned to the discussion about class relations and the primacy of the social relations in which we find class relations (for example, wage relations). He felt that the regulation school and the use of the concept of accumulation gave the impression of society as being driven by a mechanism. Society is acting or individuals are acting. He also returned to the discussion of Hegel (introduced by Martin Schwartz in his opening to the Roubaix Meeting) and wished to emphasise that for Hegel the idea was never removed from material life. We need to observe reality (Hegel was an excellent observer) and become more secure in the definition of our terms and the history of their use. (See note below.)

Dieter Besch criticised those who came to a discussion having claimed to have a real analysis and then impose it on reality. We need to start from a real examination of the empirical field. How could it be possible to discuss difference unless we came to a discussion with a grasp of the real ?

Jacques Aron returned to some points made earlier by Jörn Janssen. Structures in society can impose themselves on society, and on people, like a mechanism. The structure of capitalism does impose itself on society. He then developed an analogy with the self-imposition of rules that applies to drivers on a motorway.

Jörn Janssen replied by emphasising the social character of the production process.

Michael Edwards observed that the notion of accumulation can be used in a mechanical way or in a sophisticated way. It includes the notion of appropriation of surplus value and struggle over this appropriation. Accumulation is not a binding mechanism. It can be stopped, slowed or re-started by struggle.

Jonathan Charley sought to summarise the discussion. He identified three levels at which the discussion was operating. First, was the world, our knowledge of it and a desire to change it. Second, we were looking at the built environment and our knowledge and experience of it. And third, we were concerned with regions, nations and spaces. He also identified a series of issues – class, gender and race – and the necessity to examine their combinations historically and geographically. He concluded that we were asking the same or similar old questions, to which we required new answers, and we needed old answers to some of the new questions.

Dick Pratt returned to the discussion of the future of BISS by saying that we needed to look at the work of the annual BISS meeting, look at the reporting of this work, make sure that papers are properly placed alongside reviews of literature, develop a series of ideas to debate, and clarify the "drug-store" idea for future BISS meetings (an idea about choice and selection by a wider audience of the work of BISS floated in the opening papers to the Roubaix Meeting).

Yvonne Mautner said that the role of BISS in Brazil had been very important, because it had reinforced a way of seeing the urban world through production, and this had been very helpful for a wide range of people.

Lutz Luithlen agreed with other speakers that we should not be uncritical of the BISS Proceedings. But he also felt that there was a need for a very practical discussion about labour power and the production of the Proceedings. Production currently depended on a very small number of people and the hard work of Linda Clarke. He was also concerned about the need to bring in younger people to BISS.

Michael Edwards felt we should be realistic about what we can do and share our experience of what is and isn't possible. He also suggested that we think about the future means of communication through information technology, electronic mail etc.

Jonathan Charley spoke about the need for BISS to do two things. One was to reinforce its participants, who are frequently working in an environment hostile to their ideas and secondly, we need to do hard work on the questions we have identified.

Michael Edwards proposed that we organise a BISS meeting in 1995 in such a way that we attract new people. On the first day there could be introductions to the literature and to current debates so that a survey can be provided for people who are not necessarily familiar with all of the discussions. This would be a way of helping new participants into the debates.

Jörn Janssen argued against the need to work in this way. He felt that people who want to come are already prepared. The problem of the so called "missing" people was a problem of organisation and the establishment of a clear theme at the BISS meetings.

The remainder of the afternoon session was taken up to a short exchange amongst a number of people about the problems of who we are trying to attract to BISS, the clarity of debates and their organisation and some very brief, but not very concrete suggestions about what to do at the meetings in 1994 and 1995.

The following note was tabled

Some replies to some objections bv Jörn Janssen

Martin Schwartz

1) In Hegel's time, capitalism was not yet developed. But

a) Hegel gave in 1804 a complete theory of capitalism, considering in addition that

b) capitalism would develop into a prevailing economic stnucture. [Viz. *Jenae Realphilosophie*]

2) In Hegel. the process of knowledge is a social process (See phenomenology of the mind. "Entfremdung" and "Bildung"). (See also the great logic.) But only the state can provide the

individual with the "Bildung", education, which allows access to the Weltgeist.

3) Why the discussion about the Hegelian rational state? Because the Thatcherist or monetarist ideology is the extreme enterprise of the symmetrical and dialectical contrary to the Hegelian rational state.

4) Agreed with JJ regarding Aglietta. But A and his regulation school

a) made an accurate merger between the Hegelian rational state and the social-democratic state

b) gave some useful insights into the phenomenon of the deconstnuction of the state as a response of capitalism towards a new situation.

5) The reference to Weber was made just in order to mention that I would not refer to Weber – too discursive, too flat. etc – but providing millions of useful details.

Regarding the social process. At one extreme. you have positivism looking at phenomena which appear repeatedly and hence are treated like laws. For instance the "invisible hand". This ca be useful in order to discover hidden social relations; otherwise misleading. At the other extreme, there is german historicism (Roscher. Treitschke. Ranke. etc.) denying the possibility of human knowing the social laws and the underlying structures (all roughly speaking). But, there is no reliable method of determining where a recurrent appareance can be considered as a social structure and where not. We should just be, as Hegel was, intelligent – for example with the use of marxian categories. which are still workable (why wouldn't they be?); not necessarily true (categories are never true) but workable.

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